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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The summer of 1944 marked a significant turning point in the 
war against Nazi Germany. It was pushed back closer to its borders 
on the Eastern and Western Fronts. The Anglo-American forces had 
landed in France and the Soviets had entered Poland. The Red Army 
had overrun Rumania causing it to switch sides against Nazi 
Germany by the end of August and Finland was seeking an armistice 
with the Soviet Union. These dramatic events of the summer of 
1944 were significant to the defeat of Nazi Germany. 
Anglo-American and Soviet operations during the summer of 
1944 can be compared to examine the significance of contributions 
on the Eastern and Western Fronts to the defeat of Nazi Germany in 
a period of time when both allies were conducting extensive 
operations. A careful analysis of the contributions made by both 
the Soviet and Anglo-American allies during the summer of 1944 
produces a more balanced view of this period. The Anglo-American 
allies played the dominant role in the air war against Germany 
while the Soviet Union was dominant in the ground war. Neither 
side can claim with any veracity to have been able to defeat Nazi 
Germany alone. The massive defeats suffered on the Eastern and 
2 
Western Fronts by the German Army in 1944 were based upon the 
joint contributions made by the Soviet Union and the Anglo-
American allies combined with the mistakes made by Hitler and the 
German High Command. The factors analyzed in this study will 
hopefully provide sufficient basis to assess the relative 
contributions to the defeat of Nazi Germany by the Soviet Union and 
Western allies. 
This study will use quantitative data to determine the 
significance of each factor in the collapse of the the German Army 
in the East. Actual military events will be analyzed day by day 
summarizing the significant events on each army front using the 
same techniques employed by U.S. military Sigint traffic analysis. 
The operational and tactical level of military operations will be 
presented to delineate how the German Army was defeated in the 
field. The purpose of this study is to present each significant 
factor as a case study in the analysis of the collapse of the German 
Army in the East in the summer of 1944. The day by day analysis of 
operational and tactical military actions will delineate the 
combination of decisions and actions which lead to military 
disasters which could have possibly been avoided. This study will 
prove useful as a case study of a numerically inferior army on the 
defense against the Red Army which would have been similiar to 
the conditions which existed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
armies prior to German unification. 
This work is directed toward professionals familiar with 
detailed military analysis such as military historians, military 
professionals, military analysts and intelligence analysts. This 
work is not intended for the general reader because of the 
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extensive in depth detail employed to analyze the factors behind 
the collapse of the German Army in the East during the summer of 
1944. The actual day by day summaries of operations on the 
Eastern Front are highly detailed and directed toward professionals 
accustomed to the use of extensive in depth military detail. 
German writers have presented narrative accounts of the 
German defeats in the East during the summer of 1944.1 However, 
this study is unique from other studies done in German with the 
detailed major differences being the examination of the following 
factors: military intelligence, defensive doctrine, air superiority, 
Lend-lease, mobile reserves and the impact of Soviet strategy and 
tactics. Furthermore, this study is unique by examining the day by 
day details of the three major events on the Eastern front during 
the summer of 1944: (1) the collapse of Army Group Center; (2) the 
destruction of the XIII Army Corps in Army Group North Ukraine; and 
(3) the collapse of Army Group South Ukraine. 
The failure of German military intelligence to determine the 
main direction of the Soviet offensive during the summer of 1944 
had disastrous results. The Germans had limited mobile and 
infantry reserves to meet the Soviet summer offensive. It was, 
therefore, imperative for the Germans to deploy their reserves in 
the area where they would be available to meet the main Soviet 
offensive thrust. The placement of the scarce Panzer divisions to 
act as mobile reserves to prevent encirclement of German infantry 
was crucial to the survival of the Wehrmacht in the East. 
The following German Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions 
were available on the Eastern Front to act as mobile reserves on 
June 15, 1944: 1st Panzer Division, 3rd Panzer Division, 3rd SS 
Panzer Division "Totenkopf," 4th Panzer Division, 5th Panzer 
Division 7th Panzer Division, 8th Panzer Division, 10th Panzer 
Grenadier Division, 12th Panzer Division, 13th Panzer Division, 
14th Panzer Division, 16th Panzer Division, 17th Panzer Division, 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division, 20th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer 
Grenadier Division, 23rd Panzer Division, 24th Panzer Division, 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division, 60th Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle, '! 11th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Nordland" and 
Panzer Division "Grossdeutschland." 
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If the Germans could have deployed these reserves correctly 
then they could have prevented the destruction of Army Group 
Center which would have then prevented the draining of reserves 
from Army Groups North, North Ukraine and South Ukraine which 
then weakened their defensive capabilities against subsequent 
Soviet offensives launched against them. Army Group Center 
constituted a dike against the onrushing torrent of the Red Army 
and once it was breached the entire Eastern Front gave way and the 
front was only stabilized once the Red Army entered Eastern 
Europe. 
Foreign Armies East made inaccurate predictions about the 
main thrust of Soviet offensive operations for the summer of 1944. 
Foreign Armies East continued to predict that the Soviet main 
effort would be against Army Group North Ukraine. Foreign Armies 
East continued to hold this position despite increasing evidence 
that offensive operations were imminent against Army Group 
Center. German intelligence failed to identify the movement of 
Soviet tank armies opposite Army Group Center. Soviet radio 
silence and deception measures contributed to German confusion 
which prevented accurate intelligence assessments. Soviet air 
superiority also prevented adequate German aerial reconnaissance 
which deprived the Germans of a significant source of information. 
Therefore, the failure of intelligence was to play a central role in 
the collapse of the German Army in the East during the summer of 
1944. 
Hitler's defensive doctrine of "standing fast" completely 
handicapped the German Army on the defense. Hitler forbid the 
German Army from using a flexible defense which would have 
permitted the use of gradual withdrawal and counterattack to 
absorb Soviet attacks. Hitler instead insisted that each German 
defensive line be held to the very end before permitting any 
withdrawals. This resulted in Soviet breakthroughs and · 
penetration of German flanks and subsequent Soviet encirclements 
of German units. Entire German Armies and Corps would then be 
forced to fight for their survival in breaking out to the rear and in 
the process loosing the bulk of their heavy weapons. The German 
Army as a result often was forced to destroy their own equipment 
during breakouts from encirclements to prevent it from being 
captured by the Red Army. 
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Hitler's Wavebreak Doctrine dictated that the army must 
make an "inflexible stand" and defensive lines in depth in the rear 
were not to be employed since Hitler believed that soldiers would 
not "standfast" if they could retreat to prepared defensive 
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positions in the rear. Hitler established by decree numerous 
fortresses on the Eastern Front which were to be defended like 
medieval fortresses in earlier centuries. However, this notion was 
clearly anachronistic given the mobility and firepower of the Red 
Army. The tying down of German forces defending fortresses 
merely deprived local commanders of flexibility in deploying 
reserves to deal with Soviet attacks. 
Hitler's failure to allow Field Marshal Busch, Commander of 
Army Group Center, to execute an elastic defense based on 
withdrawal behind the Dnieper and Berezina rivers resulted in the 
destruction of Army Group Center. The shortening of the front by 
160 Kilometers by withdrawal to the Berezina river would have 
created reserves and better defensive conditions to meet the 
Soviet summer offensive. However, Hitler absolutely forbid this 
withdrawal and forced Army Group Center to conduct a defense on a 
vastly overextended front which resulted in enormous material and 
personnel losses. 
The loss of air superiority by the Luftwaffe to the Soviet Air 
Force was critical to the collapse of the German Army in the East. 
The Luftwaffe from the beginning of the Russian campaign was 
already overextended by fighting on several fronts. This situation 
only became worse as the summer of 1944 approached. The loss of 
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air power because of dispersion to several theaters prevented the 
concentration of strength in the East to wage strategic warfare. 
The failure to wage strategic warfare from the air against the 
Soviet sources of armaments allowed the Soviet production of 
tanks, aircraft and artillery to continue without interference. 
Thus, the Luftwaffe was forced to destroy Soviet military 
equipment in the field instead of in the factories. The end result 
was the Luftwaffe was increasingly forced into a defensive role on 
the Eastern Front. The Soviet Air Force attained numerical 
superiority over the Luftwaffe by the end of 1943 and this had an 
enormous impact on German ground forces which were mostly on 
the defensive on the ground. Previously, the Germans had enjoyed 
air superiority or at least air equality but by 1944 the Luftwaffe 
had fallen into a numerically inferior position compared to the 
Soviet Air Force. The Soviets had more than a 7:1 advantage in 
aircraft by the summer of 1944. The Soviet advantage was due 
mostly to the fact that 56% of the Luftwaffe was engaged in the 
West against the Anglo-American allies. Thus, German soldiers 
were forced to defend themselves against attacks from the air and 
on the ground. The Soviet use of airpower in support of its army 
proved effective with the Germans suffering heavy losses as a 
result of continuous air attacks. 
Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union played a key role in the 
defeat of the German Army in the East during the summer of 1944. 
The U.S.S.R. had received more than 6 million pairs of boots by the 
summer of 1944 which put the Red Army in marching boots. Lend-
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Lease food was of significant aid to the Red Army since it provided 
one pound of concentrated ration per day for 6 million soldiers for 
the length of the entire war. Lend-Lease motor vehicles provided 
perhaps the rriost significant aid to the Red Army by motorizing it. 
The intensiy~ motorization of the Red Army with approximately 
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500,000 tend-Lease trucks provided the Red Army with superior 
mobility compared to the Wehrmacht. Superior mobility enabled 
the Red Army to outmaneuver the German Army and drive deep into 
the rear areas causing encirclements and major disruptions which 
resulted in a series of German defeats. 
Lend-Lease truck shipments not only provided the Red Army 
with the necessary mobility to outflank non-motorized German 
formations but also allowed the Soviets to de-emphasize vehicle 
production. The Soviets were able to concentrate on tank and 
aircraft production since the United States provided the bulk of the 
Red Army's trucks, jeeps and motorcycles thru Lend-Lease aid. The 
concentration on tank production permitted huge numbers of tanks 
to be produced which dwarfed German tank production. Soviet 
production of tanks and self-propelled guns amounted to 112,952 
compared to the German production of 46,742 vehicles. Thus, Lend-
Lease aid proved significant to the defeat of the German Army in 
the East during the summer of 1944. 
The second front played a crucial role in tying down German 
mobile reserves thereby depriving the Wehrmacht of significant 
mobile formations to meet the Soviet summer offensive in the East. 
The Wehrmacht deployed 51% of its mobile formations and 42°/o of 
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its non-mobile formations in the West. Germany's two-front war 
by the summer of 1944 was depriving the Wehrmacht of necessary 
forces to concentrate in the East to meet the advances of the Red 
Army. The Eastern Front was deprived of sufficient mobile 
reserves as a result of the Anglo-American second front. This 
created a situation where the Wehrmacht could not achieve a 
stalemate on the Eastern Front because it had been weakened to 
meet the Anglo-American second front. The mobile reserves 
constituted elite German formations which would have been highly 
effective if used against Soviet breakthroughs on the Eastern Front 
during the summer of 1944. However, half of these reserves were 
tied down in the West to meet the Anglo-American second front. 
The German Army in the East had managed to maintain most 
of its defensive positions on the Belorussian sector during the 
winter of 1944. The German defensive success had been achieved 
by the use of mobile reserves and the shifting of troops in the lines 
along lateral roads and raiJways to prevent Soviet breakthroughs. 
German commanders also managed to coordinate their artillery and 
concentrate it against Soviet attacks. Soviet attacks at a 
superiority of 10: 1 were common and failed against German 
defensive positions. Soviet tactical errors on the Belorussian front 
included failure to make diversionary attacks against extended 
sectors of the front; attacks renewed at identical sectors of 
previous attacks; and a failure to coordinate their artillery in the 
breakthrough sectors. 
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Soviet operational planning for the summer offensive of 1944 
corrected the deficiencies noted in the winter offensives against 
the Belorussian front during the winter of 1944. Soviet planning 
called for six separate breakthrough areas to dismember the 
German defenses along the entire length of Army Group Center. The 
breakthrough areas on each of the four Soviet fronts were 
compressed so that the average total divisional frontage was 5.8 
kilometers compared to 24 to 32 kilometers for the German 
divisions. However, the frontage on the breakthrough sectors was 
compressed further to 1.5 kilometers per division to achieve not 
just overwhelming numerical superiority over the Germans but 
bring a level of mass to bear against German defensive positions 
which would cause them to disintegrate under the weight of the 
attack. The depth of the operation was extended for an advance of 
550 to 600 kilometers and the total number of divisions was 
increased to 166 divisions. A total of 11 armies were deployed 
against Army Group Center and two combined armies were assigned 
to make each penetration. The four fronts deployed to attack Army 
Group Center were reinforced with approximately 30 additional 
divisions prior to the start of the summer offfensive. Soviet 
numerical superiority was overwhelming with 166 divisions 
attacking approximately 49 German divisions. Soviet superiority 
was definitive in every category. The Soviets possessed the 
following margins of superiority: 1.7:1 in troops; 1.8:1 in artillery 
and mortars; 1.6:1 in tanks and assault guns and 4.9:1 in operational 
aircraft. Thus, Soviet operational planning established a plan with 
1 1 
the key elements necessary to dismember Army Group Center as the 
first step in its offensive operations for the summer of 1944. 
The collapse of Army Group Center was the most significant 
event of the summer of 1944. It marked the turning point on the 
Eastern Front during the summer of 1944. Army Group Center was 
the bulwark of the Eastern Front and once it was smashed the 
entire Eastern Front collapsed. Army Group Center consisted of the 
following: 3rd Panzer Army, 4th Army and 9th Army. 
The Soviet offensive on June 22, 1944 began first in the north 
against the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army. The 3rd Panzer Army's 
sector was critically overextended in the LI 11 Army Corps sector 
which constituted the Vitebsk enclave. The Liii Army Corps was 
completely encircled on June 24, 1944 within the Vitebsk sector 
and it capitulated on June 27, 1944. The IX Army Corps of the 3rd 
Panzer Army was battered and pushed back in the direction of Army 
Group North. The VI Army Corps was pushed to the south in the 
process of the Soviet encirclement of the Liii Army Corps. On June 
25, 1944, the VI Army Corps was removed from command of the 3rd 
Panzer Army. 
The 4th Army came under attack on June 22, 1944. The 4th 
Army had the strongest forces deployed to defend its sector of the 
front. The 4th Army retreated slowly under Soviet attack and was 
not completely encircled until July 1, 1944. 
The 9th Army was attacked on June 23, 1944 which was one 
day after the major assaults against 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th 
Army. However, the main weight of the Soviet attack did not hit 
the 9th Army until June 24, 1944. The encirclement of the 9th 
Army and Bobruisk was completed on the night of June 26-27, 
1944. 
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Thus, Army Group Center disintegrated under a series of 
Soviet encirclements which dismembered the Army Group and 
resulted in the loss of Belorussia and the annihilation of 28 German 
divisions in less than two weeks. The resulting losses had to be 
replaced primarily by weakening the other Army Groups on the 
Eastern Front: Army Group North, Army Group North Ukraine and 
Army Group South Ukraine. The weakening of these Army Groups 
was followed by a Soviet offensive against each Army Group in turn 
which brought about the collapse of the Eastern Front. 
The Soviets launched the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive with the 
1st Ukrainian Front against Army Group North Ukraine on July 13, 
1944. Soviet goals in this operation were to clear the Ukraine and 
occupy southern Poland. The Soviets had massed sufficient 
numerical superiority to achieve their objectives. The Germans 
attempted to respond to the Soviet use of mass by tactical 
flexibility in meeting the weight of the Soviet attack. However, 
the Soviet use of mass on narrow sectors was consistently 
successful and the Soviets drove into the 4th Panzer Army and the 
1st Panzer Army on the flanks of the XIII Army Corps. The XIII 
Army Corps began to disengage during the night of July 16-17, 
1944 because of the deteriorating situation along its flanks. 
However, the XIII Army Corps withdrawal movement was too slow 
and the Corps was completely encircled on July 18, 1944. On July 
1 3 
20, 1944, 85,000 men were compressed into a pocket west of 
Brody. The XI 11 Army Corps ceased to exist as an effective combat 
formation on July 22, 1944 under the tightening ring of Soviet 
encirclement. There were only a few units of the XII I Army Corps 
which managed to escape the Brody pocket. German losses 
amounted to five divisions and approximately 25,000 to 30,000 
soldiers. The losses experienced by Army Group North Ukraine were 
mostly replaced by transfers from Army Group South Ukraine which 
weakened this Army Group further. 
The final chapter in the collapse of the German Army in the 
East during the summer of 1944 was the destruction of Army Group 
South Ukraine. The Soviet methods employed against Army Group 
Center and Army Group North Ukraine were essentially the same 
methods used against Army Group South Ukraine with equally 
devastating effects on German defensive positions. Army Group 
South Ukraine had served as the reserve pool for the other Army 
Groups throughout the summer by continuous transfers of divisions 
to Army Group Center and Army Group North Ukraine to replace 
their losses. Consequently, Army Group South Ukraine was depleted 
of reserves and substantially weakened prior to the Soviet 
offensive against it on August 20, 1944. 
German intelligence failed to provide concrete direction 
about Soviet intentions toward Army Group South Ukraine. First, 
Foreign Armies East indicated that an offensive was unlikely as of 
July 30, 1944. Later, Soviet activity was recognized on the 
Rumanian Front stretching from Tiraspol to the Carpathians. 
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Nevertheless, Foreign Armies East despite significant increases in 
Soviet activity maintained the view that a major offensive against 
Army Group South Ukraine was unlikely as late as August 15, 1944. 
However, local attacks were forcast with the intention to prevent 
the further transfer of German divisions to the central front. It 
was not until August 19, 1944 which was the day preceeding the 
main offensive that intelligence estimates of Soviet intentions 
underwent a major revision, but too late to help Army Group South 
Ukraine. 
The issue of Rumanian reliability was questioned by Colonel 
General Schomer, Commander of Army Group South Ukraine, with 
the result that he was transferred on July 23, 1944 to command 
Army Group North. Meanwhile, optimistic reports were filtering 
through OKW overestimating Rumanian reliability. The loyalty of 
the Rumanian people and the Rumanian Army was confused with the 
loyalty of Marshal Antonescu. Defensive plans were based upon the 
reasonable expectations of Rumanian reliability. Therefore, a 
withdrawal to more secure defensive positions on the Pruth river 
was not permitted. 
The Soviets launched the Jassy-Kishinev Operation on August 
20, 1944. The two main attacks were launched against the area 
south of Tiraspol and northwest of Jassy. Deep breakthroughs 
occurred on the Rumanian held sectors. Soviet forces drove deep 
into the German rear area surrounding the German 6th Army and 
other elements of Army Group South Ukraine. Marshal Antonescu 
was arrested on August 23, 1944 and King Michael announced on 
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state radio that Rumania would seek an armistice. The Rumanians 
leaving the war created large holes in the defensive line and the 
German position in Rumania turned into a catastrophe. However, 
the situation even became worse with the German decision to 
attack Bucharest on August 24, 1944 in an attempt to crush the 
Rumanian putsch. The Germans failed to crush the revolt against 
Antonescu in Bucharest by not deploying sufficient forces for this 
task and this resulted in the new Rumanian government declaring 
war on Germany and bringing the Rumanian Army into the war on 
the Soviet side. The end result for Army Group South Ukraine was 
the destruction of 5 army corps headquarters, 18 divisions and the 
almost total loss of 3 other divisions. 
Finally, the significance of the German defeats in the East 
during the summer of 1944 can be demonstrated quantitatively. 
German losses in troops, armored vehicles, non-armored vehicles, 
generals and divisions exceeded the losses in the West. German 
armored vehicle and non-armored vehicle shipments were far 
greater to the East to replace its greater losses than to the West. 
The only area where German losses were higher on the Anglo-
American Fronts was in aircraft losses. The Luftwaffe received 
75% of its losses in the West compared to 25% in the East. 
Nevertheless, the German Army received the bulk of its losses 
during the summer of 1944 in the East which made the Eastern 
Front the predominant front even after the allied landing in France 
on June 6, 1944. 
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Therefore, the analysis of data from the summer of 1944 will 
show that the collapse of the German Army in the East was the 
most decisive military event during the summer of 1944 based 
upon the military losses suffered by the German Army and was the 
result of the following factors: German Intelligence failures; 
German defensive doctrine; loss of German air superiority; Lend-
lease aid to the Soviet Union; German mobile reserves committed in 
the West; Soviet numerical superiority; and Soviet offensive 
doctrine and tactics. 
The collapse of Army Group Center, the destruction of the XIII 
Army Corps in Army Group North Ukraine and the destruction of 
Army Group South Ukraine will be examined in detail day by day in 
order to delineate the significant details of the collapse of the 
German Army in the East during the summer of 1944. These three 
events constitute the decisive defeats which resulted in the 
retreat of the German Army from the Soviet Union in the summer of 
1944 and the subsequent advance of the Red Army into Eastern 
Europe. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FAILURE OF GERMAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 
TO PREDICT THE SCHWERPUNKT OF THE SOVIET 
SUMMER OFFENSIVE IN 1944 
The failure to predict the Soviet summer offensive in 1944 
was not the fault of Adolf Hitler but a failure of German military 
intelligence. Foreign Armies East under Colonel Reinhard Gehlen 
was responsible for intelligence estimates of Soviet military 
intentions, operations and capabilities. Gehlen was appointed head 
of Foreign Armies East (Fremde Heere Ost) on April 1, 1942. He 
introduced reforms which produced a new organization which 
provided a rapid flow of intelligence data from the front to his 
department. Gehlen established two parallel channels of 
intelligence. The first channel followed the military chain of le or 
intelligence officers at each command level and the second channel 
consisted of the Abwehr chain with crossovers at each level .1 
The overall intelligence network on the Eastern Front (see 
Figure 1) produced accurate predictions that had increased the 
operational and defensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht in 
countering and defeating the Red Army in the past. The defense of 
Osuga in the Ninth Army sector of Army Group Center in November 
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of 1942 delineated how successful operational military 
intelligence can be in contributing to defensive victories.2 In the 
summer of 1944, the German Army needed a clear answer to these 
questions: Where and when would the main offensive occur and how 
many forces would be involved? The answers to these questions 
were critical to its survival in the East. 
The lack of reserves ruled out the development of more than 
one center of defensive resistance which meant the Germans had 
only reserves to counter one main Soviet effort. However, the 
Soviets had learned how to confuse German intelligence by 1944 
and Foreign Armies East made predictions about the major Soviet 
offensive in the summer of 1944 that proved to be false. The 
results of these inaccurate predictions caused a disaster of 
unprecedented scale: the destruction of Army Group Center. 
FOREIGN ARMIES EAST AND OBERKOMMANOO DES HEERES 
On March 30, 1944, Gehlen's intelligence summary predicted 
further Soviet offensive operations against Army Group A which 
was designated Army Group North Ukraine on April 5, 1944. Gehlen 
stated: 
The present situation on the eastern front is 
overshadowed by the anticipated general enemy 
offensive against our Army Groups A and South. 
As it proceeds, a more menacing situation than 
ever before has emerged on the eastern front, 
and in the not too distant future this may result 
in far-reaching political, military and economic 
repercussions on the rest of the war in Europe.3 
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Colonel Gehlen was accurate in his assessment on March 30, 1944 
that there would be a longer operations pause before the next 
operations commenced.4 However, his prediction that the enemy 
had been recognized to favor the operation of an effective thrust 
against the San and Weichsel rivers and also against Rumania with 
the bulk of his forces proved to be incorrect in the short range 
assessment (see Figure 2) but accurate in the long range view of 
the strategic situation on the eastern front. s 
On April 19, 1944, Gehlen postulated the next Soviet 
objective based on the disposition of Russian forces to be the line 
Stanislau - Przemysl - Lubin - Brest.6 He predicted that the enemy 
upon reaching this line would advance in a southwestern direction 
through Slovakia into the Balkan area or drive in a northwestern 
thrust toward Warsaw and Danzig.7 Foreign Armies East (Fremde 
Heare Ost, FHO) issued a "Beurteilung der Feindlage" (enemy 
situation assessment) on May 3, 1944 which confirmed Gehlen's 
view of the situation on April 19, 1944. FHO forcasted two 
possible Soviet offensives. One possible offensive was predicted 
to cross the line Kovel-Lutsk advancing through Warsaw to the 
Baltic coast thereby cutting off Army Groups North and Center. The 
other offensive forecasted was a possible thrust through Rumania, 
Hungary and Slovakia into the Balkans (see Figure 3 & 4).a FHO 
noted that the northwestern offensive toward the Baltic coast 
would require a high level of tactical efficency. Therefore, FHO 
concluded that the most probable main effort by the Red Army 
would be directed toward the south where the weak axis allies 
could be exploited and Soviet hegemony over the Balkans be 
established.9 
21 
Gehlen confided to his deputy Gerhard Wessel that the Soviet 
High Command would most likely choose the lower risk offensive 
based on their past behavior when confronted with such options. 
Gehlen concluded that the Soviets would attempt to cross the 
Beskiden moutain range or the Carpathians and in conjunction or as 
an alternative advance between the eastern border of the 
Carpathians and the Black Sea coast in the direction of the Balkans 
and the Mediterranean.10 The attack through Warsaw to the Baltic 
coast was seen as a decisive operation that would if successful 
have major consequences on the war in the east. However, such an 
operation would encounter fierce resistance in the territory of the 
Reich. Therefore, Gehlen concluded that the Soviet main effort 
would be in the south (see Figures 3 & 4). 
On May 10, 1944, FHO revised their estimate of enemy 
offensive preparations. Heavy rail traffic and signs of a buildup 
were observed in the Kovel-Ternopol area 11 Foreign Armies East 
noted in their intelligence bulletin: 
The limitation of radio transmissions that occurred on 
9 May on an unprecedented scale over the entire 
Eastern Front, as we know from experience, could 
indicate that preparations for the enemy offensive may 
be nearing completion. That is why it is possible to 
consider the possibility that the enemy will initiate his 
offensive in the known regions within the nearest 
future. This is most likly to occur in the area of the 
Army Group North Ukraine and along the right flank of 
the Army Group Center.12 
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FHO on May 12, 1944 was now predicting two offensives according 
to the Kriegstagebuch (war diary) of the operations officer of Army 
Group Center. The main effort was still to be in the south between 
the Carpathians and the Black Sea, but another offensive force was 
assembled between the Carpathians and the Pripyat marshes to 
attack on the axis Lvov, Lublin and Brest.13 (see Figures 3 & 4) 
Chief of Staff at OKH, Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler 
recommended the buildup of reserves in Army Group North Ukraine 
to meet the anticipated offensive projected by FHO. These forces 
were taken from Army Groups North and Center to develop an 
Abwehrschwerpunkt. The OKH Kriegsgliederung of June 15, 1944 
showed the following Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions in 










20th Panzer Division 
9th SS Panzer Division, 10th SS 
Panzer Division, 16th Panzer Division 
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division 
1st Panzer Division, 7th Panzer 
Division, 8th Panzer Division 
17th Panzer Division, 20th Panzer 
Grenadier Division 
4th Panzer Division, 5th Panzer 
Division.14 
The 9th SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were transferred to the 
Western Front in the middle of June but still appear on the OKH 
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Kriegsgliederung as of June 15th. However, both divisions received 
orders to leave the Eastern Front on June 12th and the 9th SS 
Panzer Division reached the Franco-German border on June 16th.15 
The 20 Panzer Division was also later transferred to the 9th Army 
in Army Group Center on June 16th because of enemy 
concentrations in the Ninth Army sector. Nevertheless, the bulk of 
the Panzer and Panzer Grenadier Divisions on the Eastern Front 
remained in Army Group North Ukraine. 
Army Group Center, the bulwark of the Eastern Front, had 
insignificant mobile force by contrast to Army Group North Ukraine. 
The OKH Kriegsgliederung of June 15, 1944 delineated the following 







Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle" 
No mobile reserves 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division, 25th 
Panzer Grenadier Division 
No mobile reserves 
No mobile reseves.16 
The situation only improved on June 16th when the 20 Panzer 
Division was transferred to the 9th Army. 17 
This shifting of mobile reserves on the Eastern Front was 
based on the intelligence estimates that developed during May and 
June. Zeitzler suggested shifting the LVI Panzer Corps from 2nd 
Army in Army Group Center to Army Group North Ukraine on May 
10th and this suggestion was followed by a formal request by Field 
Marshal Model for the transfer of the L VI Panzer Corps to his army 
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group. On May 20th Hitler approved Model's request and the L VI 
Panzer Corps was transferred to Army Group North Ukraine which 
stripped Army Group Center of its panzer reserves.1s The 4th and 
5th Panzer Divisions were lost with the transfer of the L VI Panzer 
Corps and the 20 Panzer Division was also transferred separately 
to Army Group North Ukraine.19 Army Group Center was left with 
only three Panzer Grenadier Divisions until June 16th when the 
20th Panzer division was returned. This lack of mobile reserves 
was to be significant to the defeat of Army Group Center. Faulty 
intelligence was to play a major role in the placement of the 
critical Panzer reserves in the wrong sector of the Eastern Front to 
meet the Soviet summer offensive. 
On May 21, 1944, German Intelligence Bulletin No. 1 
stated: 
The continuing animated rail traffic along sectors 
occupied by both army groups, along with partially 
known transportation of tanks by rail, makes possible a 
conclusion concerning the continuation of major enemy 
measures aimed at the reinforcement of the troops and 
the shipment of material. According to the enemy's 
current position it is possible to establish that the 
enemy is very thoroughly preparing for his future 
operations, the main goal of which still consists of the 
"Balkan resolution".20 
The 9th Army in Army Group Center began to report an enemy 
buildup north of Rogatchev on May 30th.21 Despite 9th Army 
reports, the German Intelligence Bulletin of May 30, 1944 noted: 
Aerial reconnaissance data at the present moment 
indicate very heavy railway traffic around Kiev, 
Dnepropetrovsk, Rovno, and Ternopol, which confirm the 
opinion concerning the movement of Crimean 
soyedineniya to the front. The movement is primarily 
toward the vicinity of Balta, Ternopol, Rovno, and 
Koval, as a result of which the assumption to the 
effect that these forces are being increasingly 
confirmed.22 
Both Keitel and Jodi were convinced that the attack would 
come in the south. Keitel in May 1944 stated: 
The situation has stabilized on the Eastern Front. We 
can feel confident that the Russians will not be able to 
launch an assault for some time. Proceeding from data 
pertaining to the regrouping of enemy forces and the 
overall military and political situation, it is necessary 
to consider that the Russians probably will concentrate 
their main forces in the southern sector of the front. 
They are presently incapable of fighting along several 
main directions.23 
The Chief of Operations of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 
(OKW), General Jodi, declared at the Nuremburg trial: 
that the Russian attack would take place in the 
southern sector, in the direction of Rumanian 
petroleum, which is why most of the tank divisions 
were concentrated by us in the vicinty of the southern 
army groups.24 
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The situation began to change in June and signs of an attack 
on Army Group Center began to emerge. On June 3, 1944, FHO 
discounted the activity opposite Army Group Center as "apparently 
a deception."25 The enemy situation report of June 4, 1944 
indicated that "at any time the enemy could strengthen his local 
concentrations on the eastern front by switching his very 
considerable reserves. "26 OKH finally began to acknowledge some 
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form of offensive operations directed at Army Group Center in the 
Intelligence Summary of June 10, 1944: 
Even if there is no reason to change the opinion that the 
attacks to be expected on Army Group Center will only 
be secondary operations in the framework of the Red 
Army's major offensive as a whole, account must be 
taken of the concentrations which are still continuing 
opposite Army Group Center. These place the enemy in 
a position to develop centers of effort with a 
penetrative power which, given the relative strenghts 
of the two sides, must not be underestimated.27 
Despite the radio silence that descended along the Russian 
side of the front, German Signal Intelligence was still able to 
intercept critical information. Captain Krickendt sent a report to 
OKW on June 12, 1944 concerning a radio intercept about a large 
sabotage mission from the 3rd Belorussian Front to the "Grischin" 
Partisan Regiment: 
The enemy has used the lull on the Soviet-German front 
to increase the redeployment of troops and technical 
material over the railroads. With the objective of 
disruption of the enemy's transfers of troops, I order 
all the forces of your units to conduct mass destruction 
of railroad tracks in the rail war(Schienenkrieg) and in 
the Orsha Borisov railroad sector detonate 1000 
sections of track. You are to start immediately with 
the execution of this operation and keep the 
demolitions secret. The first attack is to be conducted 
with continuous blows to achieve a total neutralization 
of the enemy's troop redeployments. Further orders 
will not be given. Proceed independently as 
heretofore.2s 
This information indicated a positive sign of an impending 
offensive on Army Group Center. The Soviet High Command, Stavka 
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had given the same all-out rail war order to partisans on July 14, 
1943 to commence operations on July 20-21 , 1943 to coincide with 
the offensive against Orel and Briansk.29 Therefore, intelligence 
alarms should have jolted the FHO and the OKH to an immediate 
reassessment of Soviet offensive intentions. Furthermore, Signal 
Intelligence detected the presence of new armies; aerial 
reconniassance units noted strong new artillery units along the 
entire front of Army Group Center; and prisoners reported the 
appearance of assault formations in the rear of the enemy front.30 
The situation assessment by FHO on June 13, 1944 indicated 
more than one ·offensive developing on the Eastern Front. However, 
the Schwerpunkt that was seen as immediately forthcoming was 
once again expected by the FHO in the area between Kowel and the 
Carpathians, (see Figures 5 & 6) but the FHO also predicted with 
certainty diversionary attacks on Army Group Center or on the 
Rumanian northern border.31 A larger attack against Army Group 
Center was considered conceivable. An offensive from the Gomel-
Smolensk area with the objective of Minsk was possible. In fact, 
several reports indicated just such an enemy intention. FHO 
predicted that· if the enemy should actually conquer the area 
Mogilev-Orsha-Vitebsk that more than enough forces would remain 
available to conduct a further advance toward Minsk.32 Therefore, 
nine days before the Soviet offensive the intelligence assessment 
that the Schwerpunkt of operations would be against Army Group 
North Ukraine appear highly questionable. 
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Gehlen claims in his memoirs that by early June "all the 
indications were that they planned a major offensive against Army 
Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Busch, which was 
defending Poland and East Prussia."33 However, the FHO reports 
during June prior to the offensive continued to predict the main 
offensive to be against Army Group North Ukraine with a secondary 
offensive against Army Group South Ukraine (See Figures 5 & 6). 
Attacks against Army Army Group Center still were viewed as 
secondary or feints to confuse the Germans as to real direction of 
the major attack. Gehlen on June 13, 1944 recognized the 
increased Soviet strength opposite Army Group Center: 
Particular attention should be paid to the areas 
southeast and east of Bobruisk, on both sides of 
Chausey, along the highway northeast of Orsha, and on 
both sides of Vitebsk. 34 
Neverthless, Gehlen' s FHO ignored these positive signs of an 
offensive and treated them as only secondary to the expected 
Schwerpuhkt against Army Group North Ukraine.35 
Gehlen neglected to mention in his memoirs the error of 
predicting the main Soviet offensive against Army Group North 
Ukraine instead of Army Group Center. He merely defends his 
assessment that the operation was to take place in phases: 
As I had predicted on June 13, a second phase of the 
Soviet offensive began a few days after the first, with 
a general attack on Lemberg (Lvov).36 
However, the holding or diversionary attacks that had been 
predicted against Army Group Center were in actuality the 
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet summer offensive and Gehlen and the 
FHO had failed in their prediction of Soviet offensive plans which 
had disastrous effects on the Eastern Front. 
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The uncertainty of FHO intelligence estimates was noted in 
the German Intelligence Bulletin of June 13, 1944 which indicated 
that the German command had as a result of Russian radio silence 
"lost one of the most important and reliable intelligence 
sources. "37 The uncertainty was reflected further in the same 
bulletin which stated: 
After it became almost completely impossible to carry 
out radio reconnaissance difficulties occured in the 
determination of the position occupied by enemy forces. 
At present aerial reconnaissance is rather difficult 
because of the constantly increasing Russian defenses. 
That is why details pertaining to the strategic 
deployment of the enemy, which is nearing completion, 
cannot be determined.38 
Nevertheless, OKH on June 14, 1944, called a conference of 
army group and army chiefs of staff to brief them on the 
forthcoming Soviet offensive operations. Zeitzler and Chief of 
operations of OKH, General Heusinger impressed upon the chiefs of 
staffs that the Soviet offensive would be against Army Group North 
Ukraine and not Army Group Center. The attacks against Army 
Groups Center and South Ukraine were merely preliminary and 
secondary operations. OKH was sure that they would be able to 
handle the Soviet offensive. The expression used was: "zum ersten 
Mal Schwerpunkt gegen Schwerpunkt. "39 Gehlen was also present at 
the conference and warned that "simultaneous attacks on Army 
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Groups Center and South Ukraine could be expected as preliminaries 
to the big offensive against Army Group North Ukraine. "40 
Army Group Center presented clear evidence that strong 
Soviet forces were massing opposite it. No other front including 
Army Group Norh Ukraine could present such infallible indicators of 
offensive preparations on their respective fronts.41 However, Chief 
of Staff of OKH, General Zeitzler informed General Krebs, Chief of 
Staff of Army Group Center, that according to Gehlen the following 
operations were foreseen: 
Phase 1 as a simultaneous attack on Army Groups South 
Ukraine and Centre, followed after a certain interval by 
the main operation--an offensive against Army Group 
North Ukraine.42 
Therefore, despite offensive indicators against Army Group Center; 
OKH, FHO and Hitler were fixated upon the offensive in Galicia. OKH 
did at least recognize the threat to the 9th Army at Bobruisk and 
the 20th Panzer Division was transferred to Army Group Center 
from Army Group North Ukraine. 
Gehlen's assessment of the enemy's intentions had a direct 
impact upon reserve deployment as indicated by the FHO 
memorandum of June 17, 1944: 
In connection with the withdrawal of certain German 
formations from Army Group North Ukraine's area, the 
briefing given to the Chief of staff on 17 June 1944, on 
the instructions of the Head of Branch, was this. By and 
large, the centre of effort of future Soviet offensive 
operations remains directed against Army Group North 
Ukraine. The strong infantry and tank forces 
concentrated here under the command of Marshal Zhukov 
will presumably be required to make the main thrust of 
the enemy operations as a whole, with the inital 
objectives in the Przemysl-Lublin area or thereabouts. 
This view, confirmed by numerous reports from higher 
intelligence agencies (Abwehrmeldungen), remains 
unchanged despite the enemy offensive preparations 
recently observed opposite Army Group Centre ... 43 
Thus, Gehlens analysis and recommendations which provided the 
basis for assumptions about Soviet operations were in error and 
resulted in the deployment of the critical mobile reserves behind 
the wrong sectors of the Eastern Front instead of Army Group 
Center. Therefore, the mobile reserves were not available to 
prevent the catastrophe in Army Group Center. 
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On June 19, 1944, more indications of an attack on Army 
Group Center developed. Marshal Zhukov was confirmed as having 
taken command of the southern part of the enemy front by a 
captured pilot. POW's reported having been indoctrinated about the 
necessity of liberating occupied Belorussia as the first objective 
of the forthcoming offensive.44 Fremde Luftwaffe Ost (Foreign Air 
Forces East) sent a report to OKW giving the statement of 1st 
Lieutenant Kusmenkow of the Moscow Guard Fighter Regiment of 
the 3rd Air Army.45 Kusmenkow revealed that all preparations of 
the 3rd Air Army had to be complete by June 20th for the impending 
offensive that would follow within a few days. The first objective 
was Polotsk in an attempt to encircle Vitebsk rather than frontally 
assaulting it. The Air Army was to operate in support of the army 
formations. These details were confirmed by captured written 
orders. Kusmenko reported strong artillery and Panzer forces 
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assembling opposite Polotsk. The 3rd Air Army was reported as 
having to abandon good air bases in the rear to concentrate on less 
favorable forward air bases to achieve the closest possible 
concentration in the area of Polotsk. Polotsk was designated as the 
next objective for massed air attacks by the 3rd Air Army. 
Meanwhile, Field Marshal Keitel of OKW was giving a briefing 
at Sonthofen and announced that he was certain that the Russians 
would not mount a large scale offensive on Army Group Center. He 
believed that an offensive would occur in the south towards Lvov 
and then Rumania. 46 
The night· of June 19, 1944 brought about a new perspective 
at FHO. The partisans in Belorussia during the night had conducted 
the most massive railroad demolition operation recorded to date. 
10,500 demolitions interrupted all railway traffic to the west of. 
Minsk.47 The Germans managed to disarm 3500 explosives on the 
rail lines but the material damage done was so great that rail 
movement was paralyzed for 24 hours and longer in some areas.48 
The operation of double tracks was no longer possible. One track 
had to be disassembled to repair and maintain the second track. 
The demolitions conducted on the night of June 19-20th exceeded 
the total number of demolitions for the entire month of May which 
amounted to 7000.49 
The FHO Intelligence Report of June 20, 1944 stated: 
The question of the center of effort of the offensive 
had to be reviewed in the light of the wave of 
demolitions in Army Group Center's rear during the 
night of 19/20 June, focused as this was on the axial 
rail links through Luninets, Borisov and Motodechno; and 
that there had been several mentions of 22 June as the 
date for it. Preparations for the offensive were 
reported to be complete on 3rd Panzer Army's and the 
German 4th Army's sectors, but still in progress 
opposite the German 9th Army (See Figure 7).50 
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OKH and Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) on June 20th 
noted the concentration of air power along the front. OKL 
calculated 4000 Soviet aircraft concentrated along the central 
front.51 The long-range air forces continued to be deployed in the 
south. OKL asserted that "clearly attacks must be seen as possible 
anywhere but particularly probable in the south." OKH noted the 
strong ground-attack and fighter units in the Gome! area and west 
of Smolensk. Such concentrations indicated that the enemy 
intended to pursue objectives in great depth. These air units were 
intended for close air support of mechanized formations. The 
number of aircraft available permitted the enemy to provide 
massive air support along all primary thrust tines. The air units 
were noted to have completed all preparations as of of June 20, 
1944.52 
On June 21, 1944, OKW, OKH and Army Group Center were 
alerted by Lt. Colonel Scmatschlaeger in the Abwehr that known 
enemy agents and partisans had received orders from the 3rd 
Belorussian Front on June 19th indicating impending offensive 
operations. In addition to destroying rail road tracks along the 
Orsha-Borisov line, they were to "report by radio transport trains, 
military concentrations and possible targets for the Soviet Air 
Force. "53 This indicated the direction of Soviet air operations as 
being behind Orsha, Vitebsk and Mogilev. Previously, Polotsk had 
been identified as a target for massed air attacks. Thus, Army 
Group Center emerged as the primary target of impending Soviet 
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Air offensive operations, but FHO clung to the belief that the major 
offensive would occur in the south. 
FHO issued a report on June 21, 1944 warning of impending 
attack: 
The lively enemy reconnaissance activity and local 
probing attacks, coupled with information from signals 
intelligence, indicated that the enemy facing Army 
Group Center was ready to attack. 54 
However, this attack was still viewed as only preliminary or 
secondary. 
The First Baltic and Third Belorussian Fronts started the 
offensive on June 22, 1944 by attacking northwest and southeast of 
Vitebsk in the sector of 3rd Panzer Army. The German 4th Army 
was also attacked by the Third and Second Belorussian Fronts. 
However, there were no attacks against 9th Army near Bobruisk and 
only three minor probing attacks occurred in the sector of the 2nd 
Army.ss 
On June 23, 1944, OKH still had not determined the 
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet offensive. Soviet Breakthroughs had 
occurred in the 3rd Panzer and 4th Army sectors; 9th Army was 
experiencing battalion and regimental attacks; and 2nd Army 
reported no attacks. ss FHO perceived the shifting attacks as a 
possible deception since Soviet attacks were continuing against 
Army Group North Ukraine. 
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However, On June 24th, the attacks against Army Group North 
Ukraine abated and the question of whether these attacks in 
conjunction with the attacks against Army Group Center were in 
fact feints remained unanswered.57 Army Group Center reported no 
Soviet activity against 2nd Army. But the 3rd Panzer Army, 4th and 
9th Armies reported major Soviet breakthroughs and serious 
problems maintaining their flanks against continuous Soviet 
attacks. Vitebsk was encircled and contained 5 German divisions 
and elsewhere the front was collapsing. Finally, OKH realized too 
late on June 25th that the Soviet offensive against Army Group 
Center was the main offensive. 
One central problem that plagued the Germans prior to the 
offensive was the failure to identify entire Soviet armies. This 
failure caused underestimation of forces on the central sector and 
overestimation of enemy capabilities on the southern sectors. FHO 
had not identified the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Armies on the 
central front. FHO still believed their location was north of Jassey 
opposite Army Group South Ukraine. But the 2nd Tank Army was 
near Smolensk with the 3rd Belorussian Front. 58 FHO had received a 
report from a reliable source that Marshal Rotmistrov, Commander 
of the 5th Guards Tank Army was seen near Yartsevo (northeast of 
Smolensk).59 However, FHO discounted their source since German 
Intelligence had not noted any movements of the 5th Guards Tank 
Army from its area north of Jassey. The problem was that German 
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Intelligence could not ascertain with any accuracy the location of 
Soviet strategic reserves. The 8th Guards Army was located on the 
3rd Ukranian Front east of Tiraspol by German Intelligence, but it 
had actually been transferred to the 1st Belorussian Front. The 2nd 
Guards and 51st Army were supposed to be in the Crimea according 
to German Intelligence. However, the 2nd Guards Army was 
deployed near Smolensk and the 51st Army was near Gomel.60 The 
1st Polish Army went undetected in the area east of Koval. FHO 
continued to delineate all six tank armies in the area between 
Ternopol and the Black Sea.61 
Thus, FHO and OKH made false projections about the 
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet summer offensive based upon their 
assessment of the deployment of the six tank armies. On May 3, 
1944, FHO showed the deployment of the bulk of the Soviet tank 
corps in the first and second Ukranian Fronts (see figure 8). The 
FHO Uebersicht ueber die Komandobehoerden der Roten Armee for 
May 18, 1944 delineated a Soviet order of battle with all six tank 
armies in the south.62 The 3rd Guards Tank Army, 4th Tank Army 
and 1st Tank Army were subordinated to the 1st Ukranian Front. 
The 5th Guards Tank Army, 2nd Tank Army and 6th Tank Army were 
located with the 2nd Ukranian Front. FHO failed to detect the 
movement of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Tank Army out 
of the 2nd Ukranian Front. 
On May 28, 1944, FHO noted that the XXIX Tank Corps of the 
5th Guards Tank Army had been placed in reserve which meant that 
all the elements of the 5th Guards Tank Army were now in reserve 
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except for the 5th Guards Headquarters.63 The XVIII Tank Corps and 
the V Guard Mechanized Corps of the 5th Tank Army were already 
noted in reserve on May 18, 1944.64 The 2nd Tank Army was noted 
as deployed with the 2nd Ukanian Front on May 18, 1944. On May 28, 
1944, the subordinate elements of the 2nd Tank Army: Ill Tank 
Corps and XVI Tank Corps were noted to have been placed in reserve 
on the 2nd Ukranian Front.65 FHO noted on June 7, 1944 that that 
the entire 5th Guards Tank Army was now in reserve, but it was 
still located by FHO as part of the front reserve for the 2nd 
Ukrainian Front.66 The XVI Tank Corps of the 2nd Tank Army was 
believed to have reverted from the front reserve to actual 
deployment on the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The Ill Tank Corps of the 
2nd Tank Army was noted to have reverted from the front reserve 
to deployment on the 2nd Ukrainian Front on June 17, 1944.67 FHO. 
concluded that the 2nd Tank Army was deployed on the 2nd 
Ukrainian Front (see Figure 9) when it had actually been redeployed 
to the 1st Belorussian Front. The 5th Guards Tank Army was still 
noted to be in the 2nd Ukrainian Front reserve as of June 17, 1944 
(see Figure 9).68 However, it had actually shifted to the 3rd 
Belorussian Front. Therefore, FHO conclusions as to the area of the 
next major Soviet offensive continued to be directed toward the 
south. The tank armies were to be the chief components of the 
expected offensive against Army Group North Ukraine while the 
attacks against Army Group Center and South Ukraine were 
diversionary. The consequences of this intelligence failure were 
catastrophic and resulted in the destruction of Army Group Center. 
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Figure 10 delineates German projected deployment of Soviet 
Armies alongside the actual Soviet deployment. The figure can be 
interpreted by use of the following legend: 
1-- Position of the sides by the start of the 
Belorussian operation; 2 -- Deployment of ob' 
yedineniya of Soviet forces on the situation map of the 
German General Staff of the land forces on 22 June 
1944; 3--Actual deployment of Soviet forces on 22 
June 1944; Troop lift carried out by Hitler's command 
for closing gaps in the penetrated front in Belorussia; 5 
--Sebastopol; 6 -- Baltic Front; ?--Belorussian Front; 8 
-- Ukrainian Front; 9 -- Army Group South Ukraine; 1 O -
- Army Group North Ukraine; 11 -- Army Group North; 
12 -- Army Group Center; 13 -- Kiev; 14 -- Dnepr; 15 --
Black Sea.69 
The German overall estimate of Soviet Amies in Belorussia fell 
short. Specifically, the Russians had 25% more units opposite 
Army Group Center than German Intelligence had identified (see 
Table 1 ). 
ARMY GROUP CENTER'S PROJECTION OF THE 
SOVIET SUMMER OFFENSIVE 
Army Group Center had remained in agreement with OKH and 
the FHO assessment of the location of the major summer offensive 
until the middle of June 1944. Even as of June 2, 1944, Army 
Group Center's analysis did not contradict OKH and FHO as revealed 
by the situation assessment: 
Repercussions are to be expected from the imminent 
Soviet offensive against Army Group North Ukraine, on 
German 2nd Army's extreme right (VIII corps). No 
preparations for an offensive aimed at Brest have been 
detected, but local attacks are possible. On the Eastern 
Front, holding attacks on friendly forces must be 
reckoned with, especially in these sectors: Southeast 
of Vitebsk, Lenino-Bayevo (northeast of Gorki), 
Northwest of Chausy, Southwest of Chausy, North of 
Rogachev, South of Zhlobin. The enemy will endeavor to 
exploit any inital successes with great speed by 
concentrating his reserves. On Army Group Center's 
extreme right the effects of some kind of offensive 
directed onto Polotsk may be felt. 10 
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However, the situation before Army Group Center had changed 
by June 14, 1944. More Soviet reinforcements were were noted to 
have deployed before Army Group Center which caused General 
Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group Center, to raise this issue with 
General Zeitzler at the OKH conference concerning Soviet offensive 
plans. Zeitzler and Gehlen only recognized these troop 
concentrations as preparations for diversionary or feint attacks 
while the main offensive would occur against Army Group North 
Ukraine. 
General Peter Von der Groeben, an operations officer, at Army 
Group Center stated: 
After May 1944 ... a systematic concentration to front of 
the arc-shaped line held by Army Group Center was 
evident. Aerial reconnaisance, agents' reports and 
especially radio intelligence furnished Army Group 
Center with a clear and pertinent picture of the 
assembly of Russian forces. 11 
Groeben claimed that there was no doubt on the part of Army Group 
Center's High Command that the attack would fall on Army Group 
Center because of the tremendous concentrations that the Soviets 
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had deployed opposite the front. 12 Field Marshal Busch had made it 
repeatedly clear in reports and in personnal discussions at the 
Fuehrer's Headquarters the grave situation of the Army Group. 73 He 
requested adequate reserves, mobile units and heavy weapons. 
However, despite all requests no reserves were released to Army 
Group Center until June 16th when the 20th Panzer Division was 
transferred from Army Group North Ukraine to the 9th Army in 
Army Group Center. 
The Army Group continued to observe hopelessly the 
indications of a major, impending offensive. On June 18, 1944, 
signal intelligence indicated the possible appearance of the 5th 
Guards Tank Army but FHO and OKH rejected this evidence even 
though Marshal Rotmistrov, Commander of the 5th Guards Tank 
Army, had supposedly been seen near Yartsevo (northeast of 
Smolensk). The Army Group intelligence summary prepared by 
Oberst Worgitzky on June 19, 1944 took a much different view than 
FHOandOKH: 
The enemy situation has changed considerably since the 
2nd of June. Up till then the local attacks were going 
on, accomplished by regrouping and concentration of 
available forces, suggested that the enemy had an 
operational-level holding attack in mind. Now activity 
opposite the Army Group's salient, notably in the Gomel 
area and east of Orsha, indicates that his intentions are 
rather more far-reaching ... ln sum it must be said that 
the enemy attacks to be expected on Army Group 
Center's sector--on Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, and 
possibly northeast of Vitebsk will be of more than local 
character. All in all the scale of ground and air forces 
suggests that the aim is to bring about the collapse of 
Army Group Center's salient by penetrations on several 
sectors ... 74 
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The intelligence summary of June 19, 1944 remained largely 
unchanged till the beginning of the offensive. The railway sabotage 
on the night of June 19-20th was regarded as an indicator that "the 
opening of the offensive must be regarded as imminent."75 
The commander of the Ninth Army, General Hans Jordan, 
summed up the feeling of the Army Group in his Kriegstagebuch 
entry of June 22, 1944: 
Ninth Army stands on the eve of another great battle, 
unpredictable in extent and duration. One thing is 
certain: in the last few weeks the enemy has 
completed an assembly on the very greatest scale 
opposite the army, and the army is convinced that that 
assembly overshadows the concentration of forces off 
the north flank of Army Group North Ukraine ... The army 
has felt bound to point out repeatedly that it considers 
the massing of strength on its front to constitute the 
preparation for this year's main Soviet offensive, which 
will have as its object the reconquest of Belorussia. 
The army believes that even under the present 
conditions, it would be possible to stop the enemy 
offensive, but not under the present directives which 
require an absolutely rigid defense ... there can be no 
doubt.. .if a Soviet offensive breaks out the army will 
either have to go over to a mobile defense or see its 
front smashed ... 
The army considers the orders establishing the 
"fortified places" particularly dangerous. 
The army, therefore, looks ahead to the coming battle 
with bitterness, knowing that it is bound by orders to 
tactical measures which it cannot in good conscience 
accept as correct and which in our own earlier 
victorious campaigns were the causes of the enemy 
defeats--one recalls the great breakthrough and 
encirclement battles in Poland and France. 
The Commanding General and Chief of Staff presented 
these thoughts to the army group in numerous 
conferences, but there, apparently, the courage was 
lacking to carry them higher up, for no 
counterarguments other than references to OKH orders 
were given. And that is the fundamental source of the 
anxiety with which the army views the future.76 
SOVIET SECRECY AND ALLIED DECEPTIONS 
IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 
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According to General John Deane, the military attache in 
Moscow a plan was developed for the summer of 1944 that would be 
mutually beneficial to the Soviets and the western allies. The plan 
was codenamed "Bodyguard" and involved Soviet feints against 
Scandinavia and Rumania to deceive the Germans into thinking some 
coordinated allied operations were to take place on the Axis flanks 
to draw off German units from northern France. 11 The Joint Chiefs 
of Staff of the United States were particulary concerned that the 
Red Army launch its summer offensive to facilitate the "Overlord" 
operation. 
The Joint Chiefs agreed on March 27, 1944 to inform the 
·Soviet General Staff of the target date for Operation Overlord.78 
General Deane's memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of February 27, 
1944 made it very clear that the Soviets would require a date for 
Overlord in order to plan their offensive, and that the Soviet front 
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was too fluid for them to inform the allies as to where their main 
effort would be.79 Deane's memorandum was submitted to the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
On April 3, 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff sent a 
telegram to the U.S. and British Military Missions in Moscow giving 
the date for Overlord as "May 31st with two or three days margin 
on either side to allow for weather and tide. "80 The British Chiefs 
of Staff were particulary concerned that the Russians fulfill the 
obligation Marshal Stalin made at Teheran to launch "a large scale 
Russian offensive in May with a view to containing the maximum 
number of German divisions in the East."81 Stalin on April 22, 1944 
informed Churchill and Roosevelt that the Soviet General Staff had 
been informed of the appointed time of the attack and the strength 
of it by Generals Deane and Burrows. Stalin then made a pledge to 
fulfill his commitments made at Tehran: 
As agreed in Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new 
offensive at the same time so as to give maximum 
support to the Anglo-American operations.82 
Nevertheless, the Soviets violated this pledge by beginning a 
secondary offensive against Finland four days after the Normandy 
landings. The Soviets failed to launch their offensive at the same 
time and then the offensive launched against Finland was not the 
main offensive thereby denying the maximum support promised to 
the allied landings. 
The Soviet plans continued to remain a secret from even their 
western allies. Despite the British request for for an offensive in 
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May prior to Overlord a lull settled over the Eastern Front except in 
the Crimea. On May 25, 1944, the western allies were still 
ignorant of Soviet plans while the Soviets were fully aware of the 
date of the Overlord operation. Thus, Soviet secrecy and deception 
were not only working against the Germans but also their own 
allies. The London Joint Intelligence Committee report of May 25, 
1944 stated: 
We believe that they (Russians) will launch a general 
offensive concurrently with Overlord. There is some 
evidence that their main effort will be in the sector 
between the Pripet Marshes and the northern 
Carpathians. The dispostion of their forces, however, 
makes it clear that the Russians are capable of 
launching large-scale offensives in more than one 
sector and may well do so. 83 
It is clear that the allies were no better informed as to 
Russian intentions than Foreign Armies East under Gehlen. 
The Soviets were clearly waiting for the launching of 
Overlord before beginning their next offensive. And it is clear that 
they were not attempting to tie down German units on the Eastern 
Front to save allied lives on the beaches of Normandy. Their 
launching of an offensive against Finland on June 10, 1944, four 
days after the Normandy landings may have corresponded to the 
"Bodyguard" deception plan, but it was not the main offensive 
agreed to at Tehran to support the invasion of France. The main 
offensive was more than two weeks later which allowed the 
Germans to transfer armored forces to the Western Front. The 
German High Command transferred the 11 SS Panzer Korps to the 
Western Front from Army Group North Ukraine beginning on June 
12th. Undoubtedly, the lack of pressure along the main front and 
the remote offensive in Karelia facilitated the transfer of SS 
Panzers to the bocage of Normandy. 
Finally, the day after the Normandy landings Stalin sent 
Roosevelt and Churchill a cable providing some information about 
the expected Soviet summer offensive: 
The summer offensive of the Soviet troops to be 
launched in keeping with the agreement reached at the 
Tehran Conference will begin in mid-June in one of the 
vital sectors of the front. The general offensive will 
develop by stages, through consecutive engagement of 
the armies in offensive operations. Between late June 
and the end of July the operations will turn into a 
general offensive of the Soviet troops. 
I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the 
operations.84 
Stalin on June 9, 1944 informed Churchill that: 
Preparations for the summer offensive of the Soviet 
troops are nearing completion. Tomorrow, June 10, we 
begin the first round on the Leningrad Front.85 
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However, the Belorussian Operation remained a secret to the 
end. On June 21, 1944, Stalin informed Churchill and Roosevelt 
that the second round of the Soviet summer offensive would 
commence within a week and would "involve 130 divisions 
including armored ones. "86 Thus, Stalin never did reveal the 
location and exact timing of the Soviet main offensive to his 
western allies. Soviet secrecy concerning the Belorussian 
Operation remained extremely well guarded. 
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Meanwhile, allied disinformation was filtering through 
German diplomatic channels concerning the Soviet summer 
offensive. OKW received a report through the Auswartiges Amt 
(Foreign Office) in Ankara, Turkey concerning a conversation 
between the Finnish envoy and the U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt. 
Steinhardt apparently told the Finnish envoy on June 6, 1944 that 
the Soviet offensive would begin in about 14 days on the Rumanian 
Front where 8000 tanks were assembled. This information was 
confirmed by Hiesinger, a member of the Soviet embassy.87 It is 
interesting to note that the date of the offensive was 
approximately correct, but the location was totally inaccurate. 
A telegram from the German Ankara Embassy on June 9, 1944 
conveyed a conversation that U.S. Ambassador Steinhardt had with a 
friendly neutral diplomatic Mission Chief. Steinhardt was reported 
to have stated that the Soviet offensive "would begin on June 15th 
with a strong group against the Carpathians, a medium strength 
group in the area of Jassy and a very strong group against the 
Rumanian Front. "88 It is unclear where Steinhardt was obtaining 
his information but one aspect of the Bodyguard Deception plans 
was to make the Germans believe that the attacks would occur on 
the flanks. 
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SOVIET MILITARY DECEPTIONS 
The Soviet deception plan to deceive the Germans can be 
divided into five elements: (1) extremely tight security; (2) 
maintenance of the German preconception that the Ukraine was the 
Schwerpunkt of the main Soviet offensive; (3) Elaborate measures 
to conceal offensive preparations on the Belorussian Front; ( 4) 
masking redeployments by simulating normalcy along the entire 
front; (5) a major feint against Finland preceeded the main 
offensive which was staggered by fronts to contuse the Germans. 
The tight. security of the Soviets can be traced to the limited 
distribution of the Soviet offensive plans in their entirety. Only 
six people were aware of the Soviet summer plans. These 
individuals were: Stalin, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the 
Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General 
Staff, and the Chief of the Operations Division and his deputy.89 
The plans were issued in single hand delivered copies for each 
front. Therefore, the majority of personnel had only a partial 
knowledge of the overall plan. 
The Soviets continued to simulate preparations tor an 
offensive from the Ukraine. The Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian 
Front was ordered to simulate a false concentration of troops to 
the northeast of Kishinev.90 Tolbukhin was specifically ordered to 
simulate the arrival of nine divisions and one armored corps. The 
simulation was conducted by rail through tour main depots between 
May 29th and June 14th.91 Similar use of rail deception was 
conducted elsewhere in the Ukraine. Massive rail activity was 
observed opposite Brest along the southern flank of Army Group 
Center during the spring. The greater part of the transport trains 
that were reported by aerial observation were empty and only 
served as a deception which was discovered only much later.92 
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Dummy tanks, artillery, aircraft, depots and radio nets were 
established to deceive the Germans. Stalin admitted that the 
Russians constructed as many as 5000 false tanks and 2000 false 
aircraft to mislead German intelligence in the past.93 The Soviets 
even developed a real antiaircraft zone with complete fighter 
cover. Long range aircraft used for attacks against German 
airfields and railroad junctions were based in the Ukraine to 
disorient the Germans.94 However, these aircraft flew combat 
missions against both Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group 
Center. 
Elaborate procedures were established to conceal the 
Belorussian offensive. In April 1944, STAVKA ordered a shift to a 
defensive posture along the front. According to Marshal Ivan 
Bagramian, Commander of the First Baltic Front, STAVKA ordered 
the creation of a defensive zone of not less than 25 miles with 
three defensive lines.95 The evacuation of all civilian population 
from this zone adjoining the front was carried out to prevent the 
Germans from infiltrating agents into the area where they could 
easily conceal themselves among the local population.96 Therefore, 
thousands of families were evacuated from the 25 mile zone to 
nearby districts. 
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Careful procedures were utilized in the area along the 
Belorussian sector to conceal the offensive preparations. Trains 
were unloaded at night and trains were dispatched to unloading 
points of up to 100 km from the front line. During the day special 
camouflage nets, canvas and bales of hay were used to conceal the 
buildup of supplies.97 All military units were instructed to 
camouflage themselves during the day and the Soviets checked 
their concealment by flying aerial reconnaissance over their own 
positions to insure effective compliance.98 Commanders were 
ordered to wear infantry uniforms only when conducting all 
reconnaissance of the front line. Radio silence was instituted 
along the front in May and only the air force, air defense, 
reconnaissance and artillery fire direction nets were allowed to 
remain active. All troop movements and unit relocations were 
conducted at night. Even artillery units were ordered to maintain 
their pattern of fire. Tractors were assigned to follow tank and 
artillery units to cover their tracks by dragging tree branches to 
erase evidence of their presence. These concealment measures 
proved fairly effective and the Germans only began taking notice of 
the Soviet buildup after the first week in June. 
The Soviets also simulated normalcy along the front. 
Reconnaissance was conducted along the entire front by company 
and battalion size units. This masked the intentions of future 
Soviet operations. Probes in one sector would be matched by 
probes in another sector so as to simulate normalcy along the 
entire front. 
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Finally, the feint against Finland distracted German attention 
away from the ongoing Belorussian offensive preparations. The 
Soviet planning of the offensive called for the offensive to be 
conducted in stages. The feint against Finland combined with a 
staggered offensive confused the Germans until the offensive 
developed into a clear general offensive. The 1st Baltic Front lead 
off the attack on June 22-23rd, followed by the 3rd Belorussian 
Front which then extended to the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. 
The offensive was staggered by approximately 48 hours from north 
to south possibly because the required air power could not be 
brought to bear at all the critical points simultaneously. This 
created the impression of holding attacks which confused the 
German High Command until the full weight of the offensive was 
joined on June 25, 1944.99 
TABLE I 
DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET ARMIES ON TWO FRONTS, 22 JUNE 1944 
BELORUSSIAN UKRAl~E 
German Actual German Actual 
Estimate Deployment Estimate Deployment 
Tank Armies: 0 2 6 4 
Other Armies: 18 22 ? ? ' 
TOTALS: 18 24 ? ? 
Source: Barton Whaley, Strategm: Deception and Surprise in War, 
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Figure 1. German Intelligence Channels. Source: U.S. 
War Department, Military Intelligence Division, German 
Military Intelligence 1939-1945 (Frederick, Maryland: 
University Publications of America, Inc., 1984), p. 12. 
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Present and Remaining Anticipated Soviet Offensive 
Operations, March 29, 1944. Source: National Archives 
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Figure 3. Probable Soviet Operational Directions and 
Current Enemy Force Deployment, May 3, 1944. Source: 
National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, Roll 587. 
54 









Figure 4. Probable Soviet Operational Directions and 
Current Enemy Force Deployment, May 3, 1944. Source: 
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Figure 5. Probable Soviet Operational Intentions and 
Current Enemy Force Deployment, June 13, 1944. 














Figure 6. Probable Soviet Operational Intentions and 
Current Enemy Force Dep:oyment, June 13, 1944. 
Source: National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78, 
Roll 587. 
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Figure 7. Belorussian Partisan Rail Attacks, June 19-
20, 1944. Source: National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-78, Roll 113. 
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Figure 8. Employment of Soviet Tank Formations 
Opposite the German Eastern Front, May 3, 1944. 
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Figure 9. The Six Tank Armies of the Red Army, Order 
of Battle on June 17, 1944 as Noted by Fremde Heer Ost. 
Source: Kommandobehoerden der Roten Armee. 
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Figure 10. Deployment of Soviet Forces by the Start of 
the Belorussian Operation. Source: Colonel A. 
Shimanskiy, "1944 Summer-Fall Campaign On The 
Eastern Front," Joint Publications Research Service No. 
46237 (20 August 1968), p. 6. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
GERMAN DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE IN 1944: 
STANDING FAST VERSUS ELASTIC DEFENSE 
The German Army defensive doctrine of elastic defense found 
in the 1933 Truppenfuehrung manual remained in effect as the 
standard doctrinal reference throughout the war.1 However, elastic 
defense lost its elasticity due to Hitler's orders which confused 
and muddled German defensive practices. Hitler's inflexibility in 
how the defense should be conducted resulted in an operational 
rigidity which produced needless German losses and caused the 
encirclement amd the destruction of numerous German military 
formations. In the summer of 1944, elastic defense was the only 
hope for Army Group Center, but Hitler insisted on a rigid stand 
fast deployment which resulted in the destruction of twenty-eight 
divisions.2 
HITLER'S DOCTRINE OF STANDING FAST 
Hitler's standfast doctrine originated in the winter of 1941-
42. The Wehrmacht had become stalled before Moscow and the 
Soviet counteroffensive threatened to overwhelm the German Army 
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since it was unprepared for winter operations. Hitler forbid a 
general retreat which under the winter conditions probably saved 
the Wehrmacht from the fate of the Grande Armee in 1812. He 
ordered the Wehrmacht to stand fast. General Bock of Army Group 
Center was ordered to cease all withdrawals and defend its present 
positions. Hitler ordered that German soldiers were to follow his 
dictum: "not one single step back. "3 General withdrawal was 
declared out of the question. The stand fast orders established the 
framework of German defensive strategy under Hitler. The 
successful outcome of the stand fast policy in the winter of 1941-
42 persuaded Hitler that his own instincts were superior to the 
collective wisdom of the front commanders and the General Staff. 
Will and determination replaced sound strategy. Hitler would order 
troops to stand fast against impossible odds and this resulted in 
needless loss of precious manpower in the Wehrmacht. 
General Jodi described Hitler's actions after Stalingrad as 
follows: 
will: 
From then on, he intervened more and more frequently 
in operational decisions often down to matters of 
tactical detail, in order to impose with unbending will 
what he thought the generals simply refused to 
comprehend: that one had to stand or fall, that each 
voluntary step backwards was an evil in itself.4 
Field Marshal Erich Von Manstein described Hitler's belief in 
The will for victory which gives a commander the 
strength to see a grave crisis through is something very 
different from Hitler's will which in the last analysis 
stemmed from a belief in his own "mission." Such a 
belief inevitably makes a man impervious to reason and 
leads him to think that his own will can operate beyond 
the limits of hard reality-whether these consist in the 
presence of far superior enemy forces, in the conditions 
of space and time, or meeting in the fact that the 
enemy also happens to have a will of his own. s 
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Thus, the Fuehrer's fundamental principle was "to remain at 
all costs, on ground which has once been won." The new defensive 
tenet became "an inflexible stand." This principle according to 
General Blumentritt became responsible for the severe handicap 
under which German Commanders had to operate after 1941. 
According to Blumentritt, "without free, independent strategic 
resposibility--uninfluenced by pressure and fear--no general is in 
a position to gain successes in the field. "6 Furthermore, the 
Fuehrer even forbid the establishment of defensive lines in the rear 
which could have been established to free reserves for a more 
mobile defense. Hitler apparently believed that defensive lines in 
the rear exerted a magnetic force on soldiers, and that they should 
never be tempted by prematurely establishing defense lines behind 
them.7 He believed soldiers would fight harder knowing there were 
no defensive lines to the rear, and this corresponded to his 
conception of the stand fast policy. 
HITLER'S WAVEBREAK DOCTRINE 
The stand fast doctrine was supplemented by what Percy 
Schramm, the writer of the OKW war diary, called the wavebreak 
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doctrine in 1944.8 This doctrine tied the hands of the army 
commanders even further making it even more difficult to conduct 
an elastic defense. On March 8, 1944, Hitler issued Fuehrer Order 
No. 11: 
In view of various incidents, I issue the following 
orders: 
1. A distinction will be made between Fortified Areas 
[feste Plaetze], each under a Fortified Area 
Commandant, and Local Strong-points 
[Ortsstuetzpunkte], each under a Battle Commandant. 
The Fortified Areas will fulfil the function of 
fortresses in former historical times. They will ensure 
that the enemy does not occupy these areas of decisive 
operational importance. They will allow themselves to 
be surrounded, thereby holding down the largest 
possible number of enemy forces, and establishing 
conditions favourable for successful counterattacks.9 
Based upon the above directive a whole series of fortresses 
were established in the East. Hitler's assumption was that the 
enemy required more forces to lay siege to the fortresses than 
were required for the defense. This presupposed that the enemy 
would have to take these fortresses, since he would require the 
road junctions and railway depots. In fact, the Soviets bypassed 
fortresses and surrounded others with inferior units.10 The 
Germans, on the other hand, tied up critical numbers of troops 
which were then later sacrificed in needless encirclements instead 
of being conserved and used in an elastic defense. 
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ELASTIC DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC WITHDRAWAL: 
THE LAST HOPE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER 
Elastic defense is the application of depth, maneuver, 
firepower and counterattack to exhaust the attacker in the depth of 
the defense. Figure 11 delineates the concept of elastic defense as 
found in the Truppenfuehrung manuel. The Germans were strong 
enough in 1944 and possessed sufficient maneuvering space in 
Belorussia to apply an elastic defense to wear down the Soviets. 
General Wladyslaw Anders provides a description of the tactics of 
elastic defense: 
This defense consists of the alternative use of 
premeditated retreat and sudden counter-stroke. The 
retreat enables the defender to avoid the blows of the 
attacker and to draw him on, while a sudden 
counterattack holds the chance of defeating the 
aggressor at the moment when his offensive begins to 
peter out. These tactics prove practicable if the 
defender has superiority over the attacker in both 
command and mobility.11 
Therefore, Field Marshal Busch presented two alternatives of 
conducting an elastic defense: "kleinen Loesung" (Dnjepr Solution) 
and "grossen Loesung" (Beresina Solution). 12 The first solution was 
a rearward adjustment to a relatively tankproof position which had 
been prepared along the line Polotsk--west of Vitebsk--the Dnjepr 
at Orsha--Mogilev. This solution would require a withdrawal of 55 
kilometers and would shorten the front by 80 kilometers. The 
second solution was more sweeping involving a withdrawal behind 
the largely marshy length of the river Berezina between Polotsk 
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and Bobruisk (see Figure 12).13 This would require a withdrawal of 
140 kilometers and would shorten the front by 160 kilometers. 
Field Marshal Busch proposed executing a withdrawal just prior to 
the Soviet summer offensive which would then require the Soviets 
to conduct an additional time consuming approach march to the next 
German defensive line. Both the "kleinen Loesung" and the "grossen 
Loesung" were part of an overall elastic defense plan which could 
grind down the Soviet offensive momentum, but would require the 
sacrifice of territory something that was unacceptable to Hitler. 
Hitler responded with the "Fuehrerbefehl Nr. 11. He declared 
certain cities in the area of Army Group Center "Festen Plaetzen": 
Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha, Vitebsk and Minsk (see Figure 13).14 This 
decision by Hitler tied up large numbers of troops in exposed 
positions that could be encircled thereby depriving Army Group 
Center of sufficient forces to adequately conduct an elastic 
defense. The demand by Hitler to hold Vitebsk which was the most 
tenuous of the cities prompted Field Marshal Busch to ironically 
declare according to the Fuehrer: "Our prestige is at stake! Vitebsk 
is the only Eastern Front town whose loss will cause the world to 
sit up and take notice."15 
On May 20, 1944, Field Marshal Busch approached Hitler about 
shortening the front to strengthen the defense. Hitler accused 
Busch of "being another General who spent their whole time looking 
over their shoulder. "16 Busch responded to Hitler's intimidation by 
mindlessly carrying out his instructions to execute a rigid 
positional defense. Busch held a conference on May 24, 1944 and 
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instructed the army commanders and the Commander-in-Chief of 
Luftflotte 6 regarding Hitler's demand to hold the existing line at 
all costs.17 He demanded that all available effort be used to 
prepare the army group's present positions. Nevertheless, army 
commanders still insisted on operational freedom of action once 
the offensive began. But Busch had given up attempting to exercise 
independence from the Fuehrer's will and his headquarters obeyed 
the Fuehrer's orders to hold the front exactly where it was. The 
army commanders later found it necessary to undertake actions 
without support of the Commander of Army Group Center. 
THE LOST POTENTIAL OF ELASTIC DEFENSE 
Army Group Center in March 1943 had withdrawn 
appproximately 100 miles to the west because it was in an 
overexposed position. This withdrawal reduced a 530 kilometer 
front to 200 kilometers. The shrinkage of the front produced a 
reserve of 15 infantry divisions, two motorized infantry divisions, 
three panzer divisions, one SS cavalry division and several 
headquarters units.1s The withdrawals of 55 and 140 kilometers 
proposed by Field Marshal Busch would shorten the front only 80 
and 160 kilometers respectively. Therefore, the corresponding 
number of divisions released as reserves would be much less. 
However, Army Group Center was in desperate need of reserves. 
The entire army group only had one Panzer division and three Panzer 
Grenadier divisions as mobile forces. Any infantry divisions that 
could have been pulled out of the front line for use as reserves 
would have improved the situation at the front. 
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The German Army was forced to fight in total defiance of 
basic principles of war which had been recognized in the eighteenth 
century. Clausewitz had defined the principles of defensive war 
which had influenced German thinking: 
He holds his position in depth for at every level from 
division to battalion, his order of battle has reserves 
for unforseen events and to renew action. A substantial 
reserve, however--perhaps one quarter or one third of 
his whole force--is kept far to the rear, far enough to 
avoid any casualities from enemy fire and, if possible 
far enough to remain outside any possibility of 
envelopment. This reserve is meant to cover his flanks 
against any wider and larger turning movement and to 
protect him against the unexpected. In the final third 
of the battle, when the enemy has revealed his whole 
plan and spent the major part of his forces, the 
defender intends to fling this body against a part of the 
enemy forces, thus opening a minor offensive battle of 
his own using every element of attack--assault, 
suprise and flanking movements. All these pressures 
will be brought to bear on the battle's center of gravity 
while the outcome still hangs in the balance in order to 
produce a total reversal. 19 
Thus, Hitler defied military reality which had been recognized 
since the eighteenth century and supplanted it with the 
psychological principle of "will." 
Even the Red Army expected the Germans to pursue a more 
rational defense. Colonel N. Loshchagin and Colonel A. Melnichuk 
writing in Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on June 17, 1944 stated: 
The German command has a tendacy to have strong 
reserves, even at the cost of weakening the troops at 
the front. On the Soviet-German front the operational 
reserves average from one to three divisions in armies, 
and from two to five divisions in army groups. They are 
employed in a strictly centralized manner.20 
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Furthermore, in defensive operations Germans were noted to have 
most of their operational reserves composed of mobile forces such 
as Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions which were to be used en 
masse to liquidate breakthroughs and stabilize the front. However, 
Army Group Center lacked the mobile reserves because these had 
been allocated to Army Group North Ukraine and France. The Army 
Group held a front of 1100 kilometers with 40 divisions (see Figure 
14 ).21 This amounted to each division holding about 25 kilometers. 
This amounted to three to four times the frontage previously 
regarded as acceptable for a successful defense.22 Army Group 
Center also lacked heavy artillery, assault guns and antitank 
weapons to block possible tank approaches. Hitler's refusal to 
develop more defensive positions in depth caused a rigidity of 
defense because once the main defenses had been breached there 
were no series of defensive lines prepared to fall back on 
throughout Belorussia (see figure 15). 
General Kurt Von Tippelskirch, Commander of the 4th Army, 
reported that all army commanders in Army Group Center begged 
for permission to withdraw to the Beresina line. This withdrawal 
would have taken the punch out of the Soviet offensive, but all such 
suggestions were rejected. Nevertheless, Tippelskirch displayed 
initiative despite Hitler's orders. He withdrew his forces back to 
the Dnieper on his sector, and this action allowed him to keep his 
front intact. But the fronts of the other armies to his north and 
south were ruptured producing a general collapse. Tippelskirch 
made the following assessment: 
It would have been much wiser strategy to withdraw 
the whole front in time. The Russians always needed a 
long pause for preparation after any German 
withdrawal, and they always lost disproportionately 
when attacking. A series of withdrawals by adequately 
large steps would have worn down the Russian strength, 
besides creating opportunities for counter-strokes at a 
time when. the German forces were still strong enough 
to make them effective ... 
The root cause of Germany's defeat was the way that 
her forces were wasted in fruitless efforts, and above 
all in fruitless resistance at the wrong time and place. 
That was due to Hitler. There was no strategy in our 
campaign.23 
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Finally, defenders of Hitler's stand fast policy and critics of 
elastic and mobile defense argue that the loss of more territory in 
a mobile defense was hardly preferable to a static defense which 
produced the same result.24 However, what these apologists such 
as Martin Van Creveld overlook in Hitler's conduct of the war is the 
fact enormous amounts of men and material could have been 
conserved which then would have been available for reserves to 
prevent the collapse of the front which occurred numerous times as 
a result of Hitler's stand fast policy. General Heinz Guderian 
summed up the situation: 
The more critical the situation became, the more 
inflexible became the attitude of the German Command. 
The advanced positions had to be defended foot by foot, 
until encirclement. Heavy losses in personnel and 
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CHAPTER IV 
AIRPOWER: THE LUFTWAFFE LOSS OF SUPERIORITY 
The loss of air superiority on the Eastern Front was a result 
of fragmentation of Luftwaffe efforts in an ever widening war and 
the numerical and qualitative increase in the Soviet Air Force. The 
massive losses suffered by the German Army in the East required 
the Luftwaffe to concentrate its effort in ground support 
operations which prevented the strategic use of its assets against 
the Soviet Union. Essentially, the Luftwaffe air units had become 
"Fire Brigades" in support of a Wehrmacht in trouble.1 Luftwaffe 
General Hermann Plocher described the Luftwaffe dilemma this 
way: 
Dispersal of its forces was the cardinal weakness of 
the Luftwaffe in these operations. No longer did 
German air units go ahead of the advancing ground 
forces. Instead, they were rapidly shifted from side to 
side wherever a crisis developed, often arriving too 
late to alleviate the danger. This continual 
transferring of air units was a result of numerical 
weakness in German air strength and the Luftwaffe's 
consequent inability to accomplish its missions all 
along an extended front.2 
The Luftwaffe was placed at an increasing disadvantage as 
the war progressed. The Italian/Balkan front, the Western front 
~ 
and the air defense of the Reich siphoned off aircraft that would 
have potentially been available for combat on the Eastern front. 
The multi-front problem was described by the Military History 
Division of the Luftwaff General Staff in a 1944 study: 
The Luftwaffe was no longer as in the past employed in 
concentration on only one front against only one enemy 
within the overall pattern of the whole war. Through 
its employment in a number of theaters simultaneously, 
it was compelled to dispatch its forces against the 
enemy in widely separated areas. This necessarily 
resulted in a reduction of operable strengths available 
in the individual segments of the fronts.s 
General d~r Flieger a. D. Paul Deichmann addressed the 
strategic failure of the Luftwaffe: 
Because of its inferior strength, the strategic 
Luftwaffe was forced out of its real role in spite of a 
clear realization of the adverse results which would 
follow. Neither in Russia, nor in the Mediterranean and 
western theaters did German air superiority continue. 
As a result the initiative passed more and more to the 
enemy. Our own forces, however, found themselves 
implicated in air defense under the pressure of events 
of the war.4 
LUFTWAFFE: STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE IN THE EAST 
Two main problems plagued the Luftwaffe in the East. The 
failure to conduct strategic warfare against the Soviet Union and 
the lack of a central command structure to unify and concentrate 
Luftwaffe resources. The strategic warfare issue had to be 
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addressed early in the war to prevent the full weight of Soviet 
industry and resources from being utilized in the war effort. 
The Luftwaffe Field Directive on the conduct of air warfare 
described three missions for the Luftwaffe: 
1 . Through combat against enemy air forces, the 
Luftwaffe weakens the enemy's military strength and 
thereby protects its own military forces, its civilian 
population, and its country. 
2. Through intervention in operations and combat on 
the ground and at sea, the Luftwaffe provides direct 
support for the Army and Navy. 
3. Through warfare against the sources of enemy 
military strength and through cutting off 
communication between these sources and the front, 
the Luftwaffe seeks to subdue the enemy force.5 
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Therefore, the Luftwaffe regarded strategic warfare as at least as 
important as the other two missions of the Luftwaffe. However, 
this was not recognized by OKW and OKH. The German Air Force 
became tied to Army support when the goals should have been the 
destruction of the Soviet. Air Force, armament works and the 
transportation network. 6 Even the production of aircraft indicated 
the lack of a strategic outlook. The Germans lacked a long range 
four-engine bomber and the plans for a "Ural bomber" had been 
dropped during 1936. 7 The Luftwaffe as a result never had a 
satisfactory long-range bomber before or during the war.a 
Finally, in late 1943 the Luftwaffe was to commence 
strategic bombing operations against the Soviet Union but it was 
already too late. The suicide of General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of 
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the General Staff of the Luftwaffe resulted in the promotion of 
General Guenther Korten to this position in September 1943. Korten 
initiated reforms to reduce Luftwaffe operations in support of the 
army. His goals were the creation of a strategic bomber force and 
a strategic fighter defense.9 Korten's reforms, however, weakened 
the Eastern Front. Zerstoerergeschwader 26 and 76 (twin-engine 
fighter units) and Jagdgeschwader 3, 11, 53 and 27 were recalled 
from the Eastern Front for defense of the Reich.10 A Geschwader 
normally contained 150 aircraft.11 But it is doubtful if these 
Geschwader were at full strength. On November 26, 1943, General 
Korten issued the directive which created a strategic bomber force 
known as IV Air Corps. The mission of this Air Corps was stated in 
the directive: 
In order to carry out systematic bombardment of 
Russian armament industries, I intend to unite the 
majority of the heavy bomber units assigned in the 
East--together with other special duty bomber units--
under the command of the Headquarters, IV Air Corps. 
These units will be assigned the mission of conducting 
air attacks against the Russian armaments industry 
with a view to destroying Soviet material resources--
tanks, artillery, and aircraft--before they can be put to 
use at the front. In this way, the Luftwaffe will be 
able to provide greater relief for our hard pressed 
Eastern armies than by its commitment in ground-
support operations alone.12 
In December 1943, eight bomber Gruppen were withdrawn 
from the Eastern Front and assigned to Flieger Korps IV which 
became independent of Luftflotte 4 with 250 aircraft for strategic 
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employment.13 Previously, these bomber aircraft had not only been 
used for combat operations in a ground-support role but also 
served as troop carrying transports.14 
The Minister of War Production and German Intelligence 
produced a comprehensive plan for attacking Soviet industry and 
resources. It was calculated that by selective bombing of key 
targets that 50-80 percent of Soviet productive capacity could be 
eliminated.15 German Intelligence estimated that such bombing 
could eliminate 3,500 tanks and 3000 front-line aircraft per 
month.16 The new strategic thinking followed this reasoning: 
Each Russian tank, each gun, each airplane, each railway 
locomotive which could be destroyed while still in the 
factory saved the German Army serious losses ... a single 
successful air attack on the Russian tank factories 
would have destroyed the product of several weeks' 
work all at once and would have been sufficient to stop 
any further production for some time. It is difficult to 
stop a rushing stream; its source, however, can be 
dammed up with relatively little effort.17 
During the spring of 1944, the Flieger Korps IV conducted a 
series of attacks and some participants described the results as 
successful. 1 a However, 1944 was too late to begin strategic 
bombing with any hope of success. The fallacy of strategic 
bombing at this time was that the German lines had been pushed 
back so far that a major portion of the targets were out of range to 
German bombers.19 The aircraft engine works in Kuybishev, Kasas, 
and Ufa were critical to the increased production of Soviet 
aircraft.20 However, these production centers were outside the 
range of German bomber aircraft and attacks had to be restricted 
to the Moscow-Yaroslavl area (see Figure 16) .21 
92 
Luftwaffe General Deichman made the following observation 
concerning the belated attempts at strategic warfare on the 
Eastern Front: 
The attempt to achieve lasting results by means of 
strategic air operations was nevertheless repeated 
frequently. Attacks were directed occasionally at 
militarily important factories in Gorki, Jaroslavl, 
Rybinsk, Moscow, and Leningrad. However, no telling 
results were achieved because the forces dispatched 
were too small and because the attacks took place at 
too long intervals.22 
In fact, the withdrawal of these Bomber Geschwader from ground 
support only served to accelerate the loss of territory on the 
Eastern Front.23 In March 1944, the IV Air Corps had a strength of 
350 bombers consisting mostly of He-111's and Ju-88's.24 
The collapse of Army Group Center brought an end to 
strategic air operations in the East. The last strategic operation 
of IV Air Corps coincided with the beginning of the main Soviet 
summer offensive, Operation Bagration. The Luftwaffe's last 
strategic victory in the East was not against the Soviets, but 
surprisingly against the Americans. On June 21, 1944, the 
Americans landed 140 B-17's at Poltava and 56 P-51 's at Mirgorod 
airfields (see Figure 17).25 The IV Air Corps was ordered to 
destroy the American force. The Germans successfully bombed 
Poltava on June 22, 1944 and destroyed 47 B-17's and damaged 26 
without a single German loss.26 Thus, ended the Strategic Air 
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Force on the Eastern Front because with the coming of the Soviet 
summer offensive the German army desperately needed every 
aircraft in ground-support operations to stave off further collapse. 
Flieger Korps IV was disbanded to provide ground support 
LUFTWAFFE AND SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Another major problem for the Luftwaffe was the lack of 
coordination and concentration of its air power. The Luftwaffe 
was divided into several Luftflotten on several fronts (see Figure 
18). The Luftflotten constituted the central organization of the 
Luftwaffe in its command structure (see Figure 19). Luftflotten 
were in fact independent air fleets. However, these Luftflotten 
were tied to the support of the German Army (see Figures 20 & 21 ). 
This was especially true in the East where these air fleets were 
committed deep in enemy territory which dissipated the air 
strength of the Germans. Luftwaffe General Deichman stated the 
solution to this problem: 
After 1941 it would have been wise to withdraw the 
bomber wings from control by the individual air fleet 
headquarters and place them under suitable command 
staffs under a centralized bomber command. This was 
the only possible way to secure their commitment in 
concentration at decisively important points when 
necessary in support of the Army. Only if this had been 
done would the Luftwaffe have been in a position to 
exercise a decisive influence on military events.21 
However, the Germans realized this only after it had become too 
late in 1944 to effect the course of events on the Eastern Front. 
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The Soviet Air Force (WS: Voenno-vozdushnye sili) 
recovered from its disastrous defeats in 1941 and 1942 to gain 
numerical superiority over the Luftwaffe by the end of 1943. The 
Soviets deployed 13 air armies on the German-Soviet Front: 1st, 
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th 
Air Armies.28 Each air army contained approximately 660 
aircraft.29 Therefore, 13 air armies at full strength would contain 
8,580 aircraft as compared to 2,312 aircraft deployed by the 
Germans on the Eastern Front.30 The Soviet Air Force was to 
increase its strength further in 1944 with increased aircraft 
production and lend lease aircraft. Meanwhile, Luftwaffe strength 
was dissipated on several fronts which prevented its forces from 
being used in a decisive manner against the Soviet Air Force. This 
resulted in a loss of air superiority on the Eastern Front during the 
summer of 1944 which proved critical to the German defeat. 
NUMERICAL COMPARISON OF THE 
LUFTWAFFE AND THE SOVIET AIR FORCE 
The Luftwaffe maintained an average of 42.SO/o of its total 
strength on the Eastern Front from August 1943 to November 
1944.31 The number of Aircraft on the Eastern Front averaged 
2,881 between August 1943 and November 1944.32 These 
statistics delineate the dilemma of the Luftwaffe fighting on 
several fronts. The Luftwaffe could not even concentrate half its 
strength on the Eastern Front. In August 1943, the Luftwaffe 
aircraft strength was distributed to the various fronts as 
delineated in Table II. In June 1944, Luftwaffe aircraft strength 
was deployed as listed in Table Ill 
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The Luftwaffe in August 1943 had 56.4% of its forces against 
the Anglo-American forces in the West. The situation remained 
approximately the same in June 1944; 56% of the Luftwaffe 
continued to be engaged in the West. Therefore, the Soviet Air 
Force only had to engage less than half of the total available 
German airpower. This aided the Soviets in gaining air superiority 
on their only front. Meanwhile, the Germans were spread thin on 
six different fronts. 
The Luftwaffe strength on the Eastern Front was divided 
between the various Luftflotten (see Figure 22). In June 1944, the 
various types of aircraft were distributed in the Luftflotten as 
delineated in Table IV. Table IV also reveals the lack of combat 
aircraft that could be used to counter the Soviet summer offensive. 
Luftflotten 5, 1, 6, and 4 constituted the Luftflotten of the Eastern 
Front (see Figure 22). The four Luftflotten of the Eastern Front 
contained 3,267 aircraft in June 1944. However, this figure is 
deceptive because only 61% of the aircraft were combat aircraft. 
The following analysis shows the actual combat strength as 


























































Bomber Aircraft: LF 5 O 
LF 1 9 
LF 6 398 
LF 4 5-5_ 
Total: 462 
Total Combat Aircraft on the Eastern Front: 1,988 
Even the 1 ,988 combat aircraft employed in the four Eastern 
Front Luftflotten does not reveal the complete picture of 
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Luftwaffe weakness. This figure accounts for aircraft but does not 
indicate the operational status of the aircraft. Many aircraft were 
not operational because of needed repairs. Furthermore, when the 
Normandy invasion began 50 single-engine fighters were 
transferred from the central front to Germany.33 Bombers were 
also routinely used as transports instead of in a strategic bombing 
or close support role.34 
The lack of single-engine fighters in the East assured the 
Soviet Air Force of gaining superiority. The increased production 
of single-engine fighters (see Figures 23 & 24) was absorbed by 
the Anglo-American Fronts. Table IV denotes a single-engine 
fighter strength of 1 , 104 on the Anglo-American Fronts as 
compared to 408 on the Eastern Front. Therefore, the Luftflotten 
of the Eastern Front lacked fighter reserves and was forced to 
fight with an inadequate number of aircraft at a time of Soviet 
numerical superiority in the air and on the ground. 
On July 3, 1944, the collapse of Army Group Center caused a 
redeployment of Luftwaffe resources to help plug the gaping hole 
in the front in Belorussia. Aircraft were thrown in from various 
fronts to stabilize the situation. Luftflotte Reich transfered 40 
single-engine fighters to the central front. The Italian front 
yielded 85 FW 190's and 40 FW 190's were taken from the critical 
Normandy front. Another 70 FW 190's were transferred from 
Luftftotte 4 to Luftflotte 6. Luftflotte 4 was nearly stripped of all 
ground attack aircraft by the end of July 1944.35 In June 1944, 
Luftflotte 4 contained 37 4 ground attack aircraft, but by August 
1944 it retained only 59 ground attack aircraft (see Table IV & 
Table V). 
The catastrophes on the Eastern Front did increase the 
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overall percentage of Luftwaffe strength deployed in the East. In 
August 1944, 46.5% of German aircraft were employed on the 
Eastern Front compared to 44% in June 1944. However, the actual 
numbers of aircraft deployed shrank because the number of 
Luftwaffe aircraft after replacements declined by 1 ,078 aircraft 
in two months.36 This indicated heavy Luftwaffe losses during this 
summer period. In June 1944, 3,267 aircraft were on the Eastern 
Front in Luftflotten 5, 1, 6, and 4 compared to 2,948 in August 
1944 (see Tables IV & V). 
The Soviet Air Force according to Luftwaffe Commanders had 
achieved a large numerical superiority in air power by the end of 
1943.37 This superiority increased continually till the end of the 
war. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe was forced onto the defensive with 
decreasing operable strength in front line units compounded by a 
growing German shortage of fuel (see Figure 25).38 Nevertheless, 
the Germans assert that absolute air superiority was not achieved 
by the Soviets because Soviet fighter pilots remained inferior to 
their German counterparts in air combat.39 This inferiority 
allowed German bomber and dive-bomber units to execute their 
assigned missions. Therefore, the Luftwaffe could assert local air 
superiority for brief periods of time, but overall lacked air 
superiority since the Germans could not prevent the Soviet Air 
Force from executing its primary function of ground support. 
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The quality of Soviet aircraft almost equalled the Germans by 
the summer of 1944.40 Numerically, the Soviets had clearly 
surpassed the German Luftwaffe. The Soviet Air Force or VVS 
(Voenno-vozdushnye sili) grew in strength from 8,818 aircraft in 
January 1944 to 14,787 aircraft by June 1944.41 This amounted to 
an increase of 5,969 aircraft or a 68% increase in strength. The 
twelve frontal air armies contained 8, 798 operational combat 
aircraft and 1,046 R-5 and P0-2 light night bombers.42 Therefore, 
the Soviets had achieved more than a 7:1 advantage in total 
aircraft, 6:1 in operational aircraft, and more than 10:1 in fighters 
when compared to the operational front line strength of 2,085 
aircraft. 43 
THE LUFTWAFFE ANTI-TANK SUPPORT 
The effect of Soviet dominance in the air proved deterimental 
to the Luftwaffe and to the Wehrmacht. It became extremely 
hazardous for JU 88, HE 111 and JU 87 aircraft to operate except at 
night. 44 The Wehrmacht which could formerly call on the "Fire 
Brigades" of the Luftwaffe for assistance was put under even 
greater pressure by the lack of Luftwaffe support and the 
increased attacks by the Soviet Air Force. The HS 129 and JU 87G 
had been important ground attack aircraft which had been in the 
past used to destroy Soviet tank formations.45 The JU 87G was 
equipped with two 3.7 cm cannon and the HS 129 was fitted with a 
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3 cm, 3.7 cm or 7.5 cm cannon.46 These anti-tank cannons all fired 
solid-shot armor-piercing rounds. The most outstanding examples 
of this air support occurred during the summer of 1943 in 
Operation Zitadelle (see Figures 26 & 27).47 
However, this powerful striking force had its effectiveness 
reduced with the advent of massive Soviet aerial supremacy. The 
Panzerjaegerstaffeln were employed in the spring of 1944 to 
contain Soviet armored breakthroughs in the Ukraine (see Figure 
28). These units suffered heavy losses during the Soviet spring 
offensive.48 Focke Wolfe 190's were adapted to the ground support 
role by equipping them with rockets known as Panzerschreck and 
Panzerblitz.49 In 1944 the production of FW 190's increased to 
allow conversion of the Schlachtgeschwader from JU 87 to the FW 
190. The rate of conversion was 2 Gruppen every six weeks. 
Therefore, only one Gruppe (53 aircraft) (111/StG 2) of JU 87's 
remained active as a Schlachtgruppe for day operations at the end 
of 1944.50 The JU 87's were transferred to 
Nachtschlachtgeschwader (night close-air-support units).51 These 
aircraft, however, were not numerous enough to stem major Soviet 
offensive operations. Thus, German anti-tank support during the 
Soviet Belorussian campaign was weak. 
SOVIET AIR FORCE OBJECTIVES IN THE BELORUSSIAN 
CAMPAIGN AND COMPARISON OF GERMAN AND 
SOVIET SORTIE RA TES 
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The Soviet Air Force in the Belorussian operation employed 
mass to overwhelm ground and air defenses. Five air armies (1st, 
3rd, 4th, 6th and 16th) deployed a total of 5,683 operational 
aircraft or 64.6% of all frontal aircraft.S2 An additional 1000 
bombers were deployed from the Long Range Air Arm known as ADD 
(Aviatsiya dal'nevo deistviya) which brought the total to 6,683 or 
49.8% of all Soviet operational aircraft for the support of the the 
Soviet summer offensive.s3 
The Soviet Air Force was assigned the following tasks: (1) 
firmly retain air superiority; (2) support the ground forces during 
the breakthrough; (3) encirclement and destruction of the enemy 
units at Vitebsk and Bobruisk; (4) encirclement and destruction of 
Army Group Center west of Minsk; (5) interdiction of enemy 
movement of reserves; (6) disorganize the westward retreat of 
German units; and (7) provide continuous aerial reconnaissance.s4 
The skill of WS commanders and planning was marked by 
maneuvering and redeployment of air strength along the entire 
front to achieve the desired concentrations of air power at the 
moment of critical offensive operations. This support was 
achieved along the front and in depth.ss 
In May and June 1944, the Luftwaffe was capable of 1000 
sorties per day.ss However, the fuel situation (see Figure 25) and 
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the increased Soviet air superiority reduced the number of sorties 
by the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front. On September 11, 1944, only 
250 German sorties were flown against a Soviet sortie rate of 
2,000-2,500.57 The Soviet Air Force sortie rate revealed 
overwhelming Soviet air power compared to the German sortie 
rate. The Soviet Air Force flew 153,545 sorties between June 22, 
1944 and August 29, 1944 which was an average of more than 
2,250 sorties daily.58 This Soviet effort was unmatched in any 
other wartime operation.59 Thus, Soviet air superiority was firmly 
established with the onset of the Soviet summer offensive. 
COMPARISON OF EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS 
The air war in the Soviet Union while significant to the 
outcome of the war in the East was overshadowed by the Anglo-
American air war in the West where 53.5% of the Luftwaffe was 
concentrated.so The Luftwaffe total losses and damaged aircraft 
for the period of June to October 1944 demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the Anglo-American air war. Table VI delineates 
the German losses by front. The defense of the Reich involved 
36.90/o of all losses during this period. The defense of Western and 
Northern Europe accounted for 31.7% of Luftwaffe losses. The 
Italian and Balkan Theater involved only 6.8% of total air losses. 
The total Luftwaffe losses inflicted by Anglo-American 
forces during the period of June to October 1944 amounted to 
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11, 182 aircraft destroyed or damaged. 61 This amounted to 75.4% of 
all Luftwaffe losses during this period (see Table VI). The losses 
incurred on the German-Soviet Front amounted to 3,650 aircraft or 
24.60/o of total Luftwaffe losses for the same period (see Table VI). 
Therefore, Anglo-American efforts can be credited with assisting 
the Soviet Union in achieving air superiority on the Eastern Front. 
The success of the Soviet summer offensive caused a 
readjustment of German Luftflotten on the Eastern Front as the 
Wehrmacht fell back into Eastern Europe. The Luftflotten were 
consolidated into three Luftflotten: Luftflotte I isolated in 
Couriand; Luftflotte 11 covering East Prussia to Slovakia; and 
Luftflotte IV defending Austria, Hungary and northern Yugoslavia. 
TABLE II 


























Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste 
der deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer 
Geschichte No. 3, 1978, p. 328. 
TABLE Ill 


























Source: Olaf Groehler, "Staerke, Verteilung und Verluste 
der deutschen Luftwaffe im Zweiten Weltkrieg," Militaer 
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Figure 16. Soviet Production Centers. Source: General 
Hans-Detluf Herhudt von Rhoden, "The Last Great Attack 
of the German Bombers in the Eastern Theater of 
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Figure 17. The Luftwaffe's Last Strategic Victory in 
the East. Source: General Hans-Detluf Herhudt von 
Rhoden, "The Last Great Attack of the German Bombers 
in the Eastern Theater of Operations," Military Review 
Vol. 31, September 1951, p. 76. 
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Figure 18. Luftflotten Boundaries. Source: Alfred 
Price, Luftwaffe Handbook 1939-1945 (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Son, 1977), p. 11. 
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Figure 19. Tactical Subordinate Relationships in the 
German Air Force. Source: General der Flieger a. 0. Paul 
Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of 
the Army, USAF Historical Studies: No. 163 (New York: 
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Figure 20. Command Organization and Chain of 
Command for Operations of Flying Units in Support of 
the Army by Interdiction of the Battlefield. Source: 
General der Flieger a. D. Paul Deichmann, German Air 
Force Operations in Support of the Army, USAF 
Historical Studies: No. 163 (New York: Arno Press, 
1963), p. 188. 
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Figure 21. Command Relationships Between Luftwaffe 
And Army On The Eastern Front, 25 December 1943. 
Source: Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher, The German 
Air Force Versus Russia, 1943, USAF Historical Studies: 
No. 155, (New York: Arno Press, Inc., 1968), p. 364. 
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Attack Wing on July 8, 1943 at Bjelgorod. Source: 
General der Flieger a. D. Paul Deichmann, German Air 
Force Operations in Support of the Army, USAF 
Historical Studies: No. 163 (New York: Arno Press, 
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Armored Breakthrough On The Eastern Front, South, 
1944. Source: General der Flieger a. D. Paul Deichmann, 
German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, 
USAF Historical Studies: No. 163 (New York: Arno 
Press, 1963), p. 204. 
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CHAPTERV 
LEND-LEASE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COLLAPSE OF 
THE WEHRMACHT IN THE EAST IN THE SUMMER OF 
1944 
Lend-Lease contributed greatly to the military success of the 
Red Army in 1944. Lend-Lease supplies which the Soviet Union had 
received in 1941 and 1942 had not contributed significantly to the 
military successes of the Soviet Union. However, Lend-Lease 
supplies that reached the Soviet Union in 1943 and 1944 were 
significant to Soviet military success and consequently the 
collapse of the German Army in the East in the summer of 1944. 
Soviet writers fail to credit Lend-Lease with helping the 
Soviets achieve military victory over the Germans. They contend 
that Lend-Lease amounted to only 4 percent of Soviet industrial 
production although the proportion of western tanks is credited 
with 7 percent and 13 percent of aircraft. 1 Soviet writers take the 
position that "deliveries of this size could not have possibly had 
any marked effect on the course of the war," and Lend-Lease was 
"an insignificant supplementary source" of supplies.2 The supplies 
received after Stalingrad were "no longer needed," but during the 
critical first 6 months of the war Lend-Lease supplies amounted to 
only 0.1 percent of total Soviet production.3 
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Despite Soviet disclaimers about Lend-Lease aid, the 
importance of this aid can be readily established in the years 
1943-1945. Lend-Lease aid was supplied by several routes (see 
Figure 29). The Northern Russia convoy route was the most 
dangerous and difficult (see Figure 30). The opening of the "Persian 
corridor, facilitated the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies (see 
Figure 31 ). In 1943, shipments through the "Persian corridor" 
included 920 tanks, more than 5000 aircraft, and almost 145,000 
motor vehicles or nearly five times more than in 1942.4 The Soviet 
Union had received 173,000 vehicles and 4,300 tanks from the 
United States by the end of 1943.5 The gross tonnage had almost 
doubled and reached the level of 27 percent of all U.S. Lend-Lease 
(see Table VII). 
According to Table VII, 63 percent of all Lend-Lease arrived 
during 1943 and 1944. In the last 14 months of the war the Soviets 
received almost 11.1 million tons of Lend-Lease supplies. s The 
Lend-Lease shipments of 1944 were approximately 30 percent 
greater than in 1943. 1 However, the dollar value of the Lend-Lease 
supplies received during the twelve months ending in June 1944 
exceeded the previous 12 months by 81 percent (see Table VIII & 
IX).8 This level of assistance can be seen to have contributed to 
Soviet military power when the types of supplies are examined. 
There are various opinions as to which Lend-Lease supplies 
contributed most to Soviet victory. The United States supplied the 
U.S.S.R. with 15,000,000 pairs of boots between March 1941 to 
October 1945.9 The U.S.S.R. received 6 million pairs of boots by 
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1944.10 Therefore, the Red Army marched in boots primarily 
provided by the United States and boots were essential to the 
mobility of Red Army infantry. Food has been ranked as also 
important. American Lend-Lease food could have provided one 
pound of concentrated ration per day for 6 million soldiers for the 
length of the entire war.11 Lend-Lease food prevented a substantial 
reduction in civilian food supplies. It has been estimated that 
average civilian caloric consumption would have declined by at 
least one-third without Lend-Lease.12 According to Secretary of 
State, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. in 1944: 
The best-fed group in Russia today is the Red Army. 
Everything has been sacrificed for the soldiers, and 
Lend-Lease food shipments have helped to keep their 
fighting strength high.13 
Furthermore, Stettinius declared in 1944: 
Planes and tanks are the most dramatic part of our 
Lend-Lease aid to Russia, but in the last analysis they 
are probably not the most important. As Admiral Akulin 
said soon after he arrived in this country, "by sending 
us raw materials and manufacturing equipment, you 
actually increase the combat strength of the Red Army 
considerably more than you do by the number of planes 
and tanks you send us."14 
LEND-LEASE AIRCRAFT IN THE SOVIET UNION 
It is evident that Lend-Lease supplies assisted the Soviets in 
numerous areas. However, in the summer of 1944 the Red Army 
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required mobility and air power to defeat the German Army in the 
East. Lend-Lease made significant contributions in both of these 
areas. Lend-Lease aircraft comprised about 15 percent of the 
Soviet Air Force in 1943.15 The Soviet Union had received 6,430 
aircraft from the United States and 5,800 aircraft from Britain 
between June 22, 1941 and April 30, 1944.16 By October of 1944, 
Lend-Lease aircraft amounted to 8,734 U.S. and 6,015 British 
aircraft.17 Soviet combat losses amounted to 1,500 per month or 
18,000 aircraft per year.is According to Table X most of the U.S. 
Lend-Lease aircraft that arrived between June 22, 1941 and 
October 1944 were delivered after July 31, 1943. Therefore, 
between August 1943 and October 1944 the Soviet Union received 
5,087 U.S. Lend-Lease aircraft or 58 percent of all U.S. aircraft 
deliveries made since June 22, 1941. The increased deliveries of 
aircraft assisted the Soviet Union in replacing its combat losses of 
1,500 aircraft per month and in establishing air superiority in 
1944. 
THE IMPACT OF LEND-LEASE MOTOR VEHICLES 
IN THE SOVIET UNION 
The most significant impact of Lend-Lease on the collapse of 
the German Wehrmacht in the East was the delivery of motor 
vehicles to the Soviet Union which made it possible to motorize the 
Red Army. Table XI delineates in detail the number of vehicles 
delivered to the Soviet Union. Analysis of certain vehicle 
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categories shows how important Lend-Lease was to the 
motorization of the Red Army. The following vehicle categories are 
summarized based upon the actual vehicles which arrived in the 
Soviet Union from U.S. Lend-Lease: 
Jeeps 
Trucks 




















The vehicle totals given above represent the total U.S. Lend-Lease 
arrivals in the Soviet Union for the entire war. But most of the 
motor vehicles had reached the Soviet Union by the end of the Third 
Protocol period on June 30, 1944. Table XII shows the distribution 
of tonnage for trucks, other vehicles and railroad transportation 
equipment as shipped by period and protocol. 
Railroad equipment played only a minor role since only 70,466 
tons or 15 percent of Lend-Lease railroad equipment was shipped 
between July 1, 1943 and June 30, 1944. No other railroad 
equipment had been furnished prior to the third protocol period. 
The analysis of motor vehicle tonnage revealed that a total 
tonnage of 1,406,564 tons was shipped to the Soviet Union by June 
30, 1944. This constituted 61 percent of all motor vehicle tonnage 
shipped to the Soviet Union. A total of 883,387 tons or 39 percent 
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was received after June 30, 1944 and of this amount 238, 11 7 tons 
or 10.4 percent was received after Germany had surrendered. 
Approximately 61 percent of all Lend-Lease vehicles were 
furnished to the Soviet Union before July 1, 1944. Between July 1, 
1943 and June 30, 1944 approximately 742,337 tons or 32 percent 
of all Lend-Lease motor vehicles were received. The Soviet Union 
received 645,270 tons or 28 percent of all Lend-Lease vehicles 
Between July 1, 1944 and May 12, 1945. Therefore, the bulk of 
Lend-Lease motor vehicles were available for the Soviet summer 
offensive of 1944. 
Lend-Lease motor vehicles "put the Red Army infantry on 
wheels for the first time in its history."19 Previously, the Red 
Army infantry had to march into battle and during the course of 
offensive operations would lag behind the armored formations. The 
German Army would then isolate the exposed armored units and cut 
them off and seal the breach in their lines before the advancing 
Soviet infantry could reach the exposed armored units. However, 
with Lend-Lease trucks and vehicles the infantry could advance 
with the Soviet armored formations and effectuate strategic 
breakthroughs. According to the historian John Erickson: 
In the offensive operations of 1942-3 the Red Army had 
been severely inhibited by the lack of lorries. Here 
Lend-Lease Supplies which pumped in 183,000 lorries 
and jeeps by mid-1943 (and a grand total of 430,000 by 
1944 ), certainly relieved some of the Red Army's 
chronic lorry starvation. Every operation, both in 
preparation and execution, had been impeded by the 
shortage of lorries; every armored formation needed 
more lorries than it could muster.20 
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Red Army Officers told U.S. Ambassador William Averell 
Harriman in the summer of 1944 that without Lend-Lease American 
trucks the Red Army could not have advanced so rapidly.21 The 
retreating Wehrmacht had systematically destroyed railways and 
bridges. Therefore, the advancing Red Army was extremely 
dependent on motor vehicles to move their troops around and 
through devastated areas. According to an American official report 
Lend-Lease trucks carried "half of the highway-borne supplies for 
the advancing Soviet armies in the great offensives of this (1944) 
spring and summer on the Eastern Front. "22 British observers noted 
that Lend-Lease vehicles were important to the Red Army's 
success.23 The British observed that the success of the Red Army 
artillery was dependent on transport which was primarily Lend-
Lease trucks.24 The British believed that of all the Lend-Lease aid, 
"the most valuable was probably the vast number of trucks. "25 
U.S. Military Attache, General John R. Deane claimed that 
truck transportation and combat vehicles were the most" important 
Lend-Lease items.26 On a trip to the Russian front in July 1944, 
General Deane noted: 
We encountered American trucks everywhere. They 
appeared to be the only sort of vehicles used for convoy 
work. The roads were jammed with transportation of 
all descriptions, but except for American trucks there 
did not appear to be enough of any one kind to set up 
convoys which could be moved as units. They were 
easily recognized by the blue "U.S." and the American 
serial number stenciled on the hood of each ... We saw 
thousands of American trucks on the road. They were 
the only vehicles which appeared to be organized into 
transportation units. Many of them carried troops ... 27 
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General Deane delineated the significance of Lend-Lease aid 
by comparing the Soviet and German armies: 
It was apparent that the Russian victories were won by 
superior mobility. The combined bomber offensive of 
the Western Allies was taking its toll of German oil, 
and the German artillery and much of the transport we 
saw was mostly horsedrawn. The Russians with their 
preponderance of motorized and mechanized equipment 
were thus able to outmaneuver the Germans. Here again 
one could see the results of American assistance.2s 
The large numbers of four and six wheeled American trucks 
enabled the Soviet tank and motorized formations to move cross-
country while the German armor and motorized units were tied to 
the roads because of the lack of motorization in these 
formations.29 Many Panzer divisions were forced to rely on horse-
drawn panje columns for supply and baggage transport.Jo According 
to historian Albert Seaton: 
The German equivalent to the Red Army quarter-ton 
jeep for commander or messenger remained the horse. 
The counterpart of the Studebaker or Dodge six-wheeled 
drive truck was the horse-drawn panje wagon.JI 
Thus, the Red Army had achieved not only numerical superiority but 
also a superiority in motorization and mechanization over the 
Wehrmacht. 
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SOVIET AND GERMAN MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
The importance of Lend-Lease trucks in the Red Army 
becomes more apparent when Soviet and German truck production is 
compared. Soviet domestic production averaged 8000 trucks per 
month while Lend-Lease imports averaged 11,500.32 Lend-Lease 
allowed the Soviet Union to de-emphasize vehicle production so 
that it could concentrate on tank and aircraft production. German 
truck production averaged 9,500 trucks per month (see Figure 32).33 
However, according to OKW records 109, 113 trucks were lost on 
the various fronts between January and August 1944.34 This 
amounted to 39 percent of the entire military stock available and 
was the entire production for 1943.35 Despite allied bombing 
German production of motor vehicles in 1944 was considerable (see 
Table XIII). Germany also received motor vehicles from the 
industries of occupied countries in Europe (see Table XIV). It 
becomes clear from Table XIV that Germany was the primary 
producer of German Army vehicles. The production of motor 
vehicles by the Soviet Union remained inferior to Germany and its 
supply from the occupied countries. Therefore, Lend-Lease 
provided the margin of superiority to the Red Army so that it 
achieved mechanized and motorized superiority over the 
Wehrmacht. The significance of this motorized superiority in the 
summer of 1944 was noted by one historian: 
It is also doubtful that the Soviet Union could have 
conducted its immense offensives without Western aid. 
The assistance to transport and communications 
systems gave the Soviet forces a special advantage in 
massing their forces quickly, sustaining them during 
the "buildup" phase of an attack, and supporting them 
during offensives which ranged 300-400 miles in depth . 
.. . Without Western aid in this phase of the war the 
Soviet Union would still have survived, and probably 
eventually would have won. But without Lend-Lease, 
victory would have been postponed, and the Soviet share 
of victory and presence in eastern and central Europe 
reduced.36 
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Soviet truck production was very inadequate and was cut in 
half during the war.37 When American trucks became abundant 
Soviet production was scaled back even further. Soviet domestic 
truck production from 1942-1945 was approximately 197, 100. 38 
The tremendous numbers of Lend-Lease trucks, jeeps, motorcycles 
and other vehicles provided not only the mobility for the Red Army, 
but permitted the Soviet Union to concentrate productive capacity 
in the manufacture of tanks and aircraft.39 
SOVIET AND GERMAN TANK PRODUCTION 
Soviet industry freed from the constraints of having to 
produce masses of trucks was able to concentrate on tank 
production. The Soviet Union produced 79,611 tanks compared to 
25,006 produced by Germany.4o The total number of tanks and self-
propelled guns produced by the Soviet Union was approximately 
112,952 (see Table XV).41 Total German production of tanks and 
self-propelled guns amounted to 46,742 vehicles or 41 percent of 
the total Soviet production (see Table XVl).42 Table XVII delineates 
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the Soviet superiority in tank production as compared to German 
tank production during the war. lend-Lease armored vehicle 
shipments to the Soviet Union were extremely small (see Table XI) 
when compared to motor vehicle shipments. Thus, Lend-Lease aid 
permitted the Soviets to maintain and increase their tank strength 
(see Figure 33) by continued concentration on tank production since 
trucks and other motor transport were provided mostly by the 
United States. 
TABLE VII 
ANNUAL LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO THE SOVIET UNION 






















Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great 
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M. 
University, December 1986), p. 105. 
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TABLE VIII 
LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, JULY 1942-JUNE 1943 
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) 
Lend-Lease Shipments 
Ordnance and ammunition 
Aircraft and parts 
Tanks and parts 
Watercraft 
Motor Vehicles and parts 













Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great 
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M 
University, December 1986), p. 132; U.S. President, 
Reports to Congress Lend-Lease Operations, No. 16 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-45), 
p. 30. 
TABLE IX 
LEND-LEASE SHIPMENTS TO THE USSR, JULY 1943-JUNE 1944 
(THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) 
Lend-Lease Shipments 
Ordance and ammunition 
Aircraft and parts 
Tanks and parts 
Motor Vehicles and parts 














Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great 
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M 
University, December 1986), p. 135; U.S. President, 
Reports to Congress Lend-Lease Operations, No. 16 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943-45), 
p. 30. 
TABLEX 
AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES TO THE SOVIET UNION 











Source: Hubert Paul Van Tuyll, "Lend-Lease And The Great 
Patriotic War, 1941-1945," (PH.D Thesis, Texas A & M 




VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION 
UNDERTHELEND-LEASEPROGRAM 
Items Lend-Lease Total Arrived Lost Diverted 
ExgQrt Ex122rts En RQ!Jte 
Jeeps: 
1/4 ton 47,993 48,993 43,728 3,657 1,378 
4x4 
amphib. 3,510 3,510 3,510 0 0 
Total 51,5.03 52,503 47,238 3,657 1,378 
Trucks: 
3/4 ton 25,240 25,240 24,564 78 598 
1 1/2 ton 153,415 159,494 148,664 6,660 1,826 
2 1/2 ton 190,952 193,603 182,938 4,300 1, 130 
2 112 ton 589 589 586 3 0 
amphib. 
5 ton plus 852 858 814 0 0 
special 2,792 2,792 2,784 8 0 
purpose 




Total 375, 781 384,536 362,288 11,055 3,554 
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TABLE XI 
VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION 
UNDER THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM 
(continued) 
Items Lend-Lease Total Arrived Lost Diverted 




Field 1,543 1,543 1,543 9 0 
repair 
trucks 
Tank 130 130 130 0 0 
recovery 
units 
Tank 655 655 629 26 0 
trans-
porters 
Total 2,328 2,328 2,293 35 0 
Combat 
Vehicles: 
Light 1,682 1,682 1,239 443 0 
tanks 




VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION 
UNDER THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM 
(continued) 
Items Lend-Lease Total Arrived Lost Diverted 




AT 5 5 5 0 0 
75mm 
AT 650 650 650 0 0 
57mm 
AT 3in. 52 52 52 0 0 
AT 100 100 100 0 0 
37mm 
AA 1,000 1,000 1,000 0 0 
50cal. 
Half- 1, 158 1, 158 1, 104 54 0 
tracks 
Armored 3,282 3,282 3,054 288 0 
scout 
cars 
Total 13,303 13,303 12,161 1, 142 0 
Motor- 35, 170 35, 170 32,200 1,870 1, 100 
cycles 























VEHICLES DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET UNION 














































Source: Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States 
Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1969), Appendix A, Table IV; U.S. 
Department of State. Protocol and Area Information Staff 
of the U.S.S.R. Branch of the Division of Research and 
Reports. "Report on war Aid Furnished by the United States 
to the U.S.S.R." Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign 




MOTOR VEHICLES AND RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 
JUNE 22, 1941 - SEPTEMBER 2, 1945 
Time PeriQd T~ge of Cargo TQtal Tonnage 
June 22, 1941-Sept. Trucks and other 1,575 
30, 1941 Vehicles 
R.R. Transportation 0 
Equipment 
Oct. 1, 1941-June Trucks and other 214,164 
30, 1942 Vehicles 
R.R. Transportation 0 
Equipment 
July 1, 1942-June Trucks and other 448,488 
30, 1943 Vehicles 
R.R. Transportation 0 
Equipment 
July 1, 1943-June Trucks and other 742,337 
30, 1944 Vehicles 
R.R. Transportation 70,466 
Equipment 
July 1, 1944-May 12, Trucks and other 645,270 
1945 Vehicles 




MOTOR VEHICLES AND RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 
JUNE 22, 1941 • SEPTEMBER 2, 1945 
Time Period 




Type of Cargo 







Trucks and other Vehicles 
R.R. Transportation Eguipment 
2,289,951 
467.585 
Source: Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States 
Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1969), Appendix A, Table I; U.S. 
Department of State. Protocol and Area Information Staff 
of the U.S.S.R. Branch of the Division of Research and 
Reports. "Report on war Aid Furnished by the United States 
to the U.S.S.R." Foreign Economic Section, Office of Foreign 
Liquidation, Department of State, November 28, 1945, pp. 
1-8. 
TABLE XIII 
GERMAN PRODUCTION OF MOTOR VEHICLES 1944 
Product Quantity 
Trucks: 
Up to & incl. 1 .5-ton 
3-ton (incl. "Mules") 
4.5-ton & up (incl. "Mutes") 


















Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German Motor 
Vehicles Industry Report, Munitions Division, January 
1947, p. 13. 
TABLE XIV 
MOTOR VEHICLE PRODUCTION IN OCCUPIED COUNTRIES 








































Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German Motor 
Vehicles Industry Report, Munitions Division, January 
194 7, Exhibit E, pp. 1-2. 
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TABLE XV 
SOVIET ARMORED VEHICLE PRODUCTION 
IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 





T-40 41 181 
T-50 48 1 5 
T-60 1,818 4,474 
T-70 4,883 3,343 
T-80 120 
T-34 117 3,014 12,553 15, 712 3,723 
T-34- 100 11,000 18,330 
85 
T-44 200 
KV-1 141 1, 121 1,753 
KV-2 102 232 
KV-1S 780 452 
KV-85 130 
IS-2 102 2,252 1,500 
SU-76* 26 1,928 7, 155 3,562 
SU-122 25 630 493 
SU-85 750 1,300 
SU-100 500 1, 175 
SU-152 704 
ISU-122/ 35 2,510 1,530 
ISU-152 
Tgtals 2.752 61274 241690 24.006 26.933 261297 
*SU-76 figures include small number of ZSU-37 production; 1945 
figures refer only to first six months. 
Source: Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, Sgviet Tanks And 
CQmbat Vehicles of WQrld War Two (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1984), p. 225. 
TABLE XVI 
GERMAN PANZER PRODUCTION: TANKS, ASSAULT GUNS 
AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS 
PANZERS 194Q 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Mark I and II 9 233 306 77 7 
Mark Ill 895 1,845 2,555 349 
Mark IV 280 480 964 3,073 3,371 417 
Tank Destroyer 1,764 458 
IV 
Assault Gun 184 550 828 3,319 5,884 1,061 
Ill/IV 
Panther 1,850 3,964 469 
Jagd-Panther 215 166 
Tiger I 75 647 623 
Tiger II 377 112 
Jagd-Tiger 2 51 26 
Self-Propelled 1,248 2,557 1,248 87 
Guns 
151 
Total German 1,368 3,108 5,979 11,874 17,504 2,796 
Panzers 
Jagd-38 1,598 1, 136 
38 t 275 698 195 87 124 
Total Panzers 1,643 3,806 6,174 11,961 19,226 3,932 
*German 1945 figures refer only to the first three months. 
Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Tank Industry 










COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND GERMAN 



















*Soviet 1945 figures refer only to the first six months; 
German 1945 figures refer only to the first three months. 
Source: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Tank 
Industry Report, Munitions Division, January 1947, Exhibit 
A; Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and 
Combat Vehicles of World War Two (London: Arms and 
Armour Press, 1984), p. 225. 
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Figure 29. Routes To Russia. 
Jones, The Roads to Russia: 
to the Soviet Union (Norman: 






Source: Robert Huhn 
United States Lend-Lease 
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Figure 30. Convoy Routes To North Russia. 
Robert Huhn Jones, The Roads to Russia: 
Source: 
United States 
University of Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union (Norman: 
Oklahoma Press, 1969), p. 101. 
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Figure 31. Middle East Supply Routes. Source: Edward 
R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease (New York: The Macmillan, 




























"10HT1-t JA•EA.H;( ~ 1ST J Ju1. ·.-~ •~ oe. r NC-1 ot:e f tA!'f _ riat 
m;-13 M:)"4THS 1944 
NOTU 
I. • ~STI"IVCT"(J .. 0' Oil"'Tl,., I .Aue ... .._.. 
I • D10 Cl' ""tl'tr:."4 r:JlllQ fll'llt<OC>uOT °"" 
1. • ~C-OM~rrter,-Tlit"\.C'T10111 Cl' ~P¥re.J 10/'11 .... • l.lt0/44 
.. • ..,,,...,...~l ("tO O• "'t)flltOfll'~IOf'll U A •l,VU' C1' ~ IJlll.A 
c.-1ntUCT10M TQ ca..oet 
Figure 32. German Truck Production. Source: The 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey, German Motor 
Vehicles Industry Report, Munitions Division, January 
1947, Figure 3. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SECOND FRONT: THE IMPACT ON 
GERMAN MOBILE RESERVES 
The necessity of fighting on several fronts reduced the 
concentration of military forces on any one front. The Soviet Union 
benefited from the dispersion of German forces. Both the Soviet 
and Anglo-American forces had the good fortune to only have to 
fight against a portion of the German Army on any given front while 
the Germans had to face the full brunt of each of the allied armies 
on their respective fronts. In the summer of 1944, the Soviets 
would have had to confront a much larger and more mobile German 
Army if there had not been an active Anglo-American second front. 
The Anglo-American forces tied down sufficient German infantry, 
Panzer Grenadier and Panzer divisions that the Soviet summer 
offensive achieved much of its success because the German 
reserves which could have been used to halt the offensive were 
engaged against Anglo-American forces. The most significant 
reserves the Wehrmacht had to prevent Soviet breakthroughs were 
its mobile formations and 49 percent of these units were located in 
the West. However, if the 2nd Hungarian Panzer Division and the 
1st Rumanian Panzer Division are excluded and only German mobile 
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units are compared then the ratio becomes 51 percent in the West 
and 49 percent in the East when the Soviet summer offensive began 
(see Tables XVIII & XX). If the mobile formations in the West had 
been available in the East during the summer of 1944 the outcome 
of the Soviet summer offensive would have been different. 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST AND THE EAST 
IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 
The German military had 79 infantry divisions, 9 Luftwaffe 
field divisions, 5 parachute divisions, 1 air landing division, 5 
Jaeger divisions, 5 mountain divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 8 
Panzer Grenadier divisions, and 15 Panzer divisions located in the 
West in June 1944 (see Tables XVIII & XIX). The German and Axis 
order of battle in the East contained 130 German infantry divisions, 
4 German Luftwaffe field divisions, 7 German Jaeger divisions, 5 
German mountain divisions, 6 German Panzer Grenadier divisions, 
16 German Panzer divisions, 11 Hungarian infantry divisions, 1 
Hungarian Panzer division, 18 Rumanian infantry divisions, 2 
Rumanian mountain divisions, 1 Rumanian Panzer division and 1 
Slovakian infantry division (see Tables XX & XXI). 
A comparison of non-mobile divisions in the West and the 
'East as delineated in Table XIX and Table XXI show the bulk of non-
mobile divisions to be in the East. According to Tables XIX and XXI, 
58 percent of German non-mobile divisions were located in the East 
and 42 percent were in the West in June 1944. However, when all 
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Eastern European Axis divisions are also calculated into the total 
axis military force then the percentage of military power in the 
West declines in comparison to the East. A ratio of German and 
Axis Allies in the East when compared to the West shows that 63 
percent of all German and Axis non-mobile divisions were in the 
East compared to 37 percent in the West. 
Therefore, the majority of German and Axis divisions were 
deployed in the East. However, 51 percent of all German mobile 
divisions and 42 percent of all non-mobile German divisions were 
located in the West. This military deployment in the West 
amounted to 128 divisions of which more than half would have been 
available to fight in the East if there had been no second front. 
Soviet success in the East was achieved because of German 
weakness and German weakness resulted from fighting a two-front 
war. If the German forces in the West had been mostly available to 
fight in the East then the outcome of the war in the East would 
have been different. German mobile reserves were absolutely 
critical to the success of German defense against Soviet 
breakthroughs and half of these reserves were needed to prevent an 
Anglo-American breakthrough in the West. Therefore, the second 
front pinned down the critical reserves needed to prevent the 
Soviet breakthrough in the East in the summer of 1944. 





Army Group B 
15th Army: 
7th Army: 







GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS, 
ORDER OF BATILE IN THE WEST 
JUNE 1944 
Mobile Divisions 
233rd Reserve Panzer Division 
19th Panzer Division 
2nd Panzer Division 
116th Panzer Division 
9th SS Panzer Division 
"Hohenstaufen" 
10th SS Panzer Division 
"Frundsberg" 
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1 st SS Panzer Division 
"Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" 
21st Panzer Division 
12th SS Panzer Division 
"Hitlerjugend" 
17th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Division "Goetz Von 
Berlichingen" 
Panzer Lehr Division 
2nd SS Panzer Division "Das 
Reich" 
9th Panzer Division 
11th Panzer Division 
3rd Panzer Grenadier Division 
29th Panzer Grenadier Division 
90th Panzer Grenadier Division 
26th Panzer Division 




GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS, 
ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST 
JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Country and Army 
10th Army: 
Army Detachment Von Zangen: 
0.B. SOUTHEAST 
Anny Group E 
GFEECE 
Total Mobile Divisions: 
Panzer Grenadier Divisions 
Panzer Divisions 
Total Mobile Divisions 
Mobile Divisions 
15th Panzer Grenadier Division 
16th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Division "Reichsfuehrer SS" 
18th SS Panzer Grenadier 
Division "Horst Wessel" 





Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
10 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V. 
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene 
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr. 
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World 
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41-
473; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorjsierten 
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: Podzun-
Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej, 
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11, 
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing 
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe 
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown, 
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46; 
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. -




GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE, 
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN, 
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS 







IN JUNE 1944 
Divisi_ons 
89th Infantry Division 
196th Infantry Division 
199th Infantry Division 
230th Infantry.Division 
269th Infantry Division 
270th Infantry Division 
274th Infantry Division 
280th Infantry Division. 
295th Infantry Division 
702nd Infantry Division 
710th Infantry Division 
14th Luftwaffe Field Division 
160th Reserve Infantry Division 
166th Reserve Infantry Division 
363rd Infantry Division 
416th Infantry Division 
34 7th Infantry Division 
719th Infantry Division 
16th Luftwaffe Field Division 
4 7th Infantry Division 
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TABLE XIX 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE, 
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN, 
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS 
Country and Army 
15th Army: 
7th Army 
IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Division~ 
48th Infantry Division 
49th Infantry Division 
84th Infantry Division 
85th Infantry Division 
165th Reserve Infantry Division 
182nd Reserve Infantry Division 
245th Infantry Division 
326th Infantry Division 
331 st Infantry Division 
344th Infantry Division 
346th Infantry Division 
348th Infantry Division 
711th Infantry Division 
712th Infantry Division 
1 7th Luftwaffe Field Division 
18th Luftwaffe Field Division 
77th Infantry Division 
91 st Air Landing Division 
243rd Infantry Division 
265th Infantry Division 
266th Infantry Division 
275th Infantry Division 
319th Infantry Division 
343rd Infantry Division 
352nd Infantry Division 
353rd Infantry Division 
709th Infantry Division 
716th Infantry Division 
2nd Parachute Division 
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TABLE XIX 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE, 
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN, 
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS 
Country and Army 
7th Army 







IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Divisions 
3rd Parachute Division 
5th Parachute Division 
189th Reserve Infantry Division 
158th Reserve Infantry Division 
159th Reserve Infantry Division 
276th Infantry Division 
708th Infantry Division 
148th Reserve Infantry Division 
157th Reserve Infantry Division 
242nd Infantry Division 
244th Infantry Division 
271 st Infantry Division 
272nd Infantry Division 
277th Infantry Division 
338th Infantry Division 
715th Infantry Division 
65th Infantry Division 
92nd Infantry Division 
162nd Infantry Division 
356th Infantry Division 
362nd Infantry Division 
19th Luftwaffe Field Division 
20th Luftwaffe Field Division 
4th Parachute Division 
71 st Infantry Division 
94th Infantry Division 
278th Infantry Division 
305th Infantry Division 
334th Infantry Division 
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TABLE XIX 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE, 
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN, 
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS 
IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Country and Army Divi.siQns 
10th Army 
Army Detachment Von Zangen 
1st Parachute Division 
5th Mountain Division 
114th Jaeger Division 
42nd Jaeger Division 
0.B. SOUTHEAST 
2nd Panzer Army 
Army Group E 
GFEECE 
19th Luftwaffe Field Division 
98th Infantry Division 
1st Mountain Division 
8th SS Cavalry Division "Florian 
Geyer" 
181 st Infantry Division 
264th Infantry Division 
297th Infantry Division 
369th Infantry Division 
373rd Infantry Division 
392nd Infantry Division 
1st Cossack Cavalry Division 
11 Sth Jaeger Division 
"Brandenburg " 
7th SS Mountain Division "Prinz 
Eugen" 
13th SS Mountain Division 
"Handschar" (Croation #1) 
21st SS Mountain Division 
(Albanian #1) 
22nd Infantry 
41 st Fortress Division 
133rd Fortress Division 
104th Jaeger Division 
117th Jaeger Division 
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TABLE XIX 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST FOR INFANTRY PARACHUTE, 
AIR LANDING, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN, 
CAVALRY, AND LUFTWAFFE FIELD DIVISIONS 
IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Country and Army Divisions 
Army Group E 
GFEECE 440th Assault Division "Rhodos" 
11th Luftwaffe Field Division 
TOTAL DIVISIONS: 
Infantry Divisions: 79 
Luftwaffe Field Divisions: 8 
Parachute Divisions: 5 
Air Landing Divisions: 1 
Jaeger Divisions: 5 
Mountain Divisions: 5 
Cavalry Divisions: 2 
Total: 105 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
10 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V. 
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene 
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr. 
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World 
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41-
4 73; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorisierten 
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: Podzun-
Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej, 
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11, 
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing 
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe 
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown, 
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46; 
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. -




GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS, ORDER OF BATTLE 
IN THE EAST JUNE 1944 
Army Group and Army 
AP.MY GROUP NORTH 
Army Detachment Narva 
AP.MY GROUP CENTER 
4th Army 
9th Army 
ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE 
1st Hungarian Army 
1st Panzer Army 
4th Panzer Army 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
6th Army 
8th Army 
4th Rumanian Army 
Mobile Divisions 
12th Panzer Division 
11th SS Panzer Grenadier 
"Nordland" 
60th Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle" 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division 
20th Panzer Division 
16th Panzer Division 
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division 
1st Panzer Division 
7th Panzer Division 
8th Panzer Division 
17th Panzer Division 
20th Panzer Grenadier Division 
4th Panzer Division 
5th Panzer Division 
1st Rumanian Panzer Division 
3rd Panzer Division 
10th Panzer Grenadier Division 
13th Panzer Division 
23rd Panzer Divsion 
Panzer Division 
"G rossdeutschland" 
3rd SS Panzer Division 
"Totenkopf" 
TABLE XX 
GERMAN MOBILE DIVISIONS, ORDER OF BATTLE 
IN THE EAST JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Army Group and Army 
4th Rumanian Army 
TOTAL MOBILE DIVISIONS 
Panzer Greandier Divisions 
Panzer Divisions 
Total German Mobile divisions 
2nd Hungarian Panzer Division 
1st Rumanian Panzer Division 
Total Mobile Divisions 
Mobile Divisions 
14th Panzer Division 








Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
1 O (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V. 
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene 
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr. 
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World 
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41-
4 73; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorisierten 
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: Podzun-
Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej, 
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11, 
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing 
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe 
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown, 
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46; 
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. -
10.8.44, National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll 
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TABLE XXI 
GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR 
INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE 
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944 
Army Group 
FINLAND 
20th Mountain Army 
ARMY GROUP NORTH 
16th Army 
Divisions 
163rd Infantry Division 
169th Infantry Division 
210th Infantry Division 
2nd Mountain Division 
6th Mountain Division 
7th Mountain Division 
Field Training Division "Nord" 
21st Infantry Division 
23rd Infantry Division 
24th Infantry Division 
30th Infantry Division 
32nd Infantry Division 
69th Infantry Division 
81 st Infantry Division 
83rd Infantry Division 
87th Infantry Division 
93rd Infantry Division 
121 st Infantry Division 
126th Infantry Division 
132nd Infantry Division 
205th Infantry Division 
207th Infantry Division 
212th Infantry Division 
215th Infantry Division 
21 Sth Infantry Division 
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Army Detachment Narva 
ARMY GROUP CENTER 
3rd Panzer Army 
Divisions 
263rd Infantry Division 
281 st Infantry Division 
285th Security Division 
290 Infantry Division 
300th Division Z.B.V. 
329th Infantry Division 
389th Infantry Division 
15th SS Waffen-Grenadier 
Division (Latvian #1) 
19th SS Waffen-Grenadier 
Division (Latvian #2) 
12th Luftwaffe Field Division 
21st Luftwaffe Field Division 
11th Infantry Division 
58th Infantry Division 
61 st Infantry Division 
122nd Infantry Division 
170th Infantry Division 
225th Infantry Division 
227th Infantry Division 
285th Security Division 
20th SS Waffen-Grenadier 
Division (Estonian #1) 
390th Field training Division 
14th Infantry Division 
707th Infantry Division 
95th Infantry Division 
197th Infantry Division 
201 st Security Division 
206th Infantry Division 
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GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR 
INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE 
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Army Group 





221 st Security Division 
246th Infantry Division 
252nd Infantry Division 
256th Infantry Division 
299th Infantry Division 
391 st Security Division 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division 
12th Infantry Division 
31st Infantry Division 
57th Infantry Division 
78th "Sturm" Division 
110th Infantry Division 
260th Infantry Division 
267th Infantry Division 
286th Security Division 
337th Infantry Division 
6th Infantry Division 
35th Infantry Division 
36th Infantry Division 
45th Infantry Division 
102nd Infantry Division 
129th Infantry Division 
134th Infantry Division 
292nd Infantry Division 
296th Infantry Division 
383rd Infantry Division 
7th Infantry Division 
137th Infantry Division 
203rd Security Division 
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ARMY GROUP NORTH UKRAINE 
4th Panzer Army 
1st Panzer Army 
Divi.s.!Qns 
251 st Infantry Division 
5th Jaeger Division 
1st Hungarian Infantry Division 
5th Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
12th Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
23rd Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
26th Infantry Division 
72nd Infantry Division 
88th Infantry Division 
131 st Infantry Division 
183rd Infantry Division 
214th Infantry Division 
217th Infantry Division 
253rd Infantry Division 
291 st Infantry Division 
339th Infantry Division 
340th Infantry Division 
342nd Infantry Division 
361 st Infantry Division 
454th Security Division 
1 st Ski Jaeger Division 
28th Jaeger Division 
1st Infantry Division 
75th Infantry Division 
96th Infantry Division 
168th Infantry Division 
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GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR 
INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE 
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Army Group 
1st Panzer Army 
1st Hungarian Army 
ARMY GROUP SOUTH UKRAINE 
Army Group General Dumitrescu 
3rd Rumanian Army 
Di vi~ 
208th Infantry Division 
254th Infantry Division 
349th Infantry Division 
357th Infantry Division 
359th Infantry Division 
367th Infantry Division 
371 st Infantry Division 
1 OOth Jaeger Division 
20th Hungarian Infantry Division 
68th Infantry Division 
101 st Jaeger Division 
16th Hungarian Infantry Division 
18th Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
19th Hungarian Reserve Infantry 
Division 
24th Hungarian Infantry Division 
25th Hungarian Infantry Division 
27th Hungarian Infantry Division 
153rd Field Training Division 
1 st Slovakian Infantry Division 
8th Rumanian Infantry Division 
9th Infantry Division 
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GERMAN AND AXIS ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE EAST FOR 
INFANTRY, JAEGER, MOUNTAIN AND LUFTWAFFE 
FIELD DIVISIONS IN JUNE 1944 
(continued) 
Army Group 
3rd Rumanian Army 
6th Army 
Army Group General Woehler 
8th Army 
Divisions 
304th Infantry Division 
2nd Rumanian Infantry Division 
9th Rumanian Infantry Division 
15th Rumanian Infantry Division 
21st Rumanian Infantry Division 
4th Rumanian Mountain Division 
15th Infantry Division 
17th Infantry Division 
38th Infantry Division 
62nd Infantry Division 
106th Infantry Division 
123rd Infantry Division 
161 st Infantry Division 
25 7th Infantry Division 
258th Infantry Division 
282nd Infantry Division 
293rd Infantry Division 
294th Infantry Division 
302nd Infantry Division 
306th Infantry Division 
320th Infantry Division 
335th Infantry Division 
355th Infantry Division 
370th Infantry Division 
384th Infantry Division 
97th Jaeger Division 
4th Mountain Division 
14th Rumanian Infantry Division 
79th Infantry Division 
376th Infantry Division 
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Luftwaffe Field Divisions 
Jaeger Divisions 
Mountain Divisions 







3rd Rumanian Infantry Division 
5th Rumanian Infantry Division 
11th Rumanian Infantry Division 
46th Infantry Division 
76th Infantry Division 
198th Infantry Division 
8th Jaeger Division 
3rd Mountain Division 
1st Rumanian "Guards" Division 
1st Rumanian Infantry Division 
4th Rumanian Infantry Division 
5th Rumanian Infantry Division 
6th Rumanian Infantry Division 
7th Rumanian Infantry Division 
8th Rumanian Infantry Division 
13th Rumanian Infantry Division 
20th Rumanian Infantry Division 
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Total German and Axis Divisions 178 
* Note Finnish military divisions have been omitted from table. 
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Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
10 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1985), pp. 502-504; Ian V. 
Hogg, German Order of Battle 1944 (New York: Hippocrene 
Books Inc., 1975), pp. D2-D136; Samuel W. Mitchum, Jr. 
Hitler's Legions: The German Army Order of Battle. World 
War II (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1985), pp. 41-
473; Rolf Stoves, Die Gepanzerten und Motorisierten 
Deutschen Grossverbande 1935-1945 (Friedburg: Podzun-
Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1986), pp. 11-276; W. Victor Madej, 
German Army Order of Battle 1939-1945 Vols. 1-11, 
Supplement (Allentown, Pennsylvania: Game Marketing 
Company, 1981); W. Victor Madej, Southeastern Europe 
Axis Armed Forces Order of Battle (Allentown, 
Pennsylvania: Game Marketing Company, 1982), pp. 26-46; 
Der Grosse Durchbruch bei Heeresgruppe Mitte Von 21.6. -
10.8.44, National Archives Microfilm Publication T-78 Roll 
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CHAPTER VII 
PRELUDE TO THE BELORUSSIAN SUMMER OFFENSIVE: 
THE WINTER BATILES OF THE FOURTH ARMY 
AND THIRD PANZER ARMY IN THE 
WINTER OF 1943-1944 
The Soviet High Command had attempted during the winter 
battles of 1943-1944 to push back the Belorussian salient 
occupied by Army Group Center without much success. Army Group 
Center had achieved for the most part a defensive success by the 
use of mobile reserves and a creative shifting of troops in the 
front lines along lateral roads and railways to prevent enemy 
breakthroughs. Therefore, the Soviet High Command was forced to 
adopt new tactics and a more coordinated offensive plan so as to 
prevent the German shifting of mobile reserves and army level 
reserves to prevent breakthroughs. The evolution of the 
operational planning for the Summer Belorussian Offensive 
stemmed from the previous Soviet failures to breakthrough Army 
Group Center's Belorussian salient in the winter battles of 1943-
1944. An examination of the German 4th Army's defense of the 
Orsha-Mogilev sector and 3rd Panzer Army's protracted defense of 
the Vitebsk-Polotsk sector during the winter of 1943-1944 
delineates the problem the Soviet High Command faced in trying to 
182 
penetrate well prepared defensive positions backed up with mobile 
reserves. 
FOURTH ARMY 
The German Command of Army Group Center anticipated a 
major Soviet offensive during November 1943 against the 4th 
Army. On November 4, 1943 the Kriegstagebuch of Army Group 
Center noted that all signs of a major enemy offensive were 
present in the 4th Army sector. 1 The enemy was noted to have 22 
Rifle Divisions, 1 Guard Tank Corps and 1 Artillery Corps 
concentrated in this sector (See Appendix B for Soviet corps, 
divisional, and non-divisional unit structures).2 The German order 
of battle on October 26, 1943 in the 4th Army sector contained 
roughly 16 divisions although some were not at their authorized 
strength (see Table XXll). Ten days later the long awaited 
offensive began along both sides of the river Dnieper and the 
autobahn in the 4th Army area (see Figure 34). 
November 14. 1943 
The Soviets attacked after strong artillery preparation with 
15 Rifle Divisions supported by numerous tanks.3 The German 4th 
Army had only 12 divisions in the 4th Army sector as of November 
8, 1943 (see Table XXlll) to meet this attack. This attack achieved 
several breakthroughs which were liquidated in a counterattack. 
But the Soviets achieved two breakthroughs which resisted the 
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German counterattacks at Kostjany and north of the autobahn at 
Nowoje Sselo. The Kostjany penetration was 3 kilometers wide 
and 2 kilometers deep extending into the German main battle line.4 
November 15. 1943 
The Soviets continued their attack with heavy 
reinforcements but all attacks from Bobrowa to Kirijewo were 
repulsed.5 The breakthrough position at Kostjany was sealed off 
and the position at Nowoje Sselo was reduced by the capture of the 
town.6 
November 16. 1943 
The Soviet attacks were repulsed and the breakthroughs 
moped up. Penetrations north of Guraki and Chandogi were thrown 
back in a counterattack. 1 The enemy attacks in the area around 
Nowoje Sselo were defeated. The Kriegestagebuch of Army Group 
Center reflected that the German defensive success was achieved 
at the cost of high casualties and the situation was becoming 
strained as a result of German losses, enemy numerical 
superiority, and the continuous intensity of the tank attacks.a 
November 17. 1943 
The Soviets renewed their battle along both sides of the 
Dnieper river in full strength with 30 Rifle Divisions and strongly 
massed tank forces.9 The objective of the attack was to force a 
breakthrough at Orsha. The main concentration of the attack was 
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against Nowoje Sselo which was lost in the course of the battle 
but in general all other attacks were repulsed.10 The Soviets lost 
94 tanks in this attack before they were repulsed.11 The 
Headquarters of Army Group Center noted that despite the 
defensive victory achieved the loss of strength of German units and 
the exhaustion of the troops made the situation critical in the 4th 
Army sector.12 
November 18-21 . 1943 
The Soviets continued their major attack without success 
and they lost 31 tanks.13 Soviet attacks decreased in strength on 
November 19th and an attempted breakthrough in the XXVI I Corps 
sector was defeated.14 On November 20th there was a general 
decrease in Soviet attacks and the German line was held. Major 
Soviet attacks ceased on November 21, 1943 after seven days of 
non-stop breakthrough attempts. The Kriegstagebuch of Army 
Group Center noted that the 4th Army had achieved a defensive 
success in the third Battle of the Smolensk Autobahn.1s 
November 22-29. 1943 
A nine day lull settled in on the 4th Army sector. The Soviets 
launched local attacks against the front of the 337th Infantry 
Division in an attempt to prevent the breakthrough at Asarowa 
from being liquidated and the disengagement from the front by the 
95th Infantry Division.16 However, by November 29th the Asarowa 
position had been cleared up and the 95th Infantry Division 
disengaged from the front. 
November 30. 1943 
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The fourth Battle of the Smolensk Autobahn commenced with 
the renewal of the major Soviet offensive against the left flank of 
the 4th Army east of Orsha.11 The main concentration of effort 
was south of the Dnieper river and north of the Autobahn in the 
XXVI I Corps sector. Despite considerable numerical superiority the 
Soviets were repulsed and only achieved a breakthrough position at 
Chandogi and Bobrowo in the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division's 
sector.1s 
December 1 . 1943 
The Soviets attacked along both sides of the Autobahn with 
28 divisions in an attempt to breakthrough to Orsha.19 The Soviets 
failed to make a breakthrough toward Orsha and penetrations north 
of the Dnieper river were eliminated by German counterattack. 
December 2. 1943 
The Soviets resumed the attack on both sides of the Autobahn 
and the Dnieper river with 31 divisions.20 In the 18th Panzer 
Grenadier Division's sector the Soviets broke into Krassnaja 
Ssloboda.21 In the sectors of the 78th Sturm Division and the 25th 
Panzer Grenadier Division all Soviet attacks were smashed.22 
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December 3. 1943 
The Soviets continued their offensive east of Orsha on both 
sides of the Autobahn. However, the Soviets lost Krassnajea 
Ssloboda to a counterattack by the 18th Panzer Grenadier 
Division.23 The 4th Army was achieving defensive success against 
Soviet attacks but the strength of the Army was reduced to 9 
divisions as of December 3rd (see Table XXIV). 
December 4. 1943 
The Soviets ceased offensive operations after four days of 
offensive battles which resulted in high Soviet casualties and 
failure to breakthrough to Orsha.24 Army Group Center's 
Kriegstagebuch noted that the 4th Army had achieved a defensive 
victory in the 4th Battle of the Smolensk Highway.2s The 
Kriegstagebuch noted that the Soviets still had considerable tank 
forces which had not yet been employed in battle and that the 
enemy had probably not given up his objective of taking Orsha.26 
December 14. 1943 
Therefore, the 4th Army was reinforced as indicated by the 
December 14, 1943 order of battle (see Table XXV). The XXlll Corps 
was transferred from the 9th Army to the 4th Army. 
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THIRD PANZER ARMY 
The Third Panzer Army was in an extremely exposed position 
during the winter of 1943-1944. It was the northern most army in 
Army Group Center. One of the Soviet major goals of the 1943-
1944 Winter Campaign was the routing of German forces at Vitebsk 
see Figures 35 & 36) 21 The German forces in the Third Panzer 
Army amounted to 8 Infantry Divisions, 4 Luftwaffe Field 
Divisions, and 1 Panzer Division (see Table XXVI). Severe battles 
were waged by the Soviets against the Third Panzer Army from 
December 13, 1943 to February 17, 1944. Despite tremendous 
Soviet pressure and some loss of ground the Third Panzer Army 
held Vitebsk and a line between Orsha in the southeast and Polotsk 
to the northwest (see Figure 37). 
December 11 . 1943 
The Kriegstagebuch of Army Group Center noted that the 
Soviets were prepared to attack from recognized concentration 
points along the front of Third Panzer Army.2s 
December 12. 1943 
Soviet reinforcements were reported to have arrived in the 
area east of Vitebsk.29 
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December 13. 1943 
The major Soviet offensive commenced against the northeast 
front of the Third Panzer Army.30 The numerically superior Soviet 
forces attacked the front of the 129th Infantry Division's sector in 
the Puljachi-Krizkije area (see Figure 38).31 The Soviets achieved 
a breakthrough onto the highway Pobki in the west. The attack 
between Bernewo and Tschernowo Lake was successful (see Figure 
38). The northern bank of Tschernowo lake was reached on the 
right and the left attack group broke through in the direction of 
Wyrowljca (see Figure 38).32 The 20th Panzer Division in a 
counterattack brought the Soviet attack to a halt on the line 
Krelina-Chobnja-Jakuschenki-Radtschenki.33 
December 14. 1943 
The IX Army Corps front was in danger of collapsing. The 
Soviets penetrated the front of the 129th Infantry Division at 
Puljachi and could not be repulsed till the Soviets had reached the 
intersection south of Wjasowki. 34 The local command had 
exhausted its reserves placing the IX Army Corps in a critical 
situation. The following day the Soviets attacked the sectors of 
the 129th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division and the 20th 
Panzer Division. The Soviets enlarged the breakthrough from the 
northeast and southwest where the spearheads of their forces 
joined in the area of Bytschicha encircling the 87th Infantry 
Division and part of the 129th Infantry Division (see Figure 39).35 
Both divisions were ordered to breakout to the southeast. The 
129th Infantry Division was pressed back to the hills south of 
Mechewoje where the counterattack of the 20th Panzer Division 
located in the town Malaschenki secured the hills south of 
Mechewoje. Soviet attacks were supported by an unusually high 
number of aircraft sorties which exceeded 11 OQ.36 
December 16. 1943 
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The Soviets succeeded in pinching off a large portion of the 
Nevel salient. The 129th Infantry Division withdrew along the line 
Dobrino-Mechowoje and the Soviets pursued the retreating Germans 
taking Dobrino, Mechowoje, and in the evening they occupied 
Bytschicha.37 The remnants of the 87th Infantry Division broke 
through the encirclement to Malaschenki (see Figure 40) on the 
same afternoon.38 The division had been reduced in strength to 
5000-6000 men without heavy weapons and almost no vehicles.39 
The 20th Panzer Division was able to hold their positions along the 
rail line stretching from Malaschenki to the Tschernowo lake (see 
Figure 40). 
December 17. 1943 
The Soviets pushed back the 129th Infantry Division to the 
line Dobrino-Kleschowo-Schilakowo causing it to lose contact with 
the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division on its right flank.40 The 20th 
Panzer Division engaged in heavy battles along the rail line lost 
Schljuchi, Blochi, and Ambrossenki on the same day (see Figure 
40).41 The crisis on this front even attracted the attention of 
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Adolf Hitler and a Fuehrerbefehl was issued on December 17th 
allowing the Third Panzer Army to withdraw to the line 
Trofimenki-Tscherny-Wyschedki-Kusmino.42 The withdrawal of 
the IX Army Corps would free 1-2 divisions which could be used to 
strengthen the front while reserves were brought up to the area of 
Vitebsk-Polotsk. The 5th Jaeger Division and the 60th Panzer 
Grenadier Division were transfered to the 3rd Panzer Army area. 43 
December 19. 1943 
The Soviets shifted their attack to the northeast of Vitebsk 
against the right flank of the 14th Division between Borok and 
Wymno Lake achieving deep breakthroughs in five places (see 
Figure 41 ).44 The withdrawal of the Liii Army Corps on the night of 
December 18th resulted in the Soviets attacking the 6th Luftwaffe 
Field Division and breaking through to occupy part of the new main 
battle line northwest of Ssmolowka. The breakthrough east of the 
Tschernowo Lake could not be sealed off. The Soviets attempted to 
breakthrough on the road. Surash-Vitebsk and to cross the road 
south of Bitowka with tank support. However, the Germans 
employed their last reserves and knocked out 60 Soviet tanks in 
the course of blocking the Soviet attack.45 Between Ssmolowka 
and the Koscho Lake all attacks were repulsed. A deep 
breakthrough on both sides of the Tschernowo Lake was repulsed. 
December 20. 1943 
During the night the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division and the 
129th Infantry Division were withdrawn under the cover of 
darkness to the Gorodok blocking position. 
December 21. 1943 
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The Third Panzer Army was attacked from two sides. Heavy 
attacks were launched against the right flank of 14th Infantry 
Division, but despite Soviet pressure the road Vitebsk-Surash was 
cleared. The Soviets succeeded in breaking through the 3rd 
Luftwaffe Field Division's sector at Rudnja, Gribali and 
Lapuschnizy.46 A Soviet night attack brought about the loss of 
Wystawka, Mischutki and Karmolity which the Germans had just 
recaptured during the day.47 According to the Kriegstagebuch of 
Army Group Center, the Third Panzer Army had from December 13-
21, 1943 destroyed 247 Soviet tanks and 8 assault guns.48 The 
14th Infantry Division was responsible for destroying 116 of the 
247 Soviet tanks.49 
December 23. 1943 
The Soviets shifted their attack to the southeast against the 
VI Army Corps. The attack was launched against the boundaries of 
the German 246th Infantry and 206th Infantry Divisions between 
the Liosno-Vitebsk road and the railroad (see Figure 42).50 Despite 
a German counterattack with reserves the front remained torn open 
with a 1 kilometer gap opened by the Soviets.51 The Liii Army 
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Corps faced powerful Soviet attacks between Ssjubowowka and the 
Koscho Lake. The 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division and the 129th 
Infantry Division were pulled back from Gorodok (see Figure 42) 
while the Soviets continued an attack from the area north of 
Ssirotino. 
December 24. 1943 
The 3rd Panzer Army faced another day of crisis on the front. 
The Soviets ruptured the boundaries of the 246th and 206th 
Infantry Divisions and reached the Liosno-Vitebsk railroad and 
proceeded west and cut the vehicle road.52 In the north Gorodok 
was given up by the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division and the 129th 
Infantry Division. On the right flank of IX Army Corps the Soviets 
advanced on both sides of Filipenki on the road Vitebsk-Polotsk. 
The 20th Panzer Division in a counterattack blocked a Soviet 
advance on Ssirotino (see Figure 42). The Fuehrer ordered the 
withdrawal of the 14th Infantry Division to the Loswiza blocking 
position on the night of December 24-25.53 The 60th Panzer 
Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" and the 5th Jaeger Division 
were released from Army Group Center reserve status and placed 
at the disposal of the 3rd Panzer Army to restore the situation 
southeast and northeast of Vitebsk (see Figure 42). 
December 25. 1943 
The "Feldherrnhalle" Panzer Grenadier Division prevented a 
deep breakthrough on the right flank of the 246th Infantry Division 
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on Christmas day thereby momentarily stabilizing the southeastern 
front.54 The 6th Luftwaffe Field Division lost Grabniza and a hole 
was punched through the inner flanks of the Liii and IX Corps which 
permitted the Soviets to cross the road Vitebsk-Ssirotino to the 
south (see Figure 42).55 The right flank of the IX Army Corps was 
pressed back clinging to both sides of the Gorodok-Ssirotino road 
up to the town lgumenschtschina. 
December 26. 1943 
The critical situation on the northern flank of the 3rd Panzer 
Army caused the Army High Command OKH to transfer the 16th 
Panzer Division from the south flank of the 9th Army to the 3rd 
Panzer Army. 56 The Soviets achieved a deep breakthrough south of 
Duena and rolled up the front line to the "Bear Position" located on 
left flank of the 14th Infantry Division and the right flank of the 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division.57 The Soviets widened their 
breakthrough in the southeast by collapsing the right flank of the 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division so that it had to withdraw to the edge 
of the woods south of Ssilki.58 The 3rd Panzer Army despite 
continued Soviet pressure contained the Soviet attacks with its 
new reinforcements (see Table XXVll). 
December 27-28. 1943 
German intelligence noted the Soviet strength in the area of 
Vitebsk to be 42 Rifle Divisions, 2 Rifle Brigades, 15 Tank 
Brigades, 4 Tank Regiments, and 4 Mechanized Brigades.59 The 
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Soviets continued to attempt a breakthrough between the vehicle 
road and the Liosno-Vitebsk road (see Figure 43). A counterattack 
by the Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" repulsed the 
Soviet breakthrough group at Roshnowo and threw it back over the 
railroad track. A breakthrough into the main battle line of the 
206th Infantry Division was cleared up by deployment of the last 
reserves. The Soviets achieved a penetration through the 
occupation of the strong points in the main battle line of the 129th 
Infantry Division and the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division in the 
wooded terrain southeast of Zygany. The 5th Jaeger Division was 
tied down by a ·soviet attack in the flank at Masurino. 
The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" threw the 
Soviets back across the vehicle road and retook the controlling hill 
219.s.so In the sector of the 129th Infantry Division and the 6th . 
Luftwaffe Field Division the Soviets penetrated the wooded terrain 
to the west bank of the Loswiza Lakes. The road had to be cleared 
from the village Losswida to the south so parts of the 129th 
Infantry Division could be withdrawn to a new defensive position. 
December 29. 1943 
All Soviet attacks against the Liii and IX Army Corps were 
repulsed. The 3rd Panzer Army from December 13-19, 1943 had 
destroyed 520 Soviet tanks, disabled 29 tanks, and captured 2 
tanks. 61 
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December 30. 1943 
The focal points of the defensive battle of Vitebsk continued 
to be in the breakthrough areas southeast and northeast of the city. 
The Soviets attacked on a wide front against the northern front of 
the 246th Infantry Division, Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle," and the right right flank of the 206th Infantry 
Division. The Soviets broke through between Dymanowo and 
Roshnowo to the vehicle road.62 In the afternoon the road was 
finally cleared by the counterattacks of the last reserves with 
assault guns. A breakthrough toward Gribuny was blocked by a 
counterattack. 
December 31. 1943 
The Germans made further progress in a counterattack by the 
Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" supported by 
reinforcements from the 4th Army in pressing the Soviets further 
back to the East away from the vehicle road (see Figure 44). The 
Soviet attack between Loswiza Lake and the road Vitebsk-Polotsk 
was repulsed.63 The 5th Jaeger Division on the right flank of the IX 
Army Corps gained control of the hills southeast of Tschisti 
bringing the Soviet penetration area up to Saronowskoje Lake under 
fire by German guns (see Figure 44). 
January 1-8. 1944 
On January 1, 1944, the Soviets cut the vehicle road 
southeast of Vitebsk and held onto a stretch of the road through 
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January 2nd. 64 Northwest of Vitebsk the Soviets captured 
Jermatschki on January 3rd. Between January 4-6, 1944 the 
Soviets attempted breakthroughs to the southeast and northwest of 
Vitebsk which were thrown back in German counterattacks (see 
Figure 45). On January 5th 42 Soviet tanks were destroyed. 65 On 
January 7, 1944, the main offensive of the Soviet forces shifted to 
the northwest of Vitebsk between Loswiza and Saranowskoje Lake. 
The Soviets achieved success against the 206th Infantry Division 
and captured Lushino, Saranowskoje Lakes and Sslobodka.66 The 
Soviet attack on January 8th achieved a breakthrough in the wooded 
area north of Kossatschi which crossed over the vehicle road to 
Makarowo and proceeded on to Lutschessa and Perewos. On this day 
Soviet tank losses amounted to 159.67 
January 11. 1944 
The Germans launched a major counterattack to recapture the 
vehicle road which was only partly successful (see Figure 46). The 
299th Infantry Division lead the counterattack and recaptured 
Makarowo and the 131st Infantry Division retook Majaklowo (see 
Figure 46).68 According to the Kriegstagebuch of Army Group 
Center 945 Soviet tanks were destroyed and 7 4 disabled in the 3rd 
Panzer Army area from December 13, 1943 to January 11, 1944.69 
January 12. 1944 
German counterattacks in the southwest and to the west of 
the vehicle road attained an improvement in the front. The 299th 
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Infantry Division's counterattack reached the high terrain east of 
the line Makarowo-Mjaklowo in the evening. The Soviets attacked 
northwest of Vitebsk with 6 divisions and 2 tank brigades (see 
Appendix B) along both sides of the Vitebsk-Ssirotino road but did 
not achieved success.70 The Germans destroyed 43 Soviet tanks in 
the course of the day on the 3rd Panzer Army Front. 11 
January 13. 1944 
The Soviets launched a counterattack against the 299th 
Infantry Division in the sector of Makarowo-Mjaklowo. The hills 
northwest of Makarowo were lost in the 12th Infantry Division's 
sector and the Soviets occupied the isthmus on the south end of the 
Saranowskoje Lake.12 
January 14. 1944 
The 12th Infantry Division pushed back the Soviets and 
reoccupied the isthmus on the south end of the Saranowskoje 
Lake. 73 On the southeast front the Soviets attempted to envelope 
Kartaschewa by an attack against the front of the 246th Infantry 
Division and the right flank of the 131 st Infantry Division.74 
January 15. 1944 
Soviet attacks to the northwest of Vitebsk subsided. 
However, Soviet attacks continued to the southeast against the 
246th Infantry Division. The Soviets acquired the woods southeast 
of Krjukowo and both sides of the communication road with a 
penetration to hill Souch. Krynki. 
January 16. 1944 
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The northwest front of the 3rd Panzer Army remained quiet, 
but the Soviets pressed their attack in the southeast with 
numerous tank formations. The focal point of the attack remained 
the 246th Infantry Division. The Soviets widened their 
penetrations and acquired both sides sides of the communication 
road and occupied the railroad station Krynki. 75 The Soviets tore a 
hole in the front which the Germans could not close until evening. 
January 17. 1944 
The sector northwest of Vitebsk remained quiet while the 
Soviet offensive continued southeast of Vitebsk (see Figure 47). 
The Soviet attack at Kryukowo was repulsed, but a hole was 
achieved in the front southwest of the railroad station Krynki.76 
The Soviets broke through to Tscherkassy, but were thrown back by 
a German counterattack which knocked out 36 Soviet tanks and 
restored the situation. 77 
January 18. 1944 
The Kriegstagebuch of Army Group Center noted that the first 
phase of the Battle of Vitebsk appeared to be finished.78 The only 
further Soviet offensive activity was an attempt to push back the 
front of the 246th Infantry Division to the south. 
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January 23. 1944 
The Soviet resumed offensive operations on the southeast 
front after a five day pause. The 246th Infantry Division received 
the brunt of the Soviet attack and the Soviets broke through south 
of Krynki. The attack reached the woods northeast of Schugajewo. 
February 2. 1944 
The 3rd Panzer Army Front had remained quiet for almost one 
week when the Soviets resumed offensive operations. The 87th and 
12th Infantry Divisions were attacked after a 30 minute artillery 
preparation by 6 Soviet divisions on a 12 kilometer wide front. 79 
The Germans repelled the attack inflicting heavy losses on the 
Soviets. 
February 3.1944 
The Soviet offensive against Vitebsk was resumed in full 
strength. Heavy artillery preparation preceded the Soviet attack 
against the front of the 299th, 131 st, and the right flank of the 
206th Infantry Division (see Figure 48).80 The Soviets achieved 
numerous breakthroughs in the German defensive positions (see 
Figure 48). German units were surrounded and forced to conduct a 
defense from all sides. German counterattacks achieved only 
limited success and both sides suffered heavy losses. The Soviet 
attack northwest of Vitebsk was preceded by a 2 hour 30 minute 
artillery preparation. The Soviets attacked with 1 O divisions 
supported by tanks against the Liil Army Corps (see Figure 48).81 
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In extremely bitter battles the Soviets broke through the German 
defensive positions and captured the rail line.a2 The Germans 
threw in all available reserves to form a makeshift defensive front 
in the secondary positions during the afternoon. The Soviets 
occupied the railroad to the south with the support of 20 tanks. 
February 4-17. 1944 
German counterattacks finally gained momentum and halted 
the Soviet breakthroughs southeast and northwest of Vitebsk. All 
further enemy attacks were repulsed and all breakthroughs were 
liquidated by German counterattacks along the 3rd Panzer Army's 
Front (see Figure 49). On February 17, 1944 the second Battle of 
Vitebsk ended in an outstanding defensive success for the 3rd 
Panzer Army. 83 The Soviets had recklessly employed 6 armies with 
a total of 53 infantry divisions and 13 tank brigades with strong 
artillery support to breakthrough from the southeast and northwest 
of Vitebsk to destroy the German divisions in "Fortress Vitebsk. "84 
The Soviets not only failed to choke off and destroy the German 
forces in Vitebsk, but they also failed to sever the railroad line 
Orsha-Vitebsk and the road between Vitebsk and Lepel. The cost of 
the Soviet defeat in the second Battle of Vitebsk from February 3-
17, 1944 was tabulated as the following: 832 prisoners; 68 
deserters; 352 tanks destroyed; 31 tanks immobilized; 24 artillery 
pieces captured; 15 mortars captured; 266 machine guns captured; 
and 40 Soviet aircraft shot down.85 
SOVIET RESOURCES AND STRATEGY IN THE 
WINTER BATTLES OF 1943-1944 
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The Soviets continued attacks intermittently till March 29, 
1944 when the Soviets finally went over to the defensive. Soviet 
attacks had failed in the 4th Army and 3rd Panzer Army areas 
because of a lack of resources, concentration of forces and 
coordination. The 1st Baltic Front consisting of the 4th Shock, 
11th Guards, 39th, 43rd, 51st Armies and the 3rd Air Army had 
operated against the Vitebsk area.86 The Western Front contained 
the 5th, 10th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 50th, 61st, 63rd, 65th Armies and 
the 1st Air Army which had operated against the Orsha area. 87 
Both of these fronts, however, did not receive the same 
quantity of reinforcements, artillery and tanks as the fronts 
operating in the Leningrad and Ukraine sectors.88 According to 
Soviet sources the 1st Baltic Front, the Western Front and the 
Belorussian Front received only 19% of all reserve reinforcements, 
26% of all guns and mortars, and only 4.2% of the tanks and assault 
guns.89 The Western Front had failed to take Orsha in the November 
and December 1943 winter battles. The 1st Baltic Front attempted 
to seize Vitebsk by the employment of the 4th Shock, 11th Guards, 
43rd and 39th Armies.90 However, the Soviets failed to take 
Vitebsk with the 1st Baltic Front and the battle that had begun on 
December 13, 1943 ended on January 18, 1944. The Soviets 
eliminated the Nevel salient northwest of Vitebsk. But the 
tenacity of the 3rd Panzer Army in holding Vitebsk required the 
Soviets to change their strategy. 
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The Soviets tried to take Vitebsk by employing two fronts 
against the 3rd Panzer Army. The 39th Army was transferred from 
the 1st Baltic Front to the Western Front. On February 3, 1944, the 
Battle for Vitebsk resumed with the 1st Baltic Front attacking 
northwest and the Western Front attacking southwest of Vitebsk. 
This offensive continued until February 17, 1944 when Soviet 
operations subsided. The Soviets had failed to take Vitebsk, but 
they had cut the Vitebsk-Orsha highway to the south of the city and 
the Vitebsk-Ssirotino road to the northwest of Vitebsk (see Figure 
50).91 Thus, the Soviets were faced with the problem of 
overcoming the fortified, entrenched, defensive positions of Army 
Group Center during the Summer of 1944. Soviet strategy and 
tactics in the planning of the Belorussian summer offensive were 
shaped as a result of the Soviet failures on the Central Front. 
GERMAN DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 
The Germans were for the most part tied to a system of 
defense in place which worked during the winter of 1943-1944 
with the use of mobile reserves and the shifting of forces. German 
mobile reserves consisted of panzer units, assault gun battalions, 
and motorized antitank units (see Appendix A).92 Artillery and 
rocket projector regiments were also made available to meet 
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Soviet attacks (see Appendix A). The shifting of German forces to 
the focal point of the Soviet attacks occurred on a battalion by 
battalion basis. When Soviet attacks were at full intensity the 
Germans transferred up to two battalions per day from an 
individual division in the army area. 93 During the night one or two 
battalions were pulled out and the adjacent sectors extended. 
These battalion sectors were extended each night as another one or 
two battalions were withdrawn until the entire division was 
withdrawn to the threatened sector.94 The Germans maintained 
their divisional integrity by this method rather then transferring 
single battalions from different divisions.95 However, when the 
Soviet pressure was at its peak it was often necessary to pull 
several battalions from several divisions at once temporarily 
causing mixing of divisions until divisional integrity could be 
restored.96 The Germans achieved remarkable results using these 
defensive tactics. In the 4th Army area the Germans consistently 
defeated numerically superior Soviet forces that outnumbered 
them by a 10:1 ratio.97 
The Commander of the 4th Army General Heinrici attributed 
his defensive success to three factors: 
In my opinion, there were three main factors that 
contributed to the success of the defense. First, I 
formed narrow divisionsal sectors, with a high ratio of 
force to space, on the actual frontage of the Russian 
assault. Secondly, I managed to form a very powerful 
artillery grouping, of 380 guns, to cover the threatened 
sector. This was controlled by a single commander, at 
Army Headquarters, and was able to concentrate its 
fire on any required point of that 20 kilometer frontage. 
The Russian offensives were supported by up to a 
thousand guns, but their fire was not so concentrated. 
Thirdly, the losses of the German divisions engaged--
which had to be reckoned as the equivalent of about one 
battalion per division in each day of battle--were 
compensated by a system of drawing battalions from 
divisions on other parts of the Army front. I always 
tried to have three fresh battalions--one for each of 
the divisions holding the battle front--ready behind 
this before the attack started. The other battalion of 
the regiment from which it was drawn would follow, 
together with the regimental staff, and in this way I 
would get complete fresh regiments incorporated in the 
front, and then complete fresh divisions. The temporary 
mixing of divisions was inevitable, and part of the 
price of tl:le defensive success, but I always tried to 
restore their integrity as soon as possible.98 
SOVIET TACTICAL FAILURES 
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A more creative Soviet plan of attack would have overcome 
such German defensive tactics by diversionary attacks against the 
critically extended sectors of the front outside of the main area of 
attack. The Soviets could also have shifted their attacks from one 
area to another area causing confusion for the German High 
Command. Instead, the Soviets in the winter battles of 1943-1944 
in Belorussia most often renewed their attacks at the identical 
·spot where they had attacked previously. 99 Soviet artillery was 
extremely effective on the first day of offensive operations, but 
after a breakthrough had been achieved the use of artillery became 
very disorganized and disjointed.100 Troops in the breakthrough 
zone were deprived of effective artillery support which caused 
them to be more susceptible to German counterattack. These 
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Soviet weaknesses were to be corrected in the Belorussian Summer 
Campaign of 1944. 
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TABLE XXll 
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 
OCTOBER 26, 1943 
Army Corps 
4th Army Reserve 
XII Corps 
XXXIX Panzer Corps 
XXVll Corps 
Army Group Center Reserve 
Formm!Qns 
286th Security Division 
KG 35th Infantry Division 
KG 56th Infantry Division 
262nd Infantry Division 
330th Infantry Division 
342th Infantry Division 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division 
95th Infantry Division 
KG 113 Infantry Division 
252nd Infantry Division 
337th Infantry Division 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division 
26th Infantry Division 
52nd Infantry Division 
KG 78th Assault Division 
197th Infantry Division 
1st SS Motorized Brigade 
Cavalry Regiment 
*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional Unit 
Structures. 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
8 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 582. 
TABLE XXlll 
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 
NOVEMBER 8, 1943 
Army Corps 
4th Army Reserve 
XII Corps 
XXXIX Panzer Corps 
Forma~ 
286th Security Division 
Corps Detachment D: 56th 
Infantry Division and 262nd 
Infantry Division 
KG 35th Infantry Division 
342nd Infantry Division 
26th Infantry Division 
95th Infantry Division 
337th Infantry Division 
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XXVll Corps 18th Panzer Grenadier Division 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division 
78th Assault Division 
197th Infantry Division 
1 st SS Motorized Brigade 
*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional 
Unit Structures. 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
8 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 586. 
TABLE XXIV 
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 
DECEMBER 3, 1943 
Army Corps 
4th Army Reserve 
XII Corps 
XXXIX Panzer Corps 
Formations 
286th Security Division 
KG 35th Infantry Division 
342nd Infantry Division 
26th Infantry Division 
337th Infantry Division 
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XXVll Corps 18th Panzer Grenadier Division 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division 
78th Assault Division 
197th Infantry Division 
*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional 
Unit Structures. 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 501. 
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TABLEXXV 
GERMAN 4TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 
DECEMBER 14, 1943 
Army Corps 
4th Army Reserve 
XXlll Corps 
XII Corps 
XXXIX Panzer Corps 
XXVll Corps 
Formations 
286th Security Division 
95th Infantry Division 
110th Infantry Division 
131 st Infantry Division 
260th Infantry Division 
267th Infantry Division 
Corps Detachment D: 56th and 
262nd Infantry Division 
35th Infantry Division 
342nd Infantry Division 
18th Panzer Grenadier Division 
26th Infantry Division 
337th Infantry Division 
25th Panzer Grenadier Division 
78th Assault Division 
197th Infantry Division 
*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional 
Unit Structures. 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehryng Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 505. 
TABLE XXVI 
GERMAN 3rd PANZER ARMY ORDER OF BATILE, 
DECEMBER 14, 1943 
Army Corps 





201 st Security Division 
2nd Luftwaffe Field Division 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division 
20th Panzer Division 
87th Infantry Division 
129th Infantry Division 
252nd Infantry Division 
3rd Luftwaffe Field Division 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division 
14th Infantry Division 
206th Infantry Division 
211th Infantry Division 
246th Infantry Division 
256th Infantry Division 
*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional 
Unit Structures. 
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Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 505. 
Army Corps 
TABLE XXVll 
GERMAN 3RD PANZER ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 
DECEMBER 26, 1943 
Formations 
3rd Panzer Army Reserve 201 st Security Division 
5th Jaeger Division 
20th Panzer Division 




2nd Luftwaffe Field Division 
3rd Luftwaffe Field Division 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division 
129th Infantry Division 
252nd Infantry Division 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division 
14th Infantry Division 
211 
60th Panzer Grenadier Division 
"F eldherrnhalle" 
197th Infantry Division 
206th Infantry Division 
211th Infantry Division 
246th Infantry Division 
256th Infantry Division 
*See Appendix A for German Divisional and Non-Divisional 
Unit Structures. 
Source: Kurt Mehner, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte Der Deutschen 
Wehrmachtfuehrung Im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 Vol. 
9 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 509. 











DEFENSE IN PLACE 
WITH MOBILE RESERVES 
Winltr 1943-1944 







Figure 34. German Defense In Place With Mobile 
Reserves: Winter 1943-1944. Source: D~partment of 
the Army, German Defense Tactics Against Russian 
Break-Throughs (Washington D.C.: Department of the 
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Figure 35. Probable Russian Operational Objectives in 
the First Battle of Vitebsk. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die 
Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk vom 13.12.43 bis 
17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T-313 
Roll 291. 
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Figure 36. Probable Russian Operational Objectives in 
the Second Battle of Vitebsk. Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die 
Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk vom 13.12.43 bis 
17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm Publication T -313 
Roll 291. 
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Figure 37. Breakthrough At Nevel. Source: Earl F. 
Ziemke, Stalingrad To Berlin: The German Defeat In The 
East (New York: Dorset Press, 1968), p. 198. 
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Figure 38. Battle of Vitebsk, December 13, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-313 Roll 291. 
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Figure 39. Battle of Vitebsk, December 15, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-313 Roll 291. 
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Figure 40. Battle of Vitebsk, December 18, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-313 Roll 291. 
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Figure 41. Battle of Vitebsk, December 19-22, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 42. Battle of Vitebsk, December 23-24, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 43. Battle of Vitebsk, December 28, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-313 Roll 291. 
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Figure 44. Battle of Vitebsk, December 31, 1943. 
Source: Pz.A.O.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk 
vom 13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
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Figure 45. Battle of Vitebsk, January 6, 1944. Source: 
Pz.A.0.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk vom 
13.12.43 bis 17.2.44. National Archives Microfilm 
Publication T-313 Roll 291. 
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Pz.A.O.K. 3, Die Abwehrschlachten um Witebsk vom 
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Publication T-313 Roll 291. 
~ 
'.' .. 
·~~- ... ~ '•I'~-~' S).;~J;:.';o,=';11'1M'~~.:;( ~~ 
.. 1~fiL: '!~.i..~~l1}.:i .. 
· ,r~~-•.:r, 11~A,.\,l,W. b'i.f!~ :, . . ; r .... •!.'9"4::.c- . , 
·;. ~. • ~,;.r11 G;i){x;srC ; ... 
. ''!°'·"··" ·~',~··· ~ .......... ·· 
>r-·:· ~ .. . . . . 
8 Su, D 
2 S. lJ,,., 
5 Pr Vcroar 
!, (',rt <) /) 
7o 5ui n 
1:, {)"9 
11 Pz >POO~"-..__ 
227 
\ ~"----.. 
- - ... 
··=· n . 
;:!:O:: '..L.-:·~bweJi ... ,;..·5d1~ 
-:. ' • · . ' . I~ I . f/ 
~~;. -;.~ ~~i.Uf17. :·~ vvµ~v .. 
\ 
.... -
t ' - ' · . I ~ \ • • 
I ~ " ; .,·· ·-~•,., ''•~. .., 
' ~·~'.~ : ... ~\;· :.~. '..'.·:; 7. . ' 
JJ~u<V.~/~ 
• 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SOVIET OPERATIONAL PLANNING, NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY 
AND THE USE OF MASS IN THE BELORUSSIAN SUMMER 
OFFENSIVE 
SOVIET OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
The Soviet General Staff reviewed the situation on the 
Central Front facing the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, 2nd 
Belorussian and 1st Belorussian Fronts after the failure of the 
winter offensives of 1943-1944 against Army Group Center. 
Stavka recognized that a fresh approach was required to break the 
back of the German defense in Belorussia. The Soviet General Staff 
recognized the need to coordinate the offensive along all four 
fronts simultaneously to achieve the maximum results. Airpower 
and artillery support also had to be coordinated to obtain the most 
optimal conditions for offensive breakthroughs and subsequent 
exploitation of breaches in the German defensive line by each of the 
four fronts. The German line had to be breached in several 
locations simultaneously to tie down German reserves and prevent 
the German Command from shifting their battalions to breakthrough 
sites by extending the frontages held by the remaining divisions not 
under extreme pressure. If this could be achieved the Soviet 
breakthroughs were certain to be successful and could not be 
blocked effectively. 
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On April 17-19, 1944, Stavka issued orders for all the fronts 
to go over to the defensive except for the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian 
Fronts.1 The order stated: "the transition to the defense is a 
temporary measure to prepare the troops for the subsequent 
advance operations.2 The input and analysis of Front Commanders 
was considered in the formation of the plan for the Belorussian 
Summer offensive. 
A preliminary plan was formulated under General A.N. 
Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on May 
20, 1944.3 The plan was code named "Bagration" after General 
Peter Bagration, the hero of the Battle of Borodino in 1812.4 This 
plan consisted of two phases. It advocated three main thrusts on 
the flanks of Army Group Center to liquidate the German salient in 
the region of Vitebsk-Orsha-Bobruisk-Minsk.5 The 3rd Belorussian 
Front in the north and 1st Belorussian Front in the south were 
designated to conduct a major pincer movement to encircle most of 
Army Group Center east of Minsk (see Figure 51 ).6 The third major 
Schwerpunkt of the Soviet plan was to be conducted by the 1st 
Baltic Front with an advance northwest of Vitebsk to take 
Molodechino (see Figure 51).7 Once the destruction of the German 
forces in the German salient of Vitebsk-Orsha-Bobruisk-Minsk had 
occurred the Soviet advance was to reach the line of Disna, 
Molodechno, Stolbsty and Starobin.s 
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During the May 22-30, 1944 period the initial "Bagration" plan 
was modified to reflect the lessons learned from the winter 
battles of 1943-1944 in Belorussia. Three significant changes 
were made to the original "Bagration" plan: 
1. The 1st Baltic Front instead of advancing to Molodechno 
was to advance along the Western Dvina river to prevent German 
Army Group North from reinforcing Army Group Center. This action 
would help complete the Soviet encirclement of German forces east 
of Minsk. 
2. The depth of the operation was extended further to the 
west. The phase one objectives to be completed by July 15th were 
moved further west to the line Druya-Svencionys-Stolbtsy-
Zhitkovichi (see Figure 52).9 Phase two objectives provided for the 
left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front to join the offensive and the 
combined fronts were to reach the line Rezekne-Daugavpils-
Grodno-Lublin by August 15, 1944 (see Figure 52).10 The total 
operation was projected for an advance of 550 to 600 kilometers to 
the west.11 
3. The number of divisions was increased in the main 
breakthrough areas from 77 to 97 divisions.12 The 1st Baltic, 3rd 
and 1st Belorussian Fronts were to first surround and destroy the 
flanks of Army Group Center in the area of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. 
The 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were to attack in the center 
toward Ors ha and Mogilev. Once the flanks had been destroyed the 
three Belorussian Fronts were to converge on Minsk surrounding the 
German 4th and 9th Armies east of the city.13 Finally, Stavka 
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decided that six breakthroughs in the German front in widely 
separated sectors were required.14 The six separate breakthroughs 
were to dismember the German defense; breakup the German forces; 
and scatter the German reserves so they could not concentrate to 
repel the Soviet breakthroughs. The four attacking fronts each 
were assigned a breakthrough area with the 3rd and 1st Belorussian 
Fronts receiving two assigned breakthrough areas. 
First Breakthrough Sector 
The 1st Baltic Front was to breach the German defense line 
with two armies southwest of Gorodok and take the area of 
Beshenkovichi.15 A portion of this force was to assist the right 
flank of the 3rd Belorussian Front in seizing Vitebsk. Once this 
front was secure then the advance on Lepel was to proceed. 
Second and Third Breakthrough Sectors 
The 3rd Belorussian Front was assigned two breakthrough 
points. Two armies were to penetrate from the area west of Liozno 
to take Senno and then proceed to take Vitebsk in cooperation with 
the 1st Baltic Front.16 The second area was also assigned two 
armies which were to advance along the Minsk main highway and 
take Borisov. Once the cities of Senno and Orsha had fallen the 
Front's mobile forces were to break through to the western bank of 
the Berezina river in the area of Borisov. 
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Fourth Breakthrough Sector 
The 2nd Belorussian Front was assigned the task of taking 
Mogilev and breaking through to the Berezina river in cooperation 
with the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts.11 This front was to 
employ one reinforced army to take Mogilev and then advance along 
the Mogilev-Minsk highway to the Berezina.1s 
Fifth and Sixth Breakthrough Sectors 
The 1st Belorussian Front was assigned two breakthrough 
areas. The fifth breakthrough was to be made by two armies from 
the area of Rogachev to Bobruisk-Osipovichi.19 The sixth 
breakthrough was to employ two armies from the area of Ozarichi 
in an advance toward Slutsk.20 The Front was to surround and 
destroy the Germans in Bobruisk and seize the region of Bobruisk-
Glusha-Glusk.21 The advance was then to proceed to Osipovichi-
Pukhovichi and on to Slutsk. 
The Soviet plan utilized two combined armies to make each 
penetration except for the penetration on the 2nd Belorussian Front. 
Therefore, a total of 11 armies were to make the initial 
penetrations against Army Group Center (see Figure 53). The 
combined effect of this offensive by 11 armies with mechanized 
and tank forces in reserve to exploit the initial breakthroughs was 
.certain to shatter the German main defense line. 
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Soviet Reinforcements 
The Soviet General Staff made the decision to reinforce the 
four fronts for the Summer Belorussian Offensive. During a two-
month period the Soviets redeployed three combined armies and one 
rifle corps (totaling 28 to 30 divisions), two tank armies, three 
tank corps, one mechanized corps and two cavalry corps to the four 
fronts assigned to Operation "Bagration."22 The 1st Tank Corps was 
transfered to the 1st Baltic Front. The 11th Guards Army and the 
2nd Guards Tank Corps were added to the 3rd Belorussian Front. 
The 2nd Belorussian Front was reinforced with the 81 st Rifle 
Corps. The right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front received the 
28th Army, the 9th and 1st Guard Tank Corps, the 1st Mechanized 
and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps. The left wing of the 1st 
Belorussian Front received the 8th Guards, 2nd Tank Army and the 
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps. The 3rd Belorussian Front received the 
5th Guards Tank Army.23 Stavka reserves from the Crimea 
consisting of the 2nd Guards and 51 st Armies were moved to the 
Smolensk area.24 The airpower in the 4 air armies supporting the 
four fronts were increased. Eleven air force corps and five air 
force divisions were added to the four air armies. 
The four Soviet fronts had a total of 166 divisions, 9 rifle 
brigades and fortified regions, 31,000 artillery guns and mortars 
(76-millimeter and above), 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 
6000 frontal aircraft, and approximately 1000 aircraft from the 
Long Range Air Force.2s If the southern wing of the 1st Belorussian 
Front is not counted because it would not participate in the first 
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phase of "Bagration" then the actual number of Soviet divisions 
participating in the start of the offensive drops to 124 divisions, 9 
rifle brigades and fortified regions, 24,400 artillery weapons and 
mortars (76-millimeter and above), 4,000 tanks and self-propelled 
guns, and 5,300 frontal aircraft (excluding the aircraft of the Long 
Range Air force).26 According to Soviet sources the Soviet High 
Command had concentrated 38% of its rifle and 40% of its tank and 
mechanized formations, and 47% of all frontal aircraft in the four 
Soviet fronts which were to launch Operation "Bagration. "27 This 
commitment of resources would permit the Soviet fronts to 
achieve the success that they had failed to achieve in the winter of 
1943-1944 in Belorussia. 
FINAL STAVKA PLAN 
The Stavka plan emerged as summarized in Figure 54. Stavka 
issued formal directives to the four attacking front commanders 
and they made the decisions on how to execute the directives in 
operations on their respective fronts.2s 
1st Baltic Front 
General Bagramyan, Commander of the 1st Baltic Front 
assigned the 6th Guards Army under General Chistyakov and the 
43rd Army under General Beloborodov to breach the German defense 
line southwest of Gorodok along a 25 kilometer sector. The armies 
were to occupy Beshenkovichi and cross the Western Dvina. A 
241 
portion of the 43rd Army would participate with the 39th Army of 
the 3rd Belorussian Front in surrounding and capturing Vitebsk.29 
Once the Polotsk-Vitebsk railroad had been seized the 1st Tank 
Corps was to exploit the breach and cross the Western Dvina and 
attack Beshenkovichi along with the advancing armies.Jo Lepel was 
also assigned to be captured. 
3rd Belorussian Front 
General Chernyakhovskiy, Commander of the 3rd Belorussian 
Front formed two strike groups within the front. The northern 
group consisted of the 39th, 5th Armies, and a mounted mechanized 
group which contained the 3rd Cavalry and 3rd Mechanized Guard 
Corps.31 The southern group consisted of the 11th Guards and 31st 
Armies (see Figure 55).32 
The northern strike group was assigned to breach an 18 
kilometer sector southeast of Vitebsk. The 39th Army under 
General Lyudnikov on the right flank was to take Gnezdilovichi and 
in cooperation with the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front surround 
and seize Vitebsk.33 The 5th Army under General Krylov was to 
advance along the Bogushevsk-Senno axis and in cooperation with 
the 11th Guards Army destroy the German 4th Army at Orsha.34 Once 
this objective was achieved the 5th Army was to emerge at the 
Berezina river. When the 5th Army had secured the Luchesa river 
the Mounted Mechanized group under General Oslikovskiy was to 
exploit the breakthrough and secure crossings on the Berezina river 
northwest of Borisov.Js 
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The southern strike group was ordered to break a 15 
kilometer sector of the German front before Orsha with the 11th 
Guards Army under General Galitskiy and the 31st Army under 
General Glagolev.36 Both armies were assigned to seize Orsha and 
advance along the Minsk highway to Borisov. The mobile group of 
the 11th Guards Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were to 
exploit the breakthrough and advance to the Berezina near 
Chernyavka. 
The 5th Guards Tank Army commanded by Marshal Rotmistrov 
was to exploit the advance of the 11th Guards Army and advance 
along the Minsk main highway to Borisov or advance through the 
breach created by the 5th Army toward Bogushevsk-Tolochin-
Borisov. Rotmistov's 5th Guards Tank Army would be employed 
along either axis depending on which route offered the most 
opportunity for advancing. 
2nd Belorussian Front 
General Zakharov, Commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front 
assigned the 49th Army under General Grishin to liberate Mogilev 
and then advance to the Berezina river.37 The 50th Army under 
General Boldin and 33rd Army under General Kryuchenkina were 
ordered to hold their present lines. However, the 50th Army was to 
have one rifle corps in reserve to exploit any breakthrough by the 
49th Army toward Chausy or Blagovichi. 
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1st Belorussian Front 
General Rokossovskiy, Commander of the 1st Belorussian 
Front divided his armies into northern and southern strike groups. 
The northern group was assigned to penetrate a 1 7 kilometer sector 
north of Rogachev.3s The southern group was ordered to 
breakthrough on a 15 kilometer front to the south of Parichi.39 The 
coordinated attacks by these two groups were to achieve the 
encirclement and destruction of the German 9th Army at Bobruisk 
with a subsequent advance toward Pukhovichi and Slutsk. 
The northern group assigned to attack north of Rogachev 
consisted of th~ 3rd Army under General Gorbatov and the 48th 
Army under General Romanenko.4o The 9th Tank Corps under General 
Sakharov constituted the Mobile Group of the 3rd Army. It was 
assigned to move into the Bobruisk area and cut off the German 
lines of communication after a breakthrough in the main German 
defensive line had been achieved. 
The southern strike group contained the 65th Army under 
General Batov, the 28th Army under General Luchinskiy and the 
Mounted Mechanized group which included the 4th Guards Cavalry 
and the 1st Mechanized Corps under the command of General 
Pliyev.41 The Mounted Mechanized group was assigned to enter the 
breach achieved at the boundary of the 65th and 28th Armies. It 
·was to advance on Slutsk, Osipovichi or Bobruisk depending on 
circumstances. 
Meanwhile, the forces on the left flank of the 1st Belorussian 
Front were to conduct active operations to prevent German units 
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from being transferred to the Minsk sector as reinforcements. This 
group of forces was to be held in reserve for the subsequent 
advance toward the Kovel-lyublin direction. 
Dnieper Military Flotilla 
The Dnieper Military flotilla was assigned the task of 
assisting the southern strike group of the 1st Belorussian Front. It 
was to serve as floating artillery and as transport for the 48th 
Army in crossing over to the west bank of the Berezina.42 It was 
also assigned to block the Germans from retreating behind the 
Berezina at river crossings. 
Soviet Airpower 
The four fronts undertaking the summer offensive in 
Belorussia were supported by air armies assigned specifically to 
each front and by Long Range Aircraft. 
3rd Air Army. The 1st Baltic Front was supported by the 3rd 
Air Army.43 The 3rd Air Army's air assault division was assigned 
to neutralize the German artillery and mortar positions. The 
fighter aircraft were to provide air cover for the advancing ground 
forces. 
1st Air Army. The 3rd Belorussian Front was supported by 
the 1st Air Army.44 The 1st Air Army was divided into two air 
force groups: one air force group supported the northern strike 
group and the southern strike group was supported by the larger air 
force group which was to assist the troops advancing toward Orsha. 
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The 1st Air Army was also tasked to help breach German lines; 
destroy the German forces surrounded at Vitebsk; and support the 
Mobile Group operating in depth in the German rear.4s 
4th Air Army. The 4th Air Army supported the 2nd 
Belorussian Front. 46 The 4th Air Army operations were planned for 
ohly the first day of the offensive. One night bomber division and 
two bomber corps of long distance aircraft were to bomb the 
forward edge of the German defense line the night preceding the 
offensive. The advancing strike group on the ground was to receive 
support from one fighter and two assault air divisions. 
16th and 6th Air Armies. The 16th Air Army assigned to 
support the 1st Belorussian Front was divided into two air force 
groups: one northern group which was to be the strongest group and 
the southern group.47 This division of airpower reflected the 
division of ground forces into their two respective groups. In 
addition the 6th Air Army was transferred from the general reserve 
to the 1st Belorussian Front. 48 Two night bomber divisions and 
long distance aircraft were to bomb the main centers of German 
defense on the night preceding the offensive. 
Long Range Aviation. The long range aircraft held in the 
general Soviet reserve were also employed in the Belorussian 
offensive. 1000 aircraft were committed to the task of 
neutralizing the German Luftflotte 6 at the following airfields: 
Belostock, Brest, Luninets, Baranovichi, Bobruisk, Minsk, and Orsha 
which comprised 60 per cent of the 6th Air Fleets aircraft. 49 Ten 
days before the start of the Belorussian Operation long range 
aviation conducted a night air operation lasting four nights 
between June 13-18, 1944 where heavy bombers flew 1,472 
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sorties to neutralize the German 6th Air Fleet.so The German rail 
lines were also targeted for bombing. The long range aircraft were 
assigned to bomb the German defenses in the six breakthrough 
sectors on the night preceding the Soviet main offensive.s1 
The total Soviet aircraft deployed in the five Soviet air 
armies amounted to 6,000 planes including more than 1, 100 day and 
night bombers and 2,000 ground attack aircraft.52 In addition, 
1,000 bombers from Long Range Aviation were included in the 
Soviet offensive operations. Ten air corps and eight air divisions 
were dispatched to reinforce the five Soviet air armies during the 
first half of June 1944 which required the additional construction 
of 70 airfields.SJ 
The 1st Air Army in the 3rd Belorussian Front and the and the 
16th Air Army in the 1st Belorussian Front received 70 per cent of 
all planes and all day bombers.54 Three air corps and two 
independent air divisions were massed in the 1st and 16th Air 
Armies. The 16th Air Army was divided into two groups: 13 air 
divisions in the northern group and 7 air divisions in the southern 
group.SS The 1st Air Army was also divided into two groups: 6 air 
divisions were to operate in the Bogushevsk sector and 11 air 
divisions in the Orsha sector.56 The Soviet High Command desired 
to maximize the effect of their air power resources by postponing 
the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front by one day so that 
aircraft of the Long Range Aviation could be concentrated totally in 
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support of the 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, and 2nd Belorussian 
Fronts on the first day of offensive operations.57 On the second day 
of the offensive the long range aircraft were transferred to support 
the 1st Belorussian Front which commenced its offensive.58 
Soviet Partisans 
The partisans were assigned several tasks in the German rear 
areas. The main tasks were to attack the German lines of 
communication, cut and hold certain roads and railroad junctions, 
capture bridges, seize river crossings and hold them till units of 
the Red Army arrived. Specifically, the partisan units behind the 
German lines opposing each of the four fronts: 1st Baltic, 3rd 
Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian were to attack 
German lines of communication. Railroads were the chief means of 
moving supplies throughout the Russian campaign for both the 
Germans and the Soviets.59 Therefore, an attack on the railroads 
constituted a significant threat to German defensive and offensive 
operations (see Figure 56). 
Partisan units with approximately 71,000 members located 
directly in the rear area of Army Group Center in June 1944 (see 
Figure 57) constituted a serious threat. There were approximately 
143,000 Belorussian partisans organized into 150 brigades and 49 
separate detachments throughout Belorussia. 60 Figure 58 
delineates the partisan strength in Belorussia as of March 1944. 
However, the partisan strength was reduced by German antipartisan 
operations between April and June 1944. Operations Regenschauer, 
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Fruehlingsfest, and Kormoron (see Figure 59) eliminated 
approximately 27,000 partisans with several thousand escaping the 
areas of German antipartisan operations.61 This weakened the 
partisans prior to the start of the Belorussian Offensive. The 
partisan bands generally were organized into groups of 3000 to 
5000 men each.62 Partisan operations were almost always 
conducted at night. Such operations included: (1) mining main 
highways; (2) demolition of railroad tracks; (3) mining railroad 
beds; and (4) surprise attacks on trains and truck convoys.63 The 
partisan units were ordered to attack and completely paralyze 
German rail activity beginning on June 20, 1944 with massive 
demolition of the main rail lines.64 The main railroad targets were 
the Polotsk-Molodechno, Glubokoye-Vilnius, Minsk-Orsha, Minsk-
Brest and Pinsk-Brest rail lines.65 
The partisan attack on the night of June 19-20, 1944 
constituted the largest attack of the war by partisans against the 
German lines of communication.66 The partisans attempted 15,000 
demolitions on the railroad lines behind Army Group Center (see 
Figure 60) on the night of June 19-20, 1944.67 10,500 demolitions 
were successful in the course of one night.68 This number of 
demolitions on one night amounted to 213 of the total demolitions 
for the month of May 1944. 69 The double-tracked rail lines were 
blocked for 24 hours and single-tracked rail lines were interrupted 
for over 48 hours. 10 The Commander of the Railroad Engineer 
Brigade #2 in Army Group Center on June 20, 1944 reported 600 
demolitions on the Orsha-Mogilev rail line and 580 demolitions on 
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the Minsk-Orsha rail line.11 Reconstruction was undertaken 
immediately. On June 21, 1944 at 1300 the railroad engineers had 
restored the eastward railroad line between Orsha and Mogilev.n 
The Minsk-Orsha rail line had one rail line open as of 2030 on June 
20, 1944.73 Both eastern and western rail lines between Minsk and 
Orsha were operational by 1800 on June 22, 1944.74 
The partisans struck again on the night of June 20-21, 1944. 
However, there were 90 per cent fewer rail line demolitions. 1s 
There were no demolitions on the night of June 22-23, 1944.76 
Apparently, the partisans ran out of explosives thereby allowing 
the Germans a 48 hour period to restore their rail lines prior to the 
start of the Soviet offensive in Belorussia.77 The German rail lines 
Dvinsk-Molodechno, Minsk-Orsha and Minsk-Bobruisk were all open 
as of June 27, 1944.78 Reinforcements and supplies were moving 
from one sector to the next sector. Thus, Soviet planning of 
partisan action against German lines of communication was poor. 
Soviet directives should have targeted the rail lines 
simultaneously with the general offensive to achieve the maximum 
effect. 
NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY 
The Soviets had achieved numerical superiority on the 
Belorussian Front. The Soviets had massed 14 combined arms 
armies, 1 tank army, 8 tank and mechanized Corps, 2 cavalry corps 
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and 4 air armies (see Table XXVlll).79 Soviet equipment amounted 
to 30,916 artillery guns, multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft 
guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self propelled guns (see Table 
XXIX), and 5,327 aircraft in addition to over 1000 long range 
aircraft (see Table XXX).so Between January 1, 1944 and June 1, 
1944 the number of German troops opposing the Soviets declined by 
900,000.81 Soviet sources put their overall superiority at 1. 7:1 in 
troops; 1.8:1 in Guns and Mortars (antiaircraft artillery excluded); 
1.6:1 in tanks and assault guns and 4.9:1 in operational aircraft.82 
However, on the Belorussian Front Soviet superiority reached levels 
that exceeded 2: 1 in all categories of military manpower and 
equipment. (see Figure 61) This level of numerical superiority does 
not reflect the actual situation on the respective Soviet Fronts 
facing German Army Group Center. On the 1st Baltic and 1st 
Belorussian Front troop strengths reached 3:1 and on all fronts tank 
strength exceeded 3:1 (see Figure 61 ). 
The order of battle of German forces as of June 22, 1944 
showed the Soviets being opposed by only 39 infantry divisions, 3 
Panzer Grenadier divisions, I Panzer division, and 6 security 
divisions.83 This German strength contrasted with the Soviet 
strength in Table XXVlll delineates a substantial Soviet numerical 
superiority in Soviet formations. The actual numerical strength of 
the Soviet Fronts is enumerated in Table XXIX. Soviet numerical 
superiority was clearly established by numbers, but it was the 
concentration of this Soviet mass that was to produce such 
spectacular success in the Belorussian Operation. 
CONCENTRATION AND MASS IN THE SOVIET 
OFFENSIVE IN BELORUSSIA 
German Defensive Concentration 
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The German formations in Army Group Center were forced to 
hold sectors of the front line which were too wide to be effectively 
defended. The 29 divisions in the front line each had to hold a 
frontage of between 24 and 32 kilometers. 84 There were few 
divisions which had a smaller sector to hold. The 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Division had the smallest sector to hold which was 17 
kilometers. 85 According to German sources there was an average 
density of 80 men per kilometer .86 German divisional artillery had 
ranges of 12.3 km and 13.3 km for their light and heavy guns. 
Therefore, German divisional artillery was not able to mass their 
fire on every sector of the divisional front line. In addition, there 
was a shortage of artillery ammunition which prevented really 
effective artillery bombardments.87 German infantry was 
supported on an average by two to three artillery tubes and one or 
two assault guns or tanks per kilometer of front.88 
Soviet Concentration of Mass in the Offensive 
The Soviets achieved an overwhelming superiority in the 
breakthrough sectors despite an overall 3:1 superiority of forces 
along the front. It was the bold concentration of forces that 
permitted the Soviets to shatter even the most formidable German 
defenses (see Figure 62 for an example of German defenses that 
could be found on the Belorussian Front). 89 The four Soviet 
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attacking fronts had an average total divisional frontage of 5.8 
kilometers per division (see Table XXXI) compared to 24 to 32 
kilometers for the German divisions.9o The concentration of Soviet 
forces was compressed further in the breakthrough sectors. The 
average divisional frontage of 5.8 kilometers was compressed to 
1.5 km per division in the breakthrough sectors (see Table XXXI). 
Soviet divisions were organized into two echelons (see Table XXXll) 
in order to use mass in the breakthrough sectors. The use of more 
than one echelon was a main factor in determining the success of 
the breakthrough operation and in maintaining the rapidity of the 
tempo in the attack. The second and succeeding echelons were 
committed once the fighting in the first defensive positions had 
been completely liquidated.91 The second echelon would then be 
committed to battle which facilitated the forward movement of the 
breakthrough. This allowed the Soviets to follow up the initial 
attacks of the first echelon with fresh follow on attacks from the 
second echelon. The overwhelming superiority achieved by the 
Soviets can be best described in terms of an attacking rifle 
division. A leading rifle division in the breakthrough sector with 
nine rifle battalions of 380 men each each attacking on a frontage 
of 2.5 to 3 kilometers would achieve a superiority of 1O:1.92 The 
first wave of infantry would put 750 Soviet infantrymen in battle 
with 80 German soldiers.93 
The Germans in the past had been able to withstand such 
pressure and defeat the Soviets. However, the concentration of 
artillery, armor, airpower, and coordinated flank attacks would 
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prove too much for the tenacious German defenders. In many cases, 
the Soviet attacking frontage was actually 1.5 kilometers, and 
Soviet troop superiority reached 15:1 in the breakthrough sectors.94 
Soviet Armor 
The Soviet superiority in armor in the breakthrough sectors 
amounted to 20:1.95 The Soviets had allocated 38% of the available 
armored vehicles for close support of the infantry in the 
breakthrough sector.96 The remaining 62% of the armored forces 
were located in the four tank corps, two cavalry/mechanized 
groups, and the 5th Guards Tank Army.97 These formations were 
formed into mobile groups which were held in reserve until a 
breakthrough had been achieved. These mobile groups would then 
exploit breakthroughs to penetrate the front in depth to encircle 
German forces and reach deep objectives in the German rear area. 
Soviet armor concentrations in the breakthrough area were 
massive. The number of tanks in the breakthrough area averaged 
35.6 tanks per kilometer (see Table XXXlll). However, the range of 
Soviet armor concentration varied from 22 per kilometer in the 1st 
Baltic Front to 45 tanks per kilometer in the 1st Belorussian.98 
Soviet Artillery 
The majority of the Soviet Artillery was concentrated on the 
breakthrough sectors. In fact, 71 % to 80% of all artillery in the 1st 
Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian Fronts targeted the 
breakthrough sectors which covered only 11-20% of the general 
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offensive area.99 In the 2nd Belorussian Front's attack sector only 
50% of the artillery was concentrated in the attack sector.100 The 
Soviets developed an artillery superiority of 35: 1.101 On the 
average 5 German guns and rocket launchers opposed 178 Soviet 
artillery guns or rocket launchers.102 The Soviet artillery density 
per kilometer ranged from 151 to 204 tubes per kilometer 
depending on the attacking front (see Table XXXIV).103 Thus, Soviet 
artillery was used on a massive scale compared to German 
artillery. 
Soviet Artillery Preparation 
The artillery preparation was of a weight and intensity not 
previously experienced in this war .104 Artillery and mortar 
preparation lasted from 120 to 140 minutes.1os The northern 
fronts commenced firing between 0600 to 0700 and the 1st 
Belorussian Front commenced firing a day later between 0400 and 
0500 hours. The fire plan called for three areas of concentration: 
(1) 15 minute concentration on defensive positions 3 km in depth; 
(2) 90 minutes of fire on preplanned, observed targets, artillery 
and heavy weapons positions; (3) 20 minutes of concentration on 
the main defensive works starting with 25% of the guns firing with 
5 minute incremental increases in intensity till 100% of the guns 
were firing intensely.106 When the troops were to launch an attack 
they were to be preceded by a rolling barrage reaching out to 2 
kilometers.101 The Soviet advance was closely coordinated with 
the artillery preparation so that the gap between the artillery 
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preparation and the beginning of the infantry assault could be 
avoided. The intensity of the artillery barrage increased toward 
the end and when the fire was at its most intense moment the 
tanks and infantry were already approaching the wall of fire. The 
tanks maintained a distance of 80-100 meters from the wall of 
fire while the infantry maintained a 150 to 200 meter distance.10s 
Soviet Use of Mass in the Four Attacking Fronts 
The overall frontage of the four attacking fronts was 690 
kilometers, but the six major breakthrough areas only made up 112 
km or 16.3% of. the total front.109 In this area the Soviets had 
concentrated 65% of their rifle divisions, 72.3% of their guns and 
mortars, and 86.60/o of their tank and mechanized Brigades.110 This 
permitted an attack with the use of echelons in depth. The 1st 
Baltic Front was to attack on a 25 kilometer front with 16 
divisions, 151 guns and mortars per km, and 22 tanks per km.111 
The 3rd Belorussian Front was attacking on northern and southern 
sectors. The northern breakthrough sector was 17.5 km wide. Ten 
rifle divisions were assigned to this sector. The southern 
breakthrough area was 19.5 km wide with 15 rifle divisions, 175 
guns and mortars per km, and 44 tanks per km.i12 The 2nd 
Belorussian Front's attack sector was 12 km with 10 rifle 
divisions, 181 guns and mortars per km, and 19 tanks and assault 
guns per km.113 The 1st Belorussian Front's northern group was 
attacking on a 17 kilometer sector with 13 divisions. The southern 
group employed 13 divisions on a 21 kilometer sector. Both groups 
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had approximately 204 guns and mortars and 45 tanks per 
kilometer.114 Thus, the Soviets had achieved the mass and 
concentration of forces in the six breakthrough areas necessary to 
overcome the German defenses in Belorussia. 
TABLE XXVlll 
SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE, 
JUNE 1944 
SOVIET FRONTS 
1st Baltic Front 
3rd Belorussian Front 
2nd Belorussian Front 
1st Belorussian Front 
(right wing) 
SOVIET FORMATIONS 
4th Shock Army 
6th Guards Army 
43rd Army 




11th Guards Army 
2nd Guards Tank Corps 
5th Guards Tank Army 
Cavalry/Mechanized Group: 
3rd Guards Cavalry Corps 
3rd Guards Mechanized Corps 
3rd Guards Tank Corps 









9th Tank Corps 
Cavalry/Mechanized Group: 
1st Guards Tank Corps 
4th Guards Cavalry Corps 
1st Mechanized Corps 
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Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of 
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense 
Publishers, 1987), p. 48. 
Men And 
TABLEXXIX 
MEN AND EQUIPMENT OF SOVIET FRONTS 
JUNE 20, 1944 
1st 
1st 3rd 2nd Belorussian 
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Egyipm~nt Balti~ B~lgryssian Belorussian (!1. wing) TQtal 
Men 227,000 389,500 202,900 434,900 1,254,30 
0 
Machine 8,432 13,214 5,750 16,035 43,431 
Guns 
Tanks 561 1, 169 102 883 2,715 
Assault 126 641 174 414 1,355 
Guns 
Anti- 778 1, 175 833 1,444 4,230 
Guns (45-
57mm) 









MRLs 604 689 264 749 2,306 
AAA Guns 420 792 329 762 2,303 
Aircraft 902 1,864 528 2,303 5,327 
Trucks 19,537 16,208 7,727 17' 177 60,649 
Source: Colonel T.N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, Great Battles on the 
Eastern Fmnt: The SQviet-German War 1941-1945 (New 
York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1982), p. 157. 
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TABLEXXX 
SOVIET EFFECTIVE AIRCRAFT STRENGTH IN THE SOVIET AIR ARMIES 
PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE 
BELORUSSIAN OFFENSIVE 
Air~raft ~ Air Army 1 Air Army 4 Air Army 16 Air Army Total 
Fighters 403 767 196 952 2318 
Ground 368 547 193 636 1744 
Attack 
Bombers - - 392 -- 263 655 
Night 79 81 121 150 431 
Bombers 




Total 902 1864 528 2033 6334 
Aircraft 
Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of 
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense 
Publishers, 1987), p. 64. 
FrQnt 
TABLEXXXI 
OPERATIONAL DENSITY OF SOVIET TROOPS 
ON THE BELORUSSIAN FRONT 
T gtal ErQntag~ Atta~ls S~~tQr 
Frontage Rifle Divs. Density Frontage Rifle Divs 
(km) (nQ) (km/div) (km) (OQ) 
1 Baltic 160 24 6.6 25 16 
3 Belo- 140 33 4.2 37 25 
russian 
2 Belo- 160 22 7.3 12 10 
russian 
1 Belo- 230 39 5.8 38 26 
russian 
(right) 










Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of 
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense · 










SOVIET A TT AC KING ECHELONS AGAINST 
ARMY GROUP CENTER 
Armies Corps Divisions 
Within Front Within Armi~s Within Corgs 
1 echelon 39th Army 2 echelons 
2 echelons 
43rd Army 2 echelons 
1 echelon 
1 echelon 39th Army 2 echelons 
2 echelons 
5th Army 2 echelons 
1 echelon 
11th Guards 2 echelons 
Army 
1 echelon 
31st Army 2 echelons 
1 echelon 
1 echelon 49th Army 3 echelons 
1 echelon 
1 echelon 3rd Army 2 echelons 
2 echelons 
(right wing) 
48th Army 2 echelons 
1 echelon 
65th Army 2 echelons 
1 echelon 





1 to 2 
echelons 












Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Russia: The Destruction of 
Army Groug Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense 


















SOVIET ARMORED DENSITY OPPOSITE 
ARMY GROUP CENTER, 
JUNE 20, 1944 
262 
Frontage (km) Tanks & SU Guns Density (AFVs/km) 
Total Attack Total Attack Overall Attack 
SectQr SectQr % Total Sectgr 
160 25 687 535 77.8 4 22 
140 33 1810 1466 80.9 13 44 
160 12 276 227 82.2 2 19 
230 29 1297 1297 100.0 5.6 45 
690 99 4070 3525 86.6 5.9 35.6 
*SU Guns are assault guns or self-propelled guns. 
Source: Gerd Niepold, Battl~ For White Rus~ia: The Destruction of 
Arm~ GrQyg C~ntre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense 


















SOVIET ARTILLERY DENSITY AND FRONTAGES 
OPPOSITE ARMY GROUP CENTER, 
JUNE 20, 1944 
263 
Frontage (km) Guns & Mortars Density (Tubes/km) 
Total Attack Total Attack Overall Attack 
Sect gr Number % Tgtal SectQr 
160 25 4,950 3,768 76.1 31 151 
140 33 7, 134 5,764 80.1 51 175 
160 12 3,989 2, 168 54.3 30 181 
230 29 8,310 5,929 71.3 36 204 
690 99 24,383 17,629 72.3 35 178 
*Multiple Rocket Lauchers are included in figures. 
Source: Gerd Niepold, Battle For White Rul2sia: The Destru~tion of 
Army Group Centre June 1944 (London: Brassey's Defense 
Publishers, 1987), p. 60. 
BASIC CONCEPIS AND PHASt.S. 
PLANNING MEMORANDUM. 






















Figure 51. Basic Concepts And Phases, Planning 
Memorandum, 20 May 1944. Source: Lt. Colonel Charles 
G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration," Military Review, 
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Figure 52. Final Stavka Concept Of Operation. Source: 
Lt. Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration," 
Military Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, p. 65. 
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MAJOR ELEMENTS OF FRONT PLAHS 
Width 
Total of Formation• 
Width of Penelra- Making Ezploitation 
front Frontage lion Ptntlrationa Foret Rtma~kl 
(hi/a. (I\ ile>-
meter) meter) 
I st IGO 25 6th Guards 1st Tank 
Bailie Army; 43d Corps 
Army 
Jd 130 18 a. Northtrn Mechanized 6th Guards Tank 
llelorussia n Shock Cavalry Army to be com· 
Group Group (Jd milted as the 
39lh Army; Cavalry and front's main ex-
6th Army 3d Guards ploiting force in 
Mechanized zone of group 
Corps) enjoying greater 
saccess 
15 b. Southern 2d Guards 





2d IGO .16 49th Army 1st Rifle Initially, this 
Belorussian Corps front had limited 
objective of seiz· 
ing l\log"ilev 
I !t 650 17 a. Northtrn 9th Tank Initially, only 
Belorussian (250) Shock Corps ri~ht win~ of 
Group this front (four 
3d Army; armies) were to 
48th Army be committed. 
Four armies had 
16 b. Southern 1st Guards a frontage of 







Figure 53. Major Elements Of Front Plans. Source: Lt. 
Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration," 
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TIME TABLE: OPERATION BAGRATION 
Sl11Pl•11 lransmiltct.I directives to all f1 ont conirnnndcrs lo ussu111c 
the Jdensc. 
St1111k11 complclcJ i11iliul Jruft of co11ccpt of opcruliu11 . 
l'la1111i11g t.lireclives bused on Slul'ku concept issued lo front cu111-
mu !Hiers. 
Four fro11t com111unJers submitted their plans lo .';1111·/, u. 
St11d•11 draft pl1111 ru111pll'led 1111d iss111,,·d us n pla1111i11i: 111<'11111rn11· 
du111 sig11cd by Army (;,~11cral A. I. A11tonuv, Deputy Chief of 
Slaff for Opcralions of the General Staff of llic Hcd Army and 
Navy. 
Plan revil'wed liy Supn·111c \.0111111andcr Joseph Stalin and his 
dt·1111lii·s ulung with the fuur front commanders and their d1ids 
of staff. 
Sta Pku revised draft plu11 . 
Stu11!.11 issued revised planning directives lo fro11l co111m11111lers. 
Frurrt pla11s finalized and reviewed by Slu1•k11. 
lly this date the four fronts hat.I rec~ived all their 1ei11fun-ing 
trnups 1111d rn111plctcd training. 
/:11!1n1!11111 la11nched---lhrl'e yt·ars and 011<' Jay uftl'r 1;l'n11an., had 
first allucked l!clurussiu. 
Figure 54. Time Table: Operation Bagration. Source: 
Lt. Colonel Charles G. Fitzgerald, "Operation Bagration," 
Military Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1964, p. 67. 
267 
30 BELORUSSIAN FRONT 
T 
fl ( .. 0., Ml ... 




11 < t.oulJotl•lli 








..... ll _J,, 
D,, 
@ 
Figure 55. 3rd Belorussian Front Shock Groups. Source: 
Major Joseph C. Arnold, "Current Soviet Tactical 
Doctrine: A Reflection of the Past," Military Review 
Vol. 57, July 1977, p. 20. 
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Figure 56. Principal Rail Lines in European Russia 
1941-1944. Source: Edgar M. Howell, The Soviet 
Partisan Movement 1941-1944 (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, August 1956), Map 2. 
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Figure 57. Partisan Situation June 1944. Source: 
Bandenlagenkarte Std. Juni 44. Heeresgruppe Mitte 
National Archives Microfilm PubHcation T-311, Roll 
219. 
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Figure 58. Partisans in the Army Group Center Rear 
Area, November 1943-March 1944. Source: Edgar M. 
Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944 
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and Kormoron, April-June 1944. Source: Edgar M. 
Howell, The Soviet Partisan Movement 1941-1944 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE COLLAPSE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER 
IN THE SUMMER OF 1944 
The collapse of Army Group Center was the most decisive 
blow inflicted on the German Army during the summer of 1944. 
The collapse of Army Group Center precipitated the defeats and 
collapses elsewhere on the Eastern Front. It was necessary to fill 
the vacuum left by the collapse of Army Group Center with the 
transfer of 46 divisions and 4 brigades to Belorussia. 1 This 
transfer of military units weakened the remaining three army 
groups on the Eastern Front and set the stage for their subsequent 
retreat or defeat. 
Furthermore, the collapse of Army Group Center was a 
catastrophe of an unprecedented scale in the East. The annihilation 
of Army Group Center resulted in the destruction of 28 divisions 
and the loss of more than 350,000 men.2 Hermann Gackenholz, an 
historian and the officer in charge of the war diary for Army Group 
Center during 1944-1945, stated that this disaster "was twice as 
great as the Stalingrad disaster. "3 The German 6th Army destroyed 
at Stalingrad contained only 4 army corps, 1 Panzer corps, 14 
infantry divisions, 3 motorized divisions, 3 Panzer divisions, 1 
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Rumanian infantry division, and 1 Rumanian cavalry division.4 The 
6th Army had approximately 300,000 men but only 220,000 were 
encircled with 100 tanks, 18,000 guns and 10,000 vehicles.s In the 
final collapse of the 6th Army 1 Field Marshaf, 24 Generals and 
90,000 men were taken prisoner but only after having resisted 
while surrounded in the asiatic cold from November 22, 1942 till 
January 31, 1943.6 The 6th Army had resisted total collapse for 
more than two months compared to Army Group center which 
collapsed in less than three weeks during the summer of 1944 with 
losses of 31 Generals and 350,000 to 400,000 men.7 
On July 18, 1944, the Organization Section of Army Group 
Center issued a report on the losses of Army Group Center from the 
period June 22, 1944 to July 15, 1944. The wounded and sick that 
were transported off the front amounted to 100,000.a The number 
of missing and dead were calculated at 300,000.9 The standing 
strength of the Army Group had fallen by at least 400,000 men 
since the beginning of the Soviet major offensive.10 Therefore, the 
collapse of Army Group Center was the single most significant 
defeat of the German Army in the summer of 1944 and represents 
the first stage of a collapse of the German Army in the East. 
In contrast, the Anglo-American forces had been bogged down 
in Normandy since June 6, 1944. The American forces did take the 
port of Cherbourg by July 1, 1944 inflicting losses on the Germans 
of 47,070 in killed, wounded or captured soldiers. 11 6 German 
generals and 826 officers were also captured in this operation.12 
It was not until August 19th that Anglo-American forces had 
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encircled the remnants of the German 5th Panzer and 7th Armies in 
the Falaise pocket.13 The allies had failed to close the pocket 
tightly and even with total air superiority elements of six or seven 
Panzer divisions managed to breakout of the Mortain-Falaise 
encirclement.14 However, the Germans did suffer the loss of 
50,000 killed and 200,000 captured.15 Nevertheless, the Anglo-
American victories while important in the West were still not as 
large as the enormous Soviet victories in the East which inflicted 
staggering losses on the German Army throughout the summer of 
1944. 
Soviet and German sources disagree on the date of the 
beginning of "Operation Bagration." The German accounts claim 
that "Bagration" started on June 22, 1944.16 The Soviet accounts 
claim "Bagration" started on June 23, 1944.17 The differences are 
based upon the Soviet reconnaissance conducted in battalion 
strength by the 1st Baltic Front and the 3rd Belorussian Front on 
June 22, 1944.18 The Germans claim that this constituted the 
beginning of the major offensive while the Soviets claim that the 
following day, June 23, 1944, was the beginning of "Operation 
Bagration." The staggering of the six offensive thrusts (see Figure 
63) into Army Group Center created some confusion as to when the 
overall offensive began. The analysis for the purpose of this study 
will examine the collapse of Army Group Center beginning on June 
22, 1944. 
The forces of Army Group Center (see Table XXXV) faced the 
reinforced strength of four Soviet Fronts: 1st Baltic, 3rd 
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Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian. The 1st Baltic 
and the 3rd Belorussian Fronts initiated a reconnaissance in force 
to ascertain the strength of the German defenses and identify 
German gun positions. The 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army bore 
the brunt of the Soviet reconnaissance before the main offensive 
began on June 23, 1944 (see Figure 64). 
JUNE 22, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The 3rd ~anzer Army commanded by Colonel General 
Reinhardt consisted of 3 corps: IX Corps, Liii Corps, and VI Corps 
(see Figure 65). These 3 corps contained approximately 9 infantry 
divisions (see Figure 65). The 3rd Panzer Army also had two more 
infantry divisions in reserve (see Figure 65). The IX Corps held the 
sector northwest of Vitebsk; the Liii Corps held the enclave 
containing Fortress Vitebsk; and the VI Corps held the sector south 
of Vitebsk (see Figure 64). 
The 1st Baltic Front began the attack in the early morning 
beginning with a 24 minute artillery barrage.19 The reconnaissance 
detachments of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies attacked the IX 
Corps front with strong armored and tactical air support.20 The 
·soviets main effort was directed at Sirotino and both sides of 
Obol. The Germans estimated at least 6 Soviet divisions were 
attacking.21 The Soviets achieved an 8 kilometer wide and 5 
kilometer deep penetration of the 252nd Infantry Division's front 
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(see Figure 66).22 In the VI Corps sector the Soviets managed a 
breakthrough in the 299th Infantry Division's sector. This 
breakthrough to the south was widened up to 3 km (see Figure 67). 
The situation was regarded seriously by OKH and the 24th 
Infantry Division and Assault Gun Brigade 909 were transferred 
from Army Group North to the 3rd Panzer Army to clear up the 
breakthrough at Obol.23 Even the 201 st Security Division was 
ordered to commit no further units to the anti-partisan Operation 
"Kormoran" and security regiment 606 was placed at the disposal 
of the 3rd Panzer Army.24 
IX Army Corps. A tactical withdrawal at Sirotino could 
improve the defensive situation, but Field Marshal Busch forbid the 
IX Corps Commander, General of Artillery Wuthmann from executing 
any withdrawals. General Wuthmann requested to withdraw to the 
secondary defense line, but Field Marshal Busch forbid it stating: 
"Sirotino must be held, abandon only under enemy pressure. "25 
Field Marshal Busch advised Wuthmann further that "nothing was to 
be abandoned that could be lost in battle."26 Field Marshal Busch 
was clearly applying Hitler's "stand fast" doctrine that would prove 
disastrous to Army Group Center. By evening the Soviets had 
achieved a penetration west of Sirotino 12 km wide and 7 km 
deep.27 Soviet air supremacy was demonstrated in the VI corps 
with 249 sorties and in the IX Corps with 381 sorties registered.28 
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4th Army 
The 4th Army was commanded by General of Infantry von 
Tippelskirch who had assumed command on June 5, 1944 since 
Colonel General Heinrici had become ill.29 The 4th Army consisted 
of 3 Corps: XXVll Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps, and XII Corps (see 
Figure 68). These 3 corps contained 8 infantry divisions and 2 
Panzer Grenadier divisions. The 4th Army reserve was the 286th 
Security Division and the Heavy Tank Battalion 501 which 
contained 29 Tiger tanks. 30 The XXVll Corps covered the area north 
of Orsha, east of Orsha and south to the area of Gorki. The XXXIX 
Panzer Corps defended Mogilev and north to Gorki and east of 
Mogilev. The XII Corps extended south to the boundary of the 9th 
Army northeast of Bobruisk. 
The Soviet attacks in the morning against the left flank of 
the XII Corps and the XXVll Corps in the sector of the 78th Assault 
Division were repulsed. In the XXXIX Panzer Corps the Soviets made 
a breakthrough on the left flank of the 110th Infantry Division near 
Gorki (see Figure 64).31 Soviet attacks were launched in the 
afternoon against the 78th Assault Division and the 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Division after heavy artillery preparation. A total of 3 
regimental, 12 battalion and 9 company strength attacks supported 
by continuous close air support were repulsed. 
9th Army 
The 9th Army commanded by General of Infantry Jordan 
consisted of 3 Corps: XXXV Corps, XXXXI Panzer Corps, and LV Corps 
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(see Figure 69). These 3 Corps contained 1 O infantry divisions. 
The 9th Army had no reserve divisions at its disposal. But there 
were two Army Group reserve divisions in its operational area: the 
20th Panzer Division and the 707th Infantry Division. The 9th 
Army boundary extended northeast from Bobruisk to the area 
northwest of Rogachev; and in the center to the east of Parichi; and 
in the southwest to the Pripyat marshes.32 On June 22, 1944, the 
9th Army reported no significant activity on its front.33 
2nd Army 
The 2nd Army commanded by Colonel General Weiss contained 
3 corps: XXlll Corps, XX Corps, and VIII Corps (see Figure 70). The 3 
corps consisted of approximately 6 divisions and 2 brigades (see 
Figure 70). The 2nd Army also had the 2nd Hungarian Infantry 
Division, 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, and the 4th Cavalry 
Brigade in reserve. 
The 2nd Army reported two regimental strength attacks 
against the 3rd Cavalry Brigade. One attack was against Stolin and 
the other against Rytschew. Both attacks were repulsed. 
JUNE 23, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The situation northwest and southwest of Vitebsk developed 
into a crisis. The Soviets had broken through the German positions 
in the IX corps in the area south of Shumilino and had achieved 
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freedom of movement in the direction of the Dvina River.34 The VI 
Corps southeast of Vitebsk had been penetrated in the area of the 
Pskov-Kiev road north of Boguschevsk to the west and south.35 The 
encirclement of Vitebsk appeared imminent (see Figure 71 ). 
IX Army Corps. The Soviets continued their pressure south of 
Obol. The Soviets in the area of Sirotino pushed units of the 252nd 
Infantry Division back to Ossinowka-Jurgewo. The Soviets 
renewed their major attack at 0400 hrs after heavy artillery 
preparation.36 The commander of the IX Army Corps reported at 
0900 hrs that the 24th Infantry Division had assembled on the 
south bank of the Dvina at Obol to assist with the blocking of the 
Soviet advance. The IX Corps received the order at 1000 hrs to hold 
a new line along the rail line including Shumilino. Major-General 
Heidkaemper briefed Field Marshal Busch about the necessity of the 
IX Corps to occupy the secondary defense position. Field Marshal 
Busch responded by ordering the "IX Army Corps to hold all its 
positions tenaciously that were currently occupied."37 Moreover, 
"the 24th Infantry Division had earlier closed the existing hole 
with one regiment and assault guns."38 Field Marshal Busch ordered 
an attack to restore the integrity of the front. 
Colonel Praefke, Chief of Staff of the IX Corps reported that 
in the Corps Detachment D sector the Soviets had forced their way 
over the rail line to Chotilowo and units of Corps Detachment D 
under the personal leadership of the division commanders were 
attacking the Soviet penetration.39 Nevertheless, the Germans 
were thrown back across the rail line by a massive attack on a 
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wide front (see Figure 71). The Soviets captured the rail station at 
Lowsha and attacked Spasskoje and Krizkije with armor and 
mounted infantry. Major General Heidkaempfer had the impression 
that the Soviets would turn their attack toward Vitebsk. 
Therefore, it was especially important that Corps Detachment D 
hold the Tiger Line. General of Artillery Wuthmann, Commander of 
IX Corps, reported at 1835 hrs and 2020 hrs that the blocking of 
the lake sector up to Moslino Lake could no longer be held. It was 
reported that only remnants of Corps Detachment D were 
retreating. Wuthmann doubted that the troops of Corps Detachment 
D would be abte to conduct further significant resistance.40 Corps 
Detachment D had only 20 light and 8 heavy field howitzers 
remaining and lacked ammunition. 
Colonel-General Reinhardt criticized the fighting abilities of 
his troops. He stated: 
the commanders are therefore responsible for seeing 
that the troops now fight as one demands. It is a 
scandal to speak of the loss of ability to resist after 
two days of battle. The Tiger Line is to be held at all 
costs.4 1 
Meanwhile, further north the 24th Infantry Division lost Rowenz 
for the second time and the Soviets were advancing further to the 
southwest. 
Liii Army Corps. Colonel Schmidt, Chief of Staff of the Liii 
Corps, recognized the need to withdraw to the secondary defense 
position in order to create more reserves and possibly disengage 
one complete division as early as 0500 hrs. There were no infantry 
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attacks during the day but the situation on the flanks of the Liii 
Corps was appearing desperate as the encirclement of Vitebsk was 
beginning to appear imminent (see Figure 72). General of Infantry 
Gollwitzer, Commander of Liii Corps, requested to withdraw to the 
secondary defensive positions at 1700 hrs. Field Marshal Busch 
agreed but he had to get Hitler's approvaf.42 Meanwhile, Field 
Marshal Busch issued the following order: 
The position was to be held under all circumstances, 
therefore, regardless of the consequences everything 
possible was to be carried out so far as the situation 
permitted.43 
General Gollwitzer in a conversation with Colonel General 
Reinhardt expressed the concern that there must be a withdrawal 
to the rear positions of Vitebsk to create reserves since the corps 
rear was completely open (see Figure 73).44 Meanwhile, alert units 
in Vitebsk reported Soviets west of the 246th Infantry Division 
advancing toward the Dvina river. Hitler approved the withdrawal 
of the Liii Corps to the secondary defense position and this order 
was received at 1850 hrs.45 During the late afternoon the 
encirclement of Vitebsk appeared even more distinct. General 
Gollwitzer received an order at 1945 hrs to assemble the 4th 
Luftwaffe Field Division in Ssossnowka for an attack in the 
direction of VI Army Corps. A further advance of Soviet armored 
forces to the west and northwest must be prevented. General 
Gollwitzer reported at 2200 hrs that weak Soviet forces had 
crossed the Dvina River at Komli and had been destroyed. The 
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Corps reportedly had no further forces to secure the area further to 
the west. Furthermore, General Gollwitzer was of the opinion that 
Corps Detachment D had not occupied the Tiger Line which granted 
the Soviets appearing on the west bank of the Dvina River complete 
freedom of movement.46 The highway from Vitebsk to the west 
was already under antitank artillery fire. Four Soviet tank 
brigades were reported south of Vitebsk. 
VI Army Corp. Strong Soviet attacks were reported 
throughout the night. Heavy artillery and mortar fire preparation 
was laid down along the entire front between the left wing of the 
256th Infantry Division and Makarowa in the 197th Infantry 
Division's sector. The hole in the line at Starobobylje remained 
open. The Soviets also achieved a breakthrough in regimental 
strength between Schnitki and Lepeschino to the Pskov-Kiev (PK) 
road at Juschkowo. The Soviets were firing on Bogushevsk by 0830 
hrs. During the morning in the 256th Infantry Division's sector the 
Soviets took the villages Ordesh, Ossipowa and Juschkowo. Then 
their attack shifted to Sselenki and Stryganzy. The Soviets also 
broke through the 299th Infantry Division and were already on the 
rail line in Samostotschje. The right wing of the 197th Infantry 
Division collapsed under a Soviet attack preceded by an artillery 
barrage. The Soviets pushed over the Lutschessa River and the rail 
line to the west (see Figure 74). In the evening Ustche and Schilki 
were lost so that the 197th Infantry Division was separated from 
the VI Army Corps (see Figure 74). Therefore, the Liii Corps took 
command of the division. 
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Colonel-General Reinhardt briefed Field Marshal Busch at 
2305 hrs on the situation of the 3rd Panzer Army. He especially 
stressed the hole in the front on the boundary between the Liii 
Corps and the IX Corps.47 Field Marshal Busch demanded the closing 
of the hole. Reinhardt referred to the anticipated new danger when 
the Soviets continued their attack on June 24th and the 5th Guards 
Rifle Corps entered the battle from the area of Sirotino.48 Field 
Marshal Busch ignored the reality of the impending encirclement of 
Vitebsk thereby endangering the entire Liii Army Corps. 
4th Army 
The Soviets began their attack against the 4th Army after the 
heaviest artillery barrage that had ever been experienced in the 
entire war.49 The massive Soviet thrusts against the center of the 
4th Army were conducted with strong armored forces and close 
support aircraft. The Soviets had to use massive force on this 
front because the 4th Army had the strongest defensive forces 
deployed (see Table XXXVI). 
XXVll Army Corps. The Soviets broke through the middle of 
the 78th Assault Division's sector north of the highway and pushed 
through to Orechi.50 The area northeast of Ramaldowo was also 
penetrated. 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Soviets advanced along both sides of 
the road Rjassna-Mogilev up to 6 km in depth into the 337th 
Infantry Division's sector.51 The Soviets had attacked this sector 
with 5 divisions. In the afternoon, the Soviets broke through 
northwest of Radomlja. 
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Meanwhile, General Tippelskirch repeated in vain his request 
to withdraw behind the Dnieper river.52 The Army Group responded 
to his request by releasing a reinforced regimental group from the 
Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" to reinforce the front 
east of Mogilev. The remainder of the understrength division was 
only permitted by Army Group Headquarters to be deployed in the 
Dnieper covering position. General Tippelskirch was not satisfied 
with these measures and requested at 2050 hrs either unrestricted 
use of the entire Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" or 
authorization to withdraw into the Dnieper covering position and 
the Hassen line.53 This would shorten the front considerably which 
had been lengthened still more since the beginning of the battles 
that lead to the Soviet breakthroughs in the XXXIX Panzer Corps and 
the XXVll Army Corps sectors.54 
Field Marshal Busch did not grant approval for the 
withdrawal, but assigned the complete Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle" to the 4th Army with the restriction that it could 
only be used in the Dnieper covering position.55 Busch also ordered 
the 14th Infantry Division out of the 4th Army sector to the north 
into the 3rd Panzer Army sector to be employed in the Tiger line on 
both sides Bogushevsk. This deprived the 4th Army of a potential 
reserve division. The 4th Army had only the 286th Security 
Division and the Heavy Tank Battalion 501 with 29 Tiger tanks 
available for reserves.56 Field Marshal Busch demanded that the 
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4th Army "stand fast" holding an overextended front with 
inadequate reserves against a numerically superior enemy. The use 
of flexible defense was denied. 
9th Army 
The Soviets opened their offensive against the 9th Army in 
the XXXXI Panzer Corps and the XXXV Army Corps sectors. In the 
XXXXI Panzer Corps sector the Soviets attacked across the entire 
front in battalion to regimental strength and were generally 
repulsed. In the XXXV Army Corps sector the left flank of the 
296th Infantry C~>ivision was attacked in battalion strength and the 
Soviets were repulsed. The main weight of the Soviet offensive 
would fall on the 9th Army sector beginning on June 24, 1944. 
JUNE 24, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The Soviet offensive achieved several critical objectives. In 
the south, the Soviets widened their breakthrough over the rail line 
to Bogushevsk and to the south. The Soviets continued their 
advance with strong armored and motorized formations to the west 
and northwest through the hole between the VI and Liii Army Corps. 
Units of the 3rd Guards Corps reached the area of Ostrovno and 
blocked the last connection of the Liii Corps to the west. 57 Soviet 
forces from the north also reached the Dvina river. Therefore, 
Vitebsk was completely encircled (see Figures 75 & 76). The Liii 
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Corps received the order to attack to the southwest to restore the 
connection to the Tiger line and hold it open. 
IX Army Corps. The Soviets broke through on both sides of 
the Leskowitschi lakes with armor and mounted infantry pushing in 
the direction of Uwoloki-Pissarewo. The IX Corps was ordered to 
occupy the line along the Dvina river between Komli and Ulla. After 
the Tiger line was penetrated on a wide front the IX Corps was to 
fight its way back to the Dvina river and prevent the Soviets from 
crossing between Budilow and Ulla. The defensive position north of 
Beshenkovichi was to be held by Corps Detachment D. Between Ulla 
and the right flank of the 24th Infantry Division Soviet units were 
advancing west. The Soviets broke into the 252nd Infantry 
Division's defensive line and took Latkowo and were continuing to 
advance with numerically superior infantry and armor forces. The 
290th Infantry Division was transferred from Army Group North 
and placed under command of the IX Corps along with the 24th 
Infantry Division.58 The 290th Infantry Division and a motorized 
artillery battalion were in transport to close the hole between the 
Dvina river at Kordan and the right wing of the 24th Infantry 
Division. All available forces which included retreating divisional 
units, construction and security units of the IX Corps were put into 
the Dvina position from Budinowo to the northwest of Ulla. The 
bridgehead at Ulla had to be abandoned and German forces retreated 
across the Dvina river blowing up the bridges. 59 Southwest of Obol 
the Soviets took Leonowo. Field Marshal Busch arranged the 
reinforcement of this front by transferring the 212th Infantry 
Division from Army Group North.60 
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VI Army Corps. General Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group 
Center, reported at 1105 hrs the reinforcement of VI Corps by the 
14th Infantry Division minus one regiment left with the 4th Army. 
The Soviet breakthrough area on the open left wing of the corps 
was extremely threatening (see Figure 77). Two Soviet regiments 
with approximately 40 tanks were observed advancing to the south 
on the Bogushevsk-Senno road. Colonel Mantey, Chief of Staff VI 
Corps, reported that the Soviet main effort south of Vitebsk was 
on both sides of Bogushevsk. The corps reported that the 256th 
Infantry Division could no longer hold its position. The Army Group 
ordered the withdrawal of the VI Corps into the Tiger line at 1245 
hrs (see Figure 78).61 The Tiger line was to be occupied between 
the army border and Bogushevsk which was completed successfully. 
The Soviets around 1200 hrs launched continuous strong attacks 
supported by at least 120 tanks against both sides of Bogushevsk 
in the Tiger line which had been occupied by the 14th Infantry 
Division. Nevertheless, Bogushevsk was captured by the Soviets. 
The hole between the VI Corps and the Liii Corps permitted the 
Soviets to advance to the west and northwest (see Figure 77). 
Liii Army Corps. The Liii Corps was in the greatest danger 
occupying the Vitebsk salient. The Soviets were advancing through 
the hole to the north to Sarudniza. The Commander of the 3rd 
Panzer Army, Colonel General Reinhardt, ordered the 4th Luftwaffe 
Field Division to assemble at Ostrovno and from there to advance 
to the southeast at 1040 hrs. The Soviets advancing to the 
northwest through the hole to the Liii Corps were already on the 
outskirts of Ostrovno and Lichoschina. The first arriving 
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battalions of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division were ordered to stop 
the Soviet advance. Thus, A crisis in the 3rd Panzer Army had 
developed because of the large gaping hole in the center between 
the VI Corps and Liii Corps which could not be closed because there 
were no available forces.62 
Chief of Staff of the Army, Colonel General Zeitzler called 
Colonel General Reinhardt at 1525 hrs and informed him that the 
Fuehrer was very much against an evacuation of Vitebsk because 
Hitler believed "this would start the ball rolling. "63 Reinhardt 
advised Zeitzler that the decision to evacuate Vitebsk today was 
imperative so that the forces could be brought out to hold other 
positions. Therefore, it was urgently required that the troops 
come out now before the encirclement so that they retained their 
operational abilities. 64 Reinhardt feared that this would be 
recognized "too late."65 Colonel General Zeitzler consulted with 
the Fuehrer and informed Reinhardt at 1535 hrs that the Fuehrer 
decided Vitebsk was to be held as a "fortress, and everything must 
be attempted so the formations can hold it. 66 The LI 11 Corps 
reported the loss of Shigaly and Soviet advances from Gorki and 
Tolstjuki in unknown strength to the north. 
Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs it was 
no longer possible to keep Vitebsk open since the Soviets already 
have occupied the perimeter road and the road from Vitebsk to 
Lepel was under Soviet fire. 67 Colonel General Reinhardt stated: 
The new situation makes the ordered solution 
impossible. Something must happen immediately. 
There is no longer another solution like the previous 
proposal. 68 
299 
Reinhardt reasoned that the forces in Vitebsk could be used 
to close the hole between the VI and IX Army Corps. Then a new 
defensive front could be constructed. However, if the order to 
evacuate Vitebsk was not given the hole between VI and IX Corps 
would grow even larger. The encirclement of the divisions in 
Vitebsk was almost completed and the 3rd Panzer Army's 
commander's plan for the new defensive front based on the reality 
of the situation was ignored by Hitler. 
Meanwhile, Lt. General Krebs and Col. General Zeitzler had 
conferred and spoke to Col. General Reinhardt at 1615 hrs. Lt. 
General Krebs informed Reinhardt that Field Marshal Busch believed 
that one division was sufficient to hold Vitebsk. Therefore, the 
other divisions were free to breakout to the rear to restore 
communication to the rest of the 3rd Panzer Army. 69 Lt. General 
Krebs informed Reinhardt the 5th Panzer Division was on its way 
from Orsha. Reinhardt requested that the IV Flieger Division 
provide some air support over Vitebsk since the Soviets had air 
superiority.70 General Reuss reported that his fighters were 
without their forward air strip at Ulla and the Stukas had been 
concentrated on the 4th Army sector. Later in the afternoon 
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fighters appeared in the area of Vitebsk. Col. General Reinhardt 
informed Field Marshal Busch at 1820 hrs that the Soviets had 
reached the south edge of Ostrovno and occupied Lichoschina. The 
4th and 6th Luftwaffe Field Divisions were to secure the road to 
the west of Vitebsk and hold it open. The order was now: "about 
face, fight back to the Tiger line."71 
Field Marshal Busch informed the 3rd Panzer Army of his 
decision to hold Vitebsk: 
His request for the Army to completely abandon Vitebsk 
had been denied. There were special reasons which 
made it essential to hold Vitebsk. Therefore, one 
division will remain in Vitebsk which is the 206th 
Infantry Division. Lt. General Hitter is appointed the 
new battle commander. The Liii Corps Commander is to 
ensure that the order to hold Vitebsk is followed. The 
breakout of the other Vitebsk divisions shall be 
conducted under the leadership of the corps 
commander. 12 
General Gollwitzer proposed that the commander of the 206th 
Infantry Division be appointed as Commandant of "Fortress 
Vitebsk." Lt. General Hitter was appointed by Field Marshal Busch 
in accordance with Fuehrer Order Nr. 11 Commander of "Fortress 
Vitebsk." (see Appendix C).73 
The Liii Army Corps in order to breakout of the encirclement 
would have to traverse a 35-40 km hole that existed between the 
VI and IX Army Corps.74 The Soviets continued to press through 
this hole to the area south of the Dvina River. The line of lakes at 
Chodzy was now under Soviet control. Thus, the Liii Army Corps 
was becoming progressively separated from the remainder of the 
3rd Panzer Army as a result of unrealistic command directives 




The Soviets continued to make headway in both breakthrough 
areas by use of heavy attacks supported by massed tanks. Each 
breakthrough position contained a Soviet Tank Corps. The Soviet 
Breakthrough position in the XXXIX Panzer Corps sector contained 
700 trucks loaded with Soviet infantry and numerous tanks. 75 The 
German front had been stretched to a thin security line. The 337th 
Infantry Division had already lost more than 3/4 of their artillery. 
The Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Dethleffsen 
requested approval from Army Group Center to withdraw the 4th 
Army Front back to the Dnieper covering position at 1100 hrs. 
However, the Army Group at 1250 hrs only approved the withdrawal 
of the left wing of the 4th Army on an 8 km stretch into the Tiger 
line between Orechi and Dewinskoje Lake. General von Tippelskirch 
conferred at 1945 hrs with Field Marshal Busch about the 
withdrawal to the Dnieper covering position, but the withdrawal 
was denied. Even a 6 km withdrawal of the 12th Infantry Division's 
left flank was not permitted by Field Marshal Busch. Field Marshal 
Busch reasoned: 
the prepared positions may not be abandoned because 
otherwise the enemy would receive encouragement. 76 
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In summary, the situation in the breakthrough areas was 
tense. The Soviets in the breakthrough sector of the 78th Assault 
Division continued to advance with armored forces to the south 
(see Figure 79). The 78th Assault Division was ordered to 
withdraw to the Hessen line west of Teolin from the Dnieper and 
connect into line Makarowo-Bridgehead-Orsha-Orechi Lake-Tiger 
line.77 In the XXXIX Panzer Corps sector the 12th Infantry Division 
could no longer hold its position and it withdrew behind the river 
Basya. The 337th Infantry Division consisted only of severely 
battered remnants and the Soviets had already crossed the river 
Basya in this sector. The critical problem was that a critical hole 
emerged between the 337th and 12th Infantry Divisions (see Figure 
80).78 There were no available forces to close the hole. 
General von Tippelskirch attributed the surprising success of 
the Soviets in the first two days of combat to several factors: 
1 . The Soviet artillery had more ammunition and a 
longer barrage than in previous major offensives. 
2. The fire control was more flexible and German 
artillery was targeted more than previously. 
3. The Soviet air superiority was especially noticeable. 
4. The Soviet armor followed rapidly behind the 
infantry breakthroughs. 
5. The breakthrough success was rapidly exploited and 
both tanks and infantry immediately advanced into the 
depth of the defense toward distant objectives. 79 
Major General Schuermann, Commander of the 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Division attributed Soviet success to the following 
factors: 
1 . The Soviets employed an enormous number of 
tactical aircraft and there was almost a complete 
absence of German aircraft. 
2. The Germans lacked operational reserves. 
3. The Front was totally overextended.80 
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The 4th Army lacked adequate reserves to counter the Soviet 
breakthroughs. The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was 
restricted to use in the Dnieper covering position and the 14th 
Infantry Division was dispatched to the 3rd Panzer Army. 
Tippelskirch argued that if the 4th Army had been given a free hand 
the situation could have been brought under control. The 4th Army 
on June 24th still had 1 O divisions and 7 were completely combat 
ready: 57, 267, 31, 12, 110, 260 Infantry Divisions, and the 18 
Panzer Grenadier Division.81 Even the 25th Panzer Grenadier 
Division was intact with only its left regiment locked in a major 
engagement. The division still had at its disposal a considerable 
number of anti-tank weapons. 
The fate of the 4th Army hung in the balance as early as the 
evening of the second day of the Soviet offensive. A continuous 
front no longer existed on the 4th Army sector. Field Marshal 
Busch at midnight informed the 4th Army that the Soviets had 
broken through at Bogushevsk with 120 tanks. 82 General von 
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Tippelskirch ordered General Voelckers of the XXVll Army Corps to 
concentrate all assault guns and self-propelled artillery on the 
left wing. In addition, two battalions of infantry were sent from 
Staiki in the rear to the left wing of the XXVll Corps. 
9th Army 
The Soviets attacked in the XXXV Army Corps sector with 5-7 
Rifle Divisions and two tank formations. They achieved a wide 
breakthrough north of Rogachev along the inner flanks of the 296th 
and 134th Infantry Divisions. The Soviets broke through the center 
of the 134th Infantry Division with strong armored forces on a 3 
km wide front which extended into the wooded terrain southwest 
of Oserani (see Figure 81). The greatest Soviet success was 
achieved south of the Berezina River in the XXXXI Panzer Corps 
sector. The attack consisted of 15 Soviet Rifle Divisions and 3 
tank formations attacking in the direction of Osaritschi and 
Dubrowa. The 129th Infantry Division was pushed back to Tremlja 
after strong artillery preparation and the 35th Infantry Division to 
a line extending from Tremlja to 1 O km northeast of 
Wolossowitschi to 6 km northwest of Tschernin. A gap developed 
between the left flank of the 35th Infantry Division and Tschernin 
and the right flank of the 36th Infantry Division (see Figure 81 ).83 
The 9th Army acquired the use of the OKH reserves: 20th Panzer 
Division and 707th Infantry Division.84 The 20th Panzer Division 
was ordered to deploy to the south in the XXXXI Panzer Corps sector 
after having first been sent north to support the XXXV Army Corps. 
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The fear was that a breakthrough in the south toward Bobruisk 
would cut the main supply route to the forces deployed east of the 
Berezina River.as 
JUNE 25, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The situation of the 3rd Panzer Army grew worse by the hour. 
The Soviets widened the hole between the VI Army Corps and the 
Dvina river by 50 km and new Soviet forces were advancing into 
this hole from the north toward Beschenkowitschi. 86 The closing 
of this gap was not possible with the available existing forces. 
The Liii Army Corps was surrounded in Vitebsk and the 290th and 
24th Infantry Divisions along with the entire VI Corps were 
removed from the 3rd Panzer Army (see Figure 92).87 
IX Army Corps. The Soviets crossed the Dvina River on both 
sides of Beschenkowitschi. Soviet tanks with mounted infantry 
also appeared north of Beschenkowitschi. Chief of Staff, Major 
General Heidkaempfer ordered the IX Corps at 0925 hrs to hold 
Beschenkowitschi at all costs. Further instructions were given to 
Security Regiment 45, 201 st Security Division, 252nd Infantry 
Division, and the Army Weapons School to build a new defense line 
between the Lukomskoje Lake and Poluoserje Lake. The 290th and 
24th Infantry Divisions were removed from the IX Corps control 
and placed under the tactical control of Army Group North's I Army 
Corps.88 The 212th Infantry Division was to advance immediately 
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to the area of Parafjanow. The Commander of the 262nd Infantry 
Divisional group in Beschenkowitschi reported to the IX Corps at 
1120 hrs that the Soviets had reached the road Ulla-
Beschenkowitschi and were in the town Pjatigosk. The IX Corps 
next report at 1340 hrs reported the Soviets reaching the 
Sswetschanka river west of Beschenkowitschi. The Corps 
requested to withdraw to the line of lakes to the south. Col. 
General Reinhardt informed Field Marshal Busch that the Dvina 
sector will be overrun and the Soviets could make it to the line of 
lakes to the south before our own troops. The Field Marshal 
answered, "the withdrawal was completely ruled out. The Dvina 
position must be held. "89 Major General Heidkaempfer reported to 
Lt. General Krebs at 1425 hrs that the situation could not last 
much longer or the Soviets would reach the Poluoserje Lake and 
then the IX Corps would have no possibility of reinforcing its right 
wing. Beschenkowitischi was surrounded (see Figure 82). Soviet 
armor was advancing to the southwest from Ssenno threatening the 
Army's rear (see Figure 82). Col. General Reinhardt informed Lt. 
General Krebs that the Soviets displayed the tendency to advance in 
the direction of Lapel. If the troops were to occupy the favorable 
ground around the lakes then the decision must be made to abandon 
the Dvina position of our own free will and in good time otherwise 
it will again be "too late."90 But Field Marshal Busch in two further 
messages at 1515 hrs and 1540 hrs gave the order that the Dvina 
position was not to be evacuated because the LI II Army Corps had 
to fight its way out.91 The Soviets were reported to have occupied 
Sswetscha at 1700 hrs. General Wuthmann reported at 1825 hrs 
that the battle in Beschenkowitschi was still continuing. The 
garrison of Beschenkowitschi was finally ordered to fight their 
way back to the main battle line during the night. 
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VI Army Corps. The 14th Infantry Division was reported to 
have been overrun by Soviet armor at 0900 hrs. A penetration of 
the Tiger line at Saoserje in the 95th Infantry Division's sector 
succeeded. The withdrawal of the 95th Infantry Division was 
permitted. It was withdrawn behind the Oboljanka River (see 
Figure 82). Maj. General Heidkaempfer was informed in a 
conference at 1000 hrs with Lt. General Krebs of the necessity of 
the VI Army Corps to be placed under the command of the 4th Army 
because of the circumstances and the withdrawal of the Corps 
towards the 4th Army sector. Lt. General Krebs confirmed this 
discussion with an order at 1110 hrs placing the VI Corps under the 
command of the 4th Army and extended the 4th Army's area of 
responsibility to the area of Ssenno (see Figure 82).92 
Liii Army Corps. The Liii Corps was cut off from the rest of 
the 3rd Panzer Army (see Figure 83). Lt. General Hitter had been 
the Commandant of Fortress Vitebsk since 0400 hrs and General 
Gollwitzer of the Liii Corps was preparing the Corps for a breakout 
from Vitebsk. Vitebsk was under attack from units of the Soviet 
43rd and 39th Armies.93 The Liii Corps reported at 1315 hrs that 
the encirclement of Vitebsk was now complete.94 The 4th 
Luftwaffe Field Division had virtually ceased to exist as a 
divisional unit and the 246th Infantry Division along with the 6th 
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Luftwaffe Field Division were engaged in bitter battles.95 Several 
penetrations into the actual city of Vitebsk had occurred. The 
Corps urgently requested fighter air cover. General Gollwitzer in 
Vitebsk reported at 1900 hrs that he would concentrate his forces 
for a breakout to the southwest beginning at 0500 hrs on June 
26th.96 He requested air cover over the area southwest of Vitebsk. 
Col. General Reinhardt advised General Gollwitzer that on the basis 
of Fuehrerbefebl Nr. 11 (see Appendix C) the 206th Infantry 
Division with Lt. General Hitter as commander were to hold 
Fortress Vitebsk.97 
Field Marshal Busch had the impression that General 
Gollwitzer must have received a new withdrawal order with 
details of the breakout. Busch ordered at 1845 hrs that a General 
Staff Officer from 3rd Panzer Army be flown or dropped by 
parachute into Vitebsk to brief General Gollwitzer on the overall 
situation. Field Marshal Busch called 3rd Panzer Army again at 
2000 hrs and insisted once again that a General Staff Officer be 
sent to Vitebsk. Col. General Reinhardt maintained that this was 
not practical and apparently set this request aside.98 But Chief of 
Staff, 3rd Panzer Army, Maj. General Heidkaempfer declared that 
Col. General Reinhardt informed Field Marshal Busch of his decision 
in the following manner: 
Field Marshal, please inform the Fuehrer that only one 
officer in the 3rd Panzer Army can be considered for 
this jump, and that's the Army Commander. I am ready 
to execute his order. 99 
There was no further discussion of this order after 
Reinhardt's statement. Lt. General Krebs informed Maj. General 
Heidkaempfer that Hitler wanted the 206th Infantry Division to 
hold Vitebsk for 6-7 more days.100 
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Lt. General Hitter reported at 2006 hrs a breakthrough into 
the northeast section of Vitebsk and a struggle in the northwest 
section which was very serious. Bitter street battles in Vitebsk 
and deep penetrations along the Pskov-Kiev (PK) road were 
reported. The 4th Luftwaffe Field Division Headquarters was 
surrounded in Ostrowno while the rest of the division ceased to 
exist (see Figure 83).101 
Meanwhile, Major Balve was briefing Colonel Graf von 
Kielmansegg about the 3rd Panzer Army situation and the lack of 
antitank weapons. During the briefing Colonel Kielmansegg 
expressed the revisionist view from OKH: 
Over the rapid falling back no reproaches from anyone. 
Everybody was taken by surprise by the enemy's 
strength. Presently, there are still no operational 
reserve formations that have appeared from the 
southern front. The view at OKH is that things would 
not have gone much better if the abandonment of 
Vitebsk had been ordered in good time.102 
Major Balve, however, spoke out vigorously against this false view. 
The 3rd Panzer Army was in serious trouble since two large 
holes had been ripped through their front by Soviet armor and 
mounted infantry. A central problem was not only lack of reserves 
but an extreme shortage of antitank weapons. 3rd Panzer Army 
notified Army Group Center that with assignment of the VI Army 
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Corps to the 4th Army and divisions north of the Dvina to the 16th 
Army that the majority of antitank weapons had been lost.103 The 
VI Corps had Panzer Jaeger Battalion 519 while Sturmgeschuetz 
(assault gun) Brigades 281, 245 and 909 were all located north of 
the Ulla. Liii Army Corps had only 3 assault gun battalions and this 
left 3rd Panzer Army with only one Sturmgeschuetz (assault gun) 
Brigade to meet the on rushing Soviet Tank Brigades. 3rd Panzer 
Army requested the return of Assault Gun Brigade 909 and other 
Nashorn and assault gun battalions. 
4th Army 
VI Army Corps. The newly assigned VI Corps reported at 
0850 hrs that a Soviet Column was advancing through the wide hole 
between its divisions and had reached the area north of Ssenno. 
The Soviets were also reported at 1030 hrs as having advanced 1 O 
km southwest of Boguschewskoje. The VI Corps had withdrawn to 
the line Staiki-Papino-Schinkow (12 km southeast of Ssenno). 
Army Group Center officially informed VI Corps with the 256th, 
299th, 14th and 95th Infantry Divisions that it was now under the 
command of 4th Army.104 The Army Group informed the 4th Army 
and the VI Corps that the 5th Panzer Division was coming up from 
the rear by train to reinforce this sector. 
XXVll Army Corps. Soviet attacks continued throughout the 
evening and night. The 78th Assault Division north of the Dnieper 
River organized a new defense line: Teolin-Makarowo-Wydriza-
Kupelka-Orechi Lake-Tiger line. Orechi was lost and Soviet armor 
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was pouring through Boguschewskoje advancing to the northeast 
towards Smoljany.105 Soviet armor was now in Ssenno 30 km 
further to the west. 1 os The XXVI I Army Corps reported that the 
Soviets had broken through south of the Orechi Lakes and Soviet 
armor was now in Ussy. General Tippelskirch ordered the right 
wing of the XXVI I Army Corps to prepare to withdraw to the Hessen 
line (see Figure 84). 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Soviets attacking from the 
southeast took Ssuchari and the 337th Infantry Division was forced 
into retreat to the Resta River where it would then prepare for 
withdrawal to the Dnieper covering position. The XXXIX Panzer 
Corps was ordered at 1100 hrs to prepare for a withdrawal to the 
Dnieper covering position. The 337th Infantry Division was pushed 
back and entered Krugloje. Field Marshal Busch gave his approval 
to withdraw the 31st and 12th Infantry Divisions at night to the 
Dnieper covering position. However, the 260th Infantry Division 
and the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division of the XXVll Corps along 
with the 110th Infantry Division were to remain in their present 
positions. 101 The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" in the 
Dnieper covering position was broken through at Ssuchari. 90 
Soviet tanks followed by trucks were advancing toward Mogilev 
(see Figure 85).108 
The situation had become critical and General Tippelskirch 
could no longer wait for approval from Field Marshal Busch and 
then Hitler. Tippelskirch ordered the withdrawal of the entire 
front between Ssutoki (on the left flank of the 18th Panzer 
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Grenadier Division) and the Dnieper northeast of Orsha back into 
the Dnieper covering position and Orsha Bridehead (see Figure 
86).109 Field Marshal Busch when briefed on Tippelskirch's actions 
was outraged. He told Tippelskirch that this was "an act in 
contravention of orders."110 Furthermore, he had defied an order 
from Hitler that only the 31st and 12th Infantry Divisions were 
allowed to withdraw to the Dnieper covering position.111 Field 
Marshal Busch ordered General Tippelskirch to have the divisions 
reoccupy the former battle line. 
General von Tippelskirch then issued the following order to 
the XXVll and XXXIX Corps: 
In all parts of the front not under attack, troops are to 
hold firm until they are attacked by a superior enemy 
force and then pushed back. The only troops to be 
withdrawn from the front are those needed to close the 
gap between the 78th Assault Division and the 25th 
Panzer Grenadier Division and those needed to cover the 
Dnieper River crossings which are threatened.112 
However, Tippelskirch had not ordered the divisions to return to 
their former positions as Field Marshal Busch had ordered. This 
dispute became moot when Hitler at 231 O hrs approved the 
withdrawal of the other divisions.113 
9th Army 
XXXV Army Corps. The Soviets attacked with 12 Rifle 
Divisions and the 9th Tank Corps out of the area north of 
Rogatschew in an attempt to sever the highway (see Figure 87).114 
The Soviets would in further attacks against the flank of the Drut 
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River Bridgeheads attempt to split up the front. However, the XXXV 
Corps achieved some local defensive success knocking out 120 
Soviet tanks.11s But the Soviets had severed the connection to the 
4th Army. Despite some local successes, the 15 km gap on the left 
of the corps could not be closed. In the center the Soviets had 
crossed the Drut River and were 5 km west of Ozarichi and 5 km 
west-northwest of Rogatschew (see Figure 87). The situation 
became worse by midnight. The left flank was ripped open (see 
Figure 87). Units of the 707th and 134th Infantry Divisions were 
fighting southwest of Buda. Both the 134th and 196th Infantry 
Divisions had been penetrated between Ozarichi and Rogatschew. 
The Soviets were now 10 km northwest of Ozarichi and had crossed 
the Rogatschew-Bobruisk road in the southwest (see Figure 87). 
The XXXV Corps had exhausted its reserves to defend its left flank 
by withdrawing battalions from the 6th, 383rd, and 45th Infantry 
Divisions in the center. 
XXXXI Panzer Corps. The Soviets had overwhelmed the 35th 
Infantry Division's defense (see Figure 85).116 The 20th Panzer 
Division arrived just in time to destroy the Soviet crossing 
attempt on the Rudnya River east of Slobodka. The 20th Panzer 
Division, however, could not continue its attack because the 
crossing site was lost. The 36th Infantry Division and the 20th 
Panzer Division achieved a rendezvous southwest of Parichi. The 
left flank of the 36th Infantry Division was penetrated and had to 
fight its way back to the Berezina River 3 km east of Parichi (see 
Figure 88). The 129th Infantry Division was also penetrated in 5 
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places. The 35th Infantry Division was fighting its way back to the 
area north and northwest of Shkava. It was reported that 200 
trucks loaded with Soviet infantry had crossed the railway through 
Zelenkovichi to the west. 
General Jordan anticipated that the 9th Army would soon be 
facing an encirclement battle. He requested that Field Marshal 
Busch permit him to withdraw the XXXV Corps southern front 
thereby releasing the 383rd Infantry Division. However, Field 
Marshal Busch responded: 
The Army without regard to the success of the enemy 
breakthroughs has to remain in their present positions 
where that is possible.111 
The 9th Army realizing its precarious situation reached the 
same solution repeatedly that the situation could only be restored 
if the 9th Army forces were granted immediate freedom of action 
by the withdrawal of the entire front to the Berezina River and the 
Bobruisk bridgehead (see Figure 89). But the answer was that the 
defensive mission of the Army had not changed and that "not one 
foot of ground was to be voluntarily abandoned. "118 
If Army Group Center was to have saved itself then decisive 
action would have been required on June 25, 1944 to restore a 
badly ruptured front by immediately withdrawing all divisions and 
the entire front line further to the west to form a new defensive 
line on the Berezina River. But instead Hitler insisted on "standing 
fast" and this permitted the Soviets to encircle entire army corps 
as the offensive progressed. There was a vacuum of leadership at 
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Army Group Center. Field Marshal Busch failed to listen to his 
army commanders and instead became a rubberstamp tor Hitler's 
orders. He failed to take decisive actions of his own to save his 
army group. Therefore, armies which had demonstrated superb 
leadership in the past in fending off the Red Army now were 
deprived of the freedom of action necessary to save themselves 
from annihilation. The fate of the Liii Army Corps, 4th Army, and 
9th Army was sealed more by Hitler's orders than Soviet offensive 
actions. 
General Jordan's expression of bitterness over the OKH and 
Army Group failures was expressed in the Kriegstagebuch on June 
25, 1944: 
Headquarters 9th Army is fully aware of the disastrous 
consequences of all these orders. It can accept them 
only inasmuch as, after representing his opposing view 
upwards in a responsible manner, a commander in the 
field is obliged to carry out the orders of his superior, 
even if these go against his own convictions. It is a 
bitter pill to swallow, though, when one feels that, 
behind these Army Group instructions which so utterly 
ignore one's own pressing suggestions, and behind the 
answers given by the Field Marshal and his Chief of 
Staff, one can see no sign of a commander showing any 
purposeful will to do his utmost, but just the execution 
of orders whose basis has long since been overtaken by 
events.119 
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JUNE 26, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The situation of the 3rd Panzer Army became more critical 
with only weak units occupying the front which was threatened by 
strong Soviet forces. The area of Lepel was the only front which 
could be reinforced. Liii Army Corps attempted a breakout to the 
southwest. The main effort of the Soviets was centered at 
Botscheikowo. 
IX Army Corps. In the early morning the Soviets attacked the 
Dvina line on both sides and south of Ulla and achieved several 
breakthroughs over a wide front. The 252nd Infantry Division 
fought its way back to the lake bottleneck of Poluoserje Lake -
Ussweja Lake. During the night encircled units of Corps 
Detachment D in Beschenkowitschi broke out to the southwest (see 
Figure 90).120 The Soviet main effort was shifted from Corps 
Detachment D to the 252nd Infantry Division according to General 
Wuthmann of the IX Corps at 0900 hrs. Corps Detachment D took 
over the southern tip of Paluoserje Lake. It was unclear what units 
of the 252nd Infantry Division had been able to fight their way 
back. The 16th Army of Army Group North assigned Panzer Jaeger 
Battalion 519 consisting of Nashorns (self-propelled 88 mm guns) 
and Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 909 consisting of assault guns to 
reinforce the IX Corps. The arrival of the 212th Infantry Division 
was delayed a few hours because of several rail demolitions north 
of Parafjanow. 
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The IX Corps reported at 1230 hrs that the Soviets had 
secured a bridgehead at Botscheikowo and the poorly equipped 
security troops could not withstand an attack. General Wuthmann 
reported a Soviet concentration of 60-70 tanks at Botscheikowo. 
General Heidkaempfer emphasized the need to concentrate as much 
artillery as possible against this armored concentration especially 
assault guns and Hummels (self-propelled 150 mm guns). General 
Wuthmann pulled back the remnants of the 252nd Infantry Division 
south of Poluoserje Lake to meet this Soviet concentration. The 
artillery of the 252nd Infantry Division was assigned to cover the 
Division sector and Botscheikowo. Col. General Reinhardt urgently 
requested air strikes against the Soviet armor concentration 
facing Botscheikowo. General Wuthmann of IX Corps reported at 
1900 hrs that Soviet armor had broken through at Botscheikowo.121 
The security troops were in retreat. Even with the arrival of 
assault guns from Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 277, a counterattack 
could not be conducted since the troops were incapable of further 
combat at this time. The right wing of the IX Corps was withdrawn 
to the lake line at the beginning of darkness: Soroschina Lake-
Nessino Lake-Ostrowno Lake-Woroschky Lakes-southern tip of 
Poluoserje Lake (see Figure 90). 
Liii Army Corps. The morning of June 26th looked bleak for 
the surrounded Liii Corps. General Gollwitzer thanked Col. General 
Reinhardt for his wishes of good luck and reported that he would 
fight to the last. In the early morning a report from the corps 
indicated that the 206th Infantry Division was outside of the 
defensive ring with significant units as a result of the 
development of the situation, and regrouping was no longer 
possible because of heavy fighting .122 There were only 4 
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battalions available to defend the "firm position" in Vitebsk so the 
conditions for carrying out the Fuehrer's order no longer existed.123 
The entire corps must now either remain in Vitebsk or breakout 
including the 206th Infantry Division.124 The situation and the 
orders had made this last decision necessary. 
Presently at 0700 hrs bitter battles were raging in southern 
and western Vitebsk. The LI 11 Corps had begun the breakout at 
0500 hrs. Lt. General Krebs reported at 1130 hrs that intervention 
to assist the Liii Army Corps was no longer possible. The battle 
for Vitebsk was to continue. Field Marshal Busch in a discussion 
with Col. General Reinhardt demanded that the following 
unequivocal radio order be sent to General Gollwitzer and General 
Hitter in Vitebsk: 
Vitebsk with the ordered units is to be held. No 
freedom of decision! You are bound by the Fuehrer's 
order.12s 
The Liii Corps was advised of strong enemy forces in 
Beschenkowitschi and in Ssenno. German units were still located 
east of Tschaschniki. Luftwaffe reports indicated at 1235 hrs that 
German infantry were crossing over the Tschernogosthiza in the 
Tiger line 3.5 km south of Budilowo. The Liii Corps continued to 
request air cover and reported that the breakthrough had reached 
the line Balbarody-Ossniki (see Figure 91 ).126 The situation at 
Ostrowno remained unclear. German troops were extremely 
exhausted and there were shortages of ammunition. The 206th 
Infantry Division reported that the mass of the division was 
presently resisting Soviet attacks 8-1 O km southeast of 
Vitebsk.121 The 246th Infantry Division was located west of the 
206th Infantry Division. 
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The Liii Army Corps had essentially been split into two 
groups (see Figure 92). The first group contained two regiments of 
the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division and the 206th and 246th Infantry 
Divisions surrounded southwest of Vitebsk.12a The second group 
contained units of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division, one regiment 
from the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division, and units of the 246th and 
197th Infantry Divisions encircled north of Ostrowno.129 The 
Germans launched 22 counterattacks in a desperate attempt to 
breakout to the west.130 Lt. General Peschel lead elements of the 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division out of the pocket more than 15 km to 
the southwest into a swampy area.131 The 206th Infantry Division 
Headquarters was moved to Teljatniki (4 km west of Vitebsk) at 
0200 hrs. Later, the Division Headquarters was transferred to a 
bunker 300 meters west of Pawlowitschi (see Figure 93).132 Major 
Voss, an officer of the 206th Infantry Division Headquarters staff 
reported that the Liii Corps Headquarters and General Gollwitzer 
during the afternoon were located in a concrete bunker 500 meters 
south of the village Baschki (see Figure 93).133 
General Gollwitzer received a radio message from 3rd Panzer 
Army Headquarters inquiring what the situation was around 
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Vitebsk. A half-hour discussion did not produce a clear 
formulation of a response to the Army Headquarters. Lt. General 
Hitter of the 206th Infantry Division did not intend to follow 
Hitler's order to stay in Vitebsk. His Division Headquarters was 
already on the southern edge of the city. He concentrated his units 
for a breakout in the evening before the village of Sarudniza. The 
Lutschessa strongpoint continued to be held (see Figure 93). The 
206th Infantry Division had concentrated its forces for a breakout 
to the south. The supplies of the division which had been 
concentrated in one area were for the most part completely 
destroyed and burned by a Soviet air attack.134 The 206th Infantry 
Division and Liii Corps Headquarters assembled at 2200 hrs with 
approximately 2000 men which were divided into battle groups of 
500 men each. General Gollwitzer's final instructions were: 
Men, we must still force this breakthrough, 
you must not let your General down.135 
The attack proceeded with yells of "Hurra" and shooting into 
the Soviet outposts. German casualties were terrible. Major Voss 
reported that he and other officers stopped this form of attack and 
proceeded with the last units silently against the enemy. The 
breakthrough succeeded in passing through the village of Sarudniza 
and past the first Soviet security line in the early morning hours of 
June 27th. Major Voss lead one attack group through behind an 
assault gun and reached the woods before the village of Schelky.136 
General Gollwitzer and Hitter had remained behind in Vitebsk.137 
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4th Army 
VI and XXVll Army Corps. The Soviets had crossed the Pskov-
Kiev (PK) road and had advanced 8 km further to the southwest. 
There were wide gaps in the defensive line between the divisions 
of both corps. Between the 78th Assault Division and the 256th 
Infantry Division there was a gap. A gap also existed between 
these divisions and the 14th Infantry Division. Between the 
divisions of the XXVI I Corps and the VI Corps there was a wide 
gap.138 Smoljany was lost and Soviet armor was already south of 
Obolzy (see Figure 94) and entering Ussweika (6 km southwest of 
Obolzy). Major. Weger of the 14th Infantry Division reported that VI 
Corps was no longer holding and radio communications had been 
lost. The 14th Infantry Division was building a new defensive 
front northeast of Kochanowo. 
Lt. General Krebs informed the 4th Army at 0820 hrs that the 
Soviets had ripped a hole 50 km wide between the VI and IX Army 
Corps and were advancing with motorized infantry and armor 
through this opening (see Figure 94).139 The Soviets were now 
advancing through Ssenno and to the southwest. Lt. General Krebs 
stated that it was impossible to close this hole and moreover a 
breakout attempt by the Liii Army Corps in Vitebsk had failed. The 
4th Army was informed that it would have to give up one of its 
assault gun brigades for use by the Army Group. 
Meanwhile, General Voelckers of the XXVll Army Corps 
reported heavy fighting on the east front of his corps and in 
Dubrowno (see Figure 95). During the late afternoon the divisions 
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were pulled back to the Orsha bridgehead. The left wing of the 
78th Assault Division extended to the rail line at Chorobrowo 
(northwest of Orsha) and had no connection to the right wing of the 
VI Army Corps on the highway in Dubowoje. The XXVll Army Corps 
was ordered to hold the defense line Dnieper covering position-the 
Dnieper west of Gatkowschtschina-Chorobrowo and to close the 
gap to the right wing of the VI Army Corps. The Commander of the 
the 78th Assault Division, Lt. General Traut was in Orsha where he 
was appointed Commandant of "Fortress Orsha" by the Fuehrer and 
ordered to defend it. 140 
Radio communications were restored to the VI Corps at 0915 
hrs and the 95th Infantry Division was reported at Sserkuti (18 km 
southeast of Ssenno). The VI Corps was ordered to defend the line 
Leschewo (12 km northwest of Kochanowo)-Ussweika-
Garneweschtschina Bridge ( 4 km west of Garneweschtschina). 
According to a report from the the 14th Infantry Division that had 
been fighting at Boguschewskoje the 256th Infantry Division had 
been surrounded and Lt. General Wuestenhagen was killed leading 
the breakout. 141 VI Army Corps was also to establish a connection 
to the 14th Infantry Division to their east. General Metz was 
assigned to organize and scrape together any forces in the area of 
Tolotschin to form a coherent defense.142 Aerial reconnaissance 
reported 40 Soviet tanks advancing from the northeast through 
Obolzy toward Tolotschin (see Figure 94). VI Corps was instructed 
to send a Tiger tank battalion and an artillery battalion to 
Tolotschin. VI Corps was to reestablish communication to the 
right wing of the 3rd Panzer Army at Lukowskoje Lake. 
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The XXVll Corps requested that Orsha be abandoned as a 
"fortified position." General von Tippelskirch responded at 1935 
hrs that Orsha was to remain a "fortified position" and that Lt. 
General Traut of the 78th Assault Division was to be the fortress 
commander .143 The main attacks against Orsha came from Soviet 
forces with armor. The Soviets had reached the northeast and 
north edge of the city. Soviet units were now even west of the 
city. The XXVll Corps was defending the "Bear, position including 
"Fortress Orsha" and also trying to prevent an advance by Soviet 
forces past Orsha to the west and south.144 "Fortress Orsha" was 
to be held against all enemy attacks. The XXVll Corps continued to 
hold Kopys and Ustje west of the Dnieper Bridgehead. 
The VI Corps was attacked between Smoljany and Tschereja 
and pushed back over the highway. In the afternoon, Kochanowo and 
Tolotschin were under attack (see Figure 94). The Soviet forces 
advancing further to the west received a radio message to rapidly 
occupy the Berezina crossings.145 The 256th, 14th and 299th 
Infantry Divisions were no longer considered unified, combat 
effective units. The VI Corps reported that 40 Soviet tanks had 
reached Tolotschin (see Figure 94). Units of the 95th Infantry 
Division were arriving with the beginning of the infantry column in 
Tolotschin trailing back to Wygoda. Elements of Tiger Tank 
Battalion 505 were also sent to defend Tolotschin. Soviet mobile 
units captured Kochanowo and proceeded past Tolotschin cutting 
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the rail line and highway to Orsha (see Figure 94).146 The XXVll and 
VI Corps were forced to rely on the Belynitschi-Berezina road for 
supplies. Unfortunately, this road also traversed heavily partisan 
infested terrain. 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that the 
31st and 12th Infantry Divisions and part of the Panzer Grenadier 
Division "Feldherrnhalle" were now in the Dneiper covering 
position. The Corps reported that the Soviets had crossed the 
Dnieper between Mogilev and Schkloff (see Figure 94). General 
Tippelskirch foresaw his army being cut off if it remained in the 
Dnieper covering position and the Orsha bridgehead. He requested 
at 0920 hrs to withdraw his Army to the "Bear position" on the 
west bank of the Dnieper River.147 Lt. General Krebs, however, did 
not have the authority to authorize the withdrawal. General 
Tippelskirch was informed that OKH would propose a withdrawal to 
the "Bear position" for tonight. 
The situation had become even more acute by noon. The 31st 
and 12th Infantry Divisions were under attack by superior Soviet 
forces. The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was thrown 
back to the west. The XXXIX Panzer Corps was ordered at the onset 
of darkness to withdraw behind the Dnieper River because the 
Soviets may reach the Lupolowo bridge at Mogilev before the 
German troops could. General Tippelskirch assembled his generals 
at XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters and informed them that there 
could no longer be any delays. The Army would withdraw tonight 
behind the Dnieper River into the "Bear line" (see Figure 96). 148 
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Rear Guards were to hold the bridgehead position east of Mogilev 
until the other troops had crossed the river whereupon they could 
then also withdraw behind the Dnieper River. The Soviets late in 
the afternoon broke into the Dnieper covering position. General 
Tippelskirch withdrew his headquarters between 1600-1800 hrs 
from Gadowitschi to Knjashizy (13 km northwest of Mogilev) (see 
Figure 94).149 
The 4th Army leaders questioned the holding of Orsha and 
Mogilev as "fortified places." However, General Tippelskirch 
continued to maintain that these cities must be held. A new 
development occurred on the right wing of the XXXIX Panzer Corps 
where the Soviets broke through the Dnieper covering position and 
had reached the Tschaussy-Mogilev rail line. The Soviets were also 
12 km east of Mogilev (see Figure 94). Between Mogilev and 
Schkloff the Soviets were crossing the Dnieper River in two places 
with armor and infantry (see Figure 94).150 There were 12 Soviet 
divisions located in this breakthrough area. 
Despite the present circumstances, the XXXIX Panzer Corps 
was ordered to defend the "Bear line" and clear up the Soviet 
breakthroughs west of the Dnieper River. In case of a Soviet 
breakthrough of the "Bear line" then "Fortress Mogilev" and 
"Fortress Orsha" were to be defended and held against all Soviet 
attacks. 
XII Army Corps. This corps had assembled the strongest units 
of the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division south of Mogilev which were 
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to be used to assist the XXXIX Panzer Corps in the battle north of 
the city. The XII Corps was ordered to hold the "Bear line." 
Thus, in the 4th Army sector the Soviets had crossed the 
Dnieper River north of Mogilev and were encircling Orsha from the 
north and west. It was impossible to establish a new front north 
of the Minsk-Smolensk highway. The Soviets had crossed the rail 
line and highway on a wide front between Orsha and Tolotschin. 
(see Figure 94). The Soviets were in a position to widen their 
breakthrough on the deep left flank of the 4th Army. 
9th Army 
XXXXI Panzer Corps. On the morning of June 26, 1944 Soviet 
tank spearheads had penetrated to within 20 km of Bobruisk 
advancing from the south.151 The 20th Panzer Division was ordere~ 
to break off its engagement east of the Berezina River and regroup 
in the area west of Bobruisk. A new defense line was to be built 
southwest of Bobruisk. However, the bridge near Glebowa Rudnja 
was blown up because of approaching Soviet tanks leaving the 20th 
Panzer Division trapped on the east bank of the Berezina River .152 
This left only the Berezina crossing at Ugly-Stassewki which was 
under heavy Soviet air attack.153 20th Panzer Division moved 
toward this crossing and in the evening encountered a Soviet armor 
column at Titowka (3 km east of Bobruisk) (see Figure 97) 
containing 10-15 Joseph Stalin heavy tanks.154 These heavy tanks 
blocked the further Advance of the 20th Panzer Division into 
Bobruisk. 
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Meanwhile, the 36th Infantry Division continued to hold the 
Paritschi area west of the Berezina River and Army Group Center 
ordered it to hold its position in order to block Soviet advances 
along the river bank road. However, this was unnecessary since the 
Soviets had already penetrated south of Paritischi to within 20 km 
south of Bobruisk. The Soviet armor spearheads were within 5 km 
of the city by late afternoon. 
General Jordan was relieved of his command around noon to 
report to Field Marshal Busch.155 Field Marshal Busch and General 
Jordan were to report to the Fuehrer immediately.156 General 
Weidling, Commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps was to assume 
command of the 9th Army temporarily. 151 
XXXV Army Corps. The 383rd Infantry Division was ordered 
back to Bobruisk immediately. The 707th Infantry Division was 
engaged in fighting around Buda. The 9th Army repeated its request 
to pull back the entire front of the XXXV Army Corps even though it 
was probably too late. The Soviets had at least 15 Rifle Divisions 
and several other tank formations operating in the corps sector. 
Soviet armor was concentrated during the afternoon 20 km 
northeast of Bobruisk near the Bobruisk-Mogilev highway. The 
withdrawal of the front was still not permitted by the High 
Command. The order was "not one step back without pressure."158 
The 134th Infantry Division was essentially destroyed under the 
weight of the Soviet attack. 159 
LV Army Corps. This corps was thrown back on the Ptitsch 
sector. Between the corps left flank at Glusk and Bobruisk was a 
gaping hole through which the Soviets were pouring 
reinforcements.160 
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During the night of June 26-27, 1944 the encirclement of 
Bobruisk was nearly completed. Soviet General Pliev's Cavalry 
Mechanized Group took Glusk and the 1st Tank Corps took Glusha. 161 
General Panov's 9th Tank Corps moved from Titowka and proceeded 
around Bobruisk to seize all the roads and crossings northeast of 
the city during the early morning hours of June 27, 1944 (see 
Figure 98).162 
Major Klassen of the 383rd Infantry Division in his report on 
the collapse of the 9th Army blames the 9th Army Commander and 
Major General Hamann for the debacle at the Titowka road junction. 
Major Klassen claimed that the high command had since November 
1943 the opportunity to build defensive positions to protect the 
railway and road bridge into Bobruisk.163 He claimed that other 
defensive positions had been established at other points but not at 
this crucial position. Furthermore, after the Soviets had achieved 
a deep breakthrough at Mogilev with armor it was incomprehensible 
that the Commandant of Bobruisk did not take action to secure the 
bridgehead east of Bobruisk immediately .164 He also claimed that 
the 20th Panzer Division was not aggressive enough when it 
encountered Soviet armored resistance blocking the road to the 
bridge. Therefore, the Soviets on June 26th were able to block the 
road junction at Titowka with Joseph Stalin heavy tanks, (see 
Figure 99) the road bridge into Bobruisk with 3 tanks, and also 
bring the railway bridge into Bobruisk under fire.165 
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JUNE 27, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The 212th Infantry Division was assigned to assemble in 
Lapel and maintain contact with Army Group North. The last radio 
message was received from the Lill Army Corps concerning the 
breakout from Vitebsk. The possibility of a breakout succeeding 
was questionable because there was an 80 km distance to cover to 
reach German lines. 166 
IX Army Corps. Tschaschniki was lost to Soviet artillery 
bombardment and armor. The Soviets broke through the IX Corps 
defensive line south of Ussweja Lake and were advancing 
northwest to Ossinowka. The bulk of the 212th Infantry Division 
had unloaded in Lepel. Lt. General Krebs notified 3rd Panzer Army 
that its units needed to hold their present positions. Major General 
Heidkaempfer advised Krebs that the 3rd Panzer Army had only 2 
divisions left intact.167 Soviet infantry entered Bobrowo and 
Soviet armor entered Sslobodka. Kampfgruppe Monteton reported a 
breakthrough on its right flank. Assault guns were on the way to 
restore the situation, but road congestion made movement 
difficult. The Soviets were gaining ground against the 201 st 
Security Division south of Ssokolskoje Lake (see Figure 100). The 
line of lakes at Ssusha was lost. The Soviets reinforced their 
breakthrough area with armor south of Ussweja Lake. Kampfgruppe 
Monteton reported at 1530 hrs two Soviet breakthroughs at Tjapino 
and Newgodowo. The Soviet main effort against the 3rd Panzer 
Army was reported at Bobrowo on the road at 1630 hrs. 
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Col. General Reinhard informed Field Marshal Busch that the 
front of the 252nd Infantry Division between the lakes had 
disintegrated (see Figure 100). The Soviets broke through Ussaja 
to the south and then swung north up to Kriwuschino. There was a 
discussion over whether to deploy the 212th Infantry Division in 
the north and maintain contact to Army Group North or deploy it in 
the south to assist the 4th Army in its breakout. Field Marshal 
Busch ordered the 212th Infantry Division to the north to maintain 
contact with Army Group North.168 Lepel was to be held under all 
circumstances. This jeopardized Kampfgruppe von Monteton's 
northern wing. The Soviets by 2000 hrs had already taken 
Sslobodka and Gluschiza while advancing toward Tettscha. 
Meanwhile, the 212th Infantry Division served as a reserve to hold 
Lapel (see Figure 101).169 The entire 3rd Panzer Army now 
consisted of two shattered divisions, security troops pulled from 
anti-partisan operations, and stragglers from the Vitebsk area. 110 
Lill Army Corps. The last message from the Liii Corps was 
sent by General Gollwitzer at 0345 hrs on June 27, 1944 which 
stated: 
Night breakout under personal leadership of Corps 
Commander has started well. By 0300 hrs several 
enemy positions penetrated at three places. We are 
fighting for Sarudniza. What is the enemy situation on 
the VI and IX Army Corps sectors and the best route to 
take from Sadaroshye? Continuous fighter cover is 
requested.111 
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The 3rd Panzer Army continued to transmit the best direction 
to breakout throughout the entire day. However, there was no 
confirmation of the message by the LI 11 Corps or the 206th Infantry 
Division by radio. 
Lt. General Peschel personally lead the breakout of elements 
of the 6th Luftwaffe Field Division and died during the attempted 
breakthrough to German lines.112 Lt. General Pistorius lead 
elements of the 4th Luftwaffe Field Division in a breakout to the 
west and died on June 28th during the march through the area of 
Gankowitschi-Rwesh.173 
On the morning of June 27, 1944 the end finally came for the 
Liii Army Corps. The Soviets issued an ultimatum to surrender and 
the remnants of the German divisions accepted it. The following 
German losses were recorded by Soviet sources: 
The enemy suffered 20,000 dead and over 10,000 taken 
prisoner near Vitebsk. The Commander of the 53rd 
Army Corps, General of Infantry Gollwitzer and Chief of 
Staff of that corps, Colonel Schmidt were taken 
prisoner.174 
Lt. General Hitter of the 206th Infantry Division was also 
taken prisoner.175 However, he had defied Hitler's order to stay in 
Vitebsk and had attempted a breakout which had advanced about 9 
miles before it ended with a bayonet charge by the East Prussian 
301 st, 312th and 413th Grenadier Regiments.176 A few desperate 
groups of men did manage to elude the Soviets and make it back to 
German lines. 
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The 246th Infantry Division dissolved in this cauldron and the 
Division Commander, Major General Mueller-Buelow was taken 
prisoner.177 The 197th Infantry Division which had been attached 
to the LI II Corps when the VI Corps had been pushed to the south 
also disintegrated and the commander Colonel Hahne was missing 
in action.178 The Liii Army Corps had ceased to exist which meant 
Army Group Center had lost the following 5 divisions: 
4th Luftwaffe Field Division 
6th Luftwaffe Field Division 
197th Infantry Division 
206th Infantry Division 
246th Infantry Division.179 
4th Army 
The XII Army Corps pulled back into the "Bear" line. The XXXIX 
Panzer Corps was under heavy pressure and the Soviets had 
achieved a deep breakthrough north of Mogilev. Ors ha in the XXVll 
Corps sector was under attack from all sides. The 78th Assault 
Division still held the center of Orsha. 180 There was no contact to 
the VI Army Corps. The 4th Army wanted to abandon the fortified 
places of Orsha and Mogilev, but Army Group Center High Command 
demanded that "Fortress Orsha" and "Fortress Mogilev" were to be 
held to the last under all circumstances.181 The 4th Army 
Headquarters was transferred to Belynitschi. 
XXVll Army Corps. Soviets were already attacking the corps 
in the rear. "Fortress Orsha" was lost to the Soviets.182 Soviet 
armor and cavalry forces in the area of Krugloje were advancing 
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south (see Figure 102). The 4th Army requested to abandon the 
Dnieper position and fight through to the west or it would have to 
permit strong units to be encircled. Army Group Center responded 
with orders for 4th Army at 1145 hrs which continued to insist 
that the Dnieper position and the fortified places were to be held. 
If the Dnieper position had to be abandoned then the fortified 
places would still have to be held and the Drut River position 
defended. Finally, at 1505 hrs a general withdrawal of all 3 corps 
of the 4th Army was permitted. The XXVll Army Corps was to fight 
its way back to the line Osery-Starosselje-rail station Kochanowo 
with contact to the right wing of the 14th Infantry Division in the 
area llinka (12 km southeast of Tolotschin). The 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Division and the 260th Infantry Division fought through 
to Starosselje (see Figure 102). 
"Fortress Orsha" had been lost and Field Marshal Busch 
inquired of General Tippelskirch how this designated "fortified 
place" had been lost. Apparently, Lt. General Traut, Commander of 
the 78th Assault Division and Commandant of "Fortress Orsha" had 
requested permission to withdraw from Orsha and the XXVll Army 
Corps granted this request only after the Soviets had broken into 
Ors ha and bitter street battles had developed .183 Lt. General Traut 
claimed that under Fuehrer Order No. 11 as Commander of a 
"Fortress" he "must have enough time" to assign his troops within 
the defensive position (see Appendix C ). Therefore, the 
positioning of his troops was not possible because the Soviets had 
already broken into Orsha from the north and northwest as the 
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troops of the 78th Assault Division entered the city.184 Lt. General 
Traut based his decision to withdraw from Orsha given the 
unfavorable circumstances and used his interpretation of Fuehrer 
Order No. 11 to save his troops from encirclement inside "Fortress 
Orsha." (see Figure 103). Meanwhile, southwest of Orsha Krugloje 
was taken by Soviet armored units. 
VI Army Corps. This corps had been broken apart and only 
isolated individual units continued fighting.185 Remnants of the VI 
Corps assembled in the area south of the highway at Krugloje. 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The Soviets achieved a deep 
breakthrough north of Mogilev. The Soviets at 1040 hrs were 
reported crossing the Dnieper north of Mogilev over a new bridge at 
Trebuchi.186 The 11 Oth Infantry Division reported that it was 
being attacked in the rear on the west bank of the Dnieper River. 
The 4th Army sent a radio message at 121 O hrs to Major General 
Erdmannsdorf, Commandant of Mogilev that Mogilev remained a 
"fortified place" and was to be held to the last.187 The Army Group 
Headquarters reinforced this order at 1515 hrs by declaring that 
"Mogilev remains a fortified place." Lt. General Bamler of the 12th 
Infantry Division was appointed new Commandant of Mogilev and 
required to obey Fuehrer Order No. 11 (see Appendix C).188 The 4th 
(1.rmy had decided to withdraw the XXXIX Panzer Corps and the XI I 
Army Corps 21 km to the west of Mogilev leaving it to stand alone 
against the Soviet onslaught. The corps were to withdraw to the 
line Wjasma-Gamarnja-Gluchi-Shurawes-Golowtschin-north of 
Osery (10 km southeast of Krugloje). 
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Major General Erdmannsdorf reported at 1920 hrs that the 
Soviets after strong artillery preparation at noon attacked Mogilev 
from the south, east and north.189 Weak German forces were unable 
to prevent the river crossing in the east and this battle was now 
being waged on the city's outskirts as a result (see Figure 104). 
Two hours and 40 minutes later at 2200 hrs Major General 
Erdmannsdorf reported that only the city center of Mogilev was 
being held by the determined hand to hand combat of officer 
Kampfgruppen.190 The last message from "Fortress Mogilev" was 
sent at 2200 hrs and received at 2314 hrs. Lt. General Bamler in 
this message requested that Captain Opke of Artillery Regiment 12 
receive the oak leaves to the Knights Cross for repeated 
outstanding military exploits. This was the last sign of life from 
Mogilev.191 
XII Army Corps. This corps was pulled back to the "Bear" line. 
The XII Corps had assembled strong forces behind its left flank to 
assist the XX.XIX Panzer Corps to close the hole that would be left 
by leaving behind the garrison in Mogilev. The XII Corps reported at 
1515 hrs that the Soviets on their right flank had advanced through 
Ussochi and reached the village of Bazewitschi (26 km north of 
Bobruisk). This meant that the 4th Army was now threatened by 
encirclement from the south as well as the north (see Figure 105). 
The 4th Army ended the day in serious trouble. Orsha had 
been lost. The Soviets had penetrated behind the Dnieper river 
between Mogilev and Schkloff and reached the area east of 
Golowtschin. The city center of Mogilev was all that remained 
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under German control. The XXVll Corps had been outflanked in the 
north and split into two parts. The VI Corps in the north had mostly 
disintegrated with the exception of the 299th Infantry Division. 
General Tippelskirch shortly before midnight issued the following 
declaration: 
Thanks and recognition to all brave veterans in the 
severe battle against every cowardly act of 
malingering. The Russian offensive and defensive must 
be fought with all means then we will succeed.192 
Tippelskirch was now appealing to his soldiers as individuals for 
acts of heroism to compensate for the blunders of the High 
Command. 
9th Army 
In the early morning hours of June 27, 1944 Bobruisk was 
encircled by Soviet forces. Approximately 70,000 troops were 
trapped in the cauldron around Bobruisk.193 Soviet forces were 
now on the road to Ssluzk, Nowyje Dorogi, and toward 
Ossipowitschi (see Figure 106). The 296th, 6th, and 45th Infantry 
Divisions were fighting their way back to a bridgehead 4 km east 
of Bobruisk. These units were trapped on the east side of the 
Berezina River with the Soviet thrust into their rear and the 
blocking of the Berezina bridge east of Bobruisk (see figure 
107). 
The 383rd Infantry Division and the 20th Panzer Division 
succeeded partially in their attack toward Titowka. The Germans 
were unable to take the wooden road bridge, but they did seize the 
337 
railway bridge and managed to keep it open (see Figure 108).194 
German troops had one exit from the east bank of the Berezina 
River and that was over this railway bridge. A steady stream of 
vehicles and troops poured into Bobruisk over this railway bridge. 
The XXXXI Panzer Corps wanted to get the 36th Infantry Division 
and the remaining elements of the 20th Panzer Division into 
Bobruisk. Therefore, a final assault to seize the wooden road 
bridge was launched and failed.195 Most of the armored elements 
of the 20th Panzer Division were lost.196 Chaos then reigned 
around the railway bridge as vehicles and guns were destroyed in a 
desperate attempt to escape to the west bank of the Berezina 
River. 
The Soviet 16th Air Army flew continuous air attacks against 
the two pockets created at Bobruisk: the XXXXI Panzer Corps in 
Bobruisk and the XXXV Corps trapped on the east side of the 
Berezina River (see Figure 108). Marshal Zhukov witnessed the 
carnage of this battle of annihilation: 
I was not able to see the liquidation of the enemy in 
Bobruisk, but witnessed the rout of of the Germans 
southeast of the city. Hundreds of bombers of 
Rudenko's 16th Air Army, coordinating missions with 
the 48th Army, struck blow after blow at the enemy 
group. Scores of trucks, cars and tanks, fuel and 
lubricants were burning all over the battlefield. More 
and more bomber echelons took their bearings from the 
blazing fires, and kept dropping bombs of various 
weights. 
The terror-stricken German soldiers scattered in every 
direction; those who did not surrender were killed. 
Thousands of Germans ... were dying in the fields of 
Byelorussia. One of our prisoners was General Luetzow, 
Commander of the 35th Army Corps. 197 
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According to Marshal Rokossovsky, Commander of the 1st 
Belorussian Front the Germans launched no less than 15 
counterattacks against Titowka on June 27, 1944.198 However, the 
Soviet 9th Tank Corps and the 108th Rifle Division prevented a 
German breakthrough across the road bridge into Bobruisk.199 
General P.A. Teryomov, Commander of the 108th Rifle Division 
described the fiercest German attack in this sector: 
About 2,000 enemy officers and men supported by fairly 
strong artillery fire attacked our positions. Our guns 
opened fire from a range of 700 meters, and machine-
guns joined in from 400 meters. The Nazis continued to 
advance. Shells exploded in their midst, machine-gun 
fire mowed them down. Still they came forward, 
stepping over the bodies of their men. They came on 
blindly. It was a mad attack. We saw the whole 
terrible.picture. There was nothing heroic in it. The 
Nazis seemed in a state of trance. There was in the 
movement of this huge mass of men more of the mulish 
stubbornness of the herd than of fighting men intent on 
forcing their will on the enemy at all costs. 
Nevertheless, the sight was an impressive one.200 
Germans suffered terribly under Soviet airpower. The 
German troops in the Dubovka area southeast of Bobruisk were 
pounded by 526 aircraft for one hour. Marshal Rokossovsky stated: 
The Nazis ran out of the woods, rushed about the 
clearing, many of them dived into the Berezina, but 
there was no escape. The whole area soon began to look 
like a huge graveyard strewn with mauled bodies and 
mangled machines.201 
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During the two day onslaught the Germans suffered more than 
10,000 dead and 6,000 prisoners were taken which eliminated the 
German pocket southeast of Bobruisk.202 
XX.XV Army Corps. The 134th Infantry Division and elements 
of the 707th Infantry Division were forced back to the Ola River 
near Batsevichi. When the remainder of the corps could not get 
through at Titowka then it began to move north to meet the 134th 
Infantry Division at the Ola River. Lt. General Phillip, Commander 
of the 134th Infantry Division committed suicide under the 
pressure of the situation (see Figure 107).203 General Freiherr von 
Luetzow lead the XXXV Corps from the area of Mikhaylevo (15 km 
east of Bobruisk) toward the Mogilev-Bobruisk road. He was later 
captured by the Soviets.204 
LV Army Corps. The corps was conducting a defense behind 
the Ptich River. The 35th Infantry Division located 15 km 
southwest of Berezorka was reduced to a few remnants. The corps 
was ordered to conduct a phased withdrawal at 1630 hrs to the 
new defense line Star-Dorogi-Lake Chervonoye. The L V Corps was 
placed under command of the German 2nd Army at 1800 hrs.205 The 
2nd Army also assumed command of "Fortified Places" Slutsk and 
Baranovichi. 
The only relief for the 9th Army was the arrival of the 12th 
Panzer Division from Army Group North that was to assemble at 
Marina Gorka.2os The 390th Field Training Division and some 
security formations were to provide cover for this deployment. 
Gruppe Lindig consisting of ad hoc units, retreating troops, troops 
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on leave, fragmented units, and railroad security forces attempted 
to hold Ossipowitschi but were thrown back during the evening.201 
JUNE 28, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
IX Army Corps. In the sector of Corps Detachment D the 
Soviets broke through onto the Kamen-Lepel road, 2 km southwest 
of Kamen. The 252nd Infantry Division reported the Soviets in the 
woods west of Olschany and on the road east of Sloboda-
Tscherstwjany which the division was blocking The Soviets had 
been attacking the city of Lepel since 0530 hrs and had broke into 
the city with 12 tanks and occupied the rail station with 4 tanks 
(see Figure 109).208 Lt. Colonel Ottow, the Commander in Lapel 
reported at 0900 hrs that his command post had been moved to the 
western exit of Lapel and that he would hold a bridgehead east of 
the Essa River.209 Gruppe von Monteton simultaneously reported 
that the Soviets with tank mounted infantry had forced their way 
into Lepel and the battle in the city was still raging (see Figure 
109). During the morning Soviet armor was reported 30 km south 
of Lepel near Studenka moving west. Major General Heidkaempfer 
requested that the Army Group hold the Beresino bridge northwest 
of Begoml. The bridges over the Essa River west of Lepel at 1230 
hrs were reported to have been blown up. During the afternoon the 
Soviets attacked the west bank of the Essa River. The battles for 
Lepel and the west bank of the Essa River were continuing as of 
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1800 hrs. The IX Corps was holding the line Woron-Uschatschi. 
The 212th Infantry Division was holding a position southwest and 
west of Lepel (see Figure 109). The corps was withdrawn to 
Ssamoschje when 30 Soviet tanks emerged at Uschatschi. The hole 
at Woronetsch to the right wing of the 16th Army was now 
approximately 12 km wide and the 3rd Panzer Army lacked the 
forces to close this hole.210 Field Marshal Busch informed Colonel 
General Reinhardt shortly before midnight that Field Marshal Model 
had taken over the command of Army Group Center.211 
4th Army 
VI Army Corps. The corps with the 299th and 14th Infantry 
Divisions recaptured Krugloje. General of Artillery Pfeiffer, 
Commander of VI Army Corps was killed in an air attack about 
2000 hrs outside of Mogilev.212 
XXVll Army Corps. The Army Group ordered the corps at 1000 
hrs to begin a withdrawal behind the Drut River and to anticipate a 
further withdrawal to the Berezina River. The 14th Infantry 
Division was assigned to the XXVll Corps since it was in the corps 
sector. General of Infantry Voelckers, Commander of XXVll Corps 
reported at 0800 hrs strong Soviet forces between Starosselje-
Gorodok. The most distant elements of the corps had crossed 
through Teterin and reached Shittja (1 km west of Kamenka) and 
Tschirtschin. General Voelckers reported that his command post 
was at Tschirtschin.213 The XXVll Corps reported a successful 
breakthrough at Troiza (south of Starosselje) to the southwest. 
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Soviet air attacks impeded the movement of the XXVll Corps. The 
260th Infantry Division was forced out of Starosselje. The 25th 
Panzer Grenadier Division was fighting on all sides (see Figure 
110). Soviet armor was again forcing their way from the north 
into Krugloje at 1245 hrs. Stuka aircraft support was requested. 
The corps received the order at midnight to cross the Berezina 
River. The bridge at Wydriza (36 km east-southeast of Borisov) 
was reported blown up and air supply was requested. 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The corps received the order to 
withdraw behind the Drut River beginning in the evening and to 
anticipate a further withdrawal to the Berezina River.214 The 5th 
Panzer Division which was unloading in Borisov reported that 
yesterday Soviet armor with infantry loaded in trucks were in the 
rear of the corps moving south of Bobr on the rail line.21s Soviet 
forces were also south of Sseljawa Lake advancing southwest 
toward Chatjuchowa. The 5th Panzer Division was engaging these 
forces (see Figure 110) and had the impression that the Soviets 
were attempting to seize the Berezina River crossings at Ziembin 
and Borisov. 
The Commander of the XXXIX Panzer Corps, General of 
Artillery Martinek was killed in a Soviet air attack on a road back 
to the Berezina River.21 s German troops were subjected to 
continuous Soviet air attacks all along the roads leading back to 
the Berezina River (see Figure 111 ).211 The Army Group recognized 
that with deep breakthroughs on both flanks of the 4th Army that 
the Berezina crossing at Beresino was threatened. Soviet armor 
was driving directly southeast of the Berezina River and had 
entered Sseliba and Brodez. General Tippelskirch ordered that a 
bridgehead east of the Berezina River be held to prevent the 
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Soviets from crossing the river. The main road to Beresino was 
crucial so the XXXIX Panzer Corps concentrated its anti-tank forces 
on the road to prevent a Soviet armor breakthrough onto the road. 
The 27th Fusilier Regiment of the 12th Infantry Division was 
dispatched immediately to Beresino where the bridge had been 
under continuous air attack since 1100 hrs.21a The 27th Fusilier 
Regiment had been cutoff from Mogilev by the Soviet offensive 
thereby survivin·g the onslaught against Mogilev. 
Meanwhile, there had been no reports from Mogilev since 
2200 hrs yesterday. It was presumed that even the city center had 
fallen. Field Marshal Busch issued an order at 1245 hrs that 
permitted the 12th Infantry Division to abandon Mogilev. However, 
it was already too late for the 12th Infantry Division. The 82nd 
Grenadier Regiment of the 31st Infantry Division had also been 
encircled at Mogilev and suffered the same fate.219 
XII Army Corps. The corps requested that a bridge be built 
over the Berezina River for its withdrawal. The 4th Army replied 
that a bridge at Perewos was being built. The corps received its 
order to withdraw behind the Drut River. It was also ordered to 
send a motorized, reinforced regimental group from the 18th 
Panzer Grenadier Division immediately to the Belynitschi-Beresino 
road to advance west and secure both sides of the Berezina River 
and cover the 4th Army right flank. The 31st Infantry Division was 
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reported at 1000 hrs as already west of the Drut River. The rest of 
the corps was delayed by the construction of a bridge over the Drut 
River.220 The XII and XXXIX Panzer Corps were ordered to bring 
their headquarters to Beresino where the 4th Army Headquarters 
was located.221 
On the left wing of the 4th Army a 100 km hole existed 
through which Soviet armor, trucks, and infantry were moving 
southwest (see Figure 110). The 5th Panzer Division which had 
just recently arrived by rail at Borisov was engaging the Soviet 
forces attempting to reach the Berezina River on the left flank of 
the 4th Army. Lt. General von Saucken was placed in command of a 
task force on the north wing of the 4th Army. The units comprising 
Gruppe von Saucken were: 5th Panzer Division, Heavy Tank 
Battalion 505, Gruppe von Gottberg, Gruppe von Altrock and staff 
from the XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters.222 Gruppe von Saucken 
was organized to block the advancing Soviet spearheads northeast 
of Borisov. 
The 4th Army was threatened with being cutoff on the east 
side of the Berezina River (see Figure 110). The 4th Army 
Headquarters was moved to Beresino after a 9 hour journey by road 
which was under continuous Soviet air attack and burning vehicles 
and dead horses obstructing the road had to be removed along the 
route.223 General Tippelskirch requested fighter cover for the road. 
The road bridge at Beresino was subjected to 25 air attacks.224 
The houses burning around the town and bridge of Beresino forced 
the 4th Army Headquarters to relocate to Shornowka (northwest of 
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Beresino). Field Marshal Busch notified 4th Army Headquarters at 
1530 hrs: 
The overall situation calls for speedy continuation of 
the rearward movement to the Berezina River. All 
combat effective formations are to be transferred as 
fast as possible through Beresino to Borisov and 
Svisloch.225 
General Tippelskirch issued the order at 17 45 hrs to all three 
corps which stated: "Get to the Berezina. No time constraints. "226 
General Tippelskirch recorded in his diary that "now the order 
comes too late. "227 Later that night Field Marshal Busch informed 
Tippelskirch that Field Marshal Model was taking command of Army 
Group Center. General Tippelskirch in his last conversation with 
Field Marshal Busch could not contain his bitterness over the 
development of the situation which resulted from the leadership of 
Army Group Center.22a 
9th Army 
The 9th Army finally received approval from Adolf Hitler to 
abandon Bobruisk in the afternoon of June 28, 1944.229 The 
previous day Hitler had ordered that Bobruisk be held with the 
383rd Infantry Division. However, when Bobruisk was encircled by 
at least 10 Soviet divisions Hitler granted the troops in Bobruisk 
freedom of action.230 Meanwhile, it was chaotic in Bobruisk which 
was under constant Soviet air attack. There was a lack of heavy 
weapons because the troops had destroyed them in their retreat 
into Bobruisk. Major Klassen of the 383rd Infantry Division 
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reported the morale of the troops had been adversely effected by 
destroying their own equipment.231 The common soldier was 
reported as saying: "This Army has destroyed itself."232 The 
Commander of the 9th Army observed: 
9th Army has virtually ceased to exist as a fighting 
force. It has not a single battleworthy formation 
left.233 
General of Armor von Vormann assumed command of the 9th 
Army under the present circumstances.234 Troops kept pouring into 
Bobruisk over the one open railway bridge over the Berezina River. 
Meanwhile, on the right wing of the 9th Army the 35th 
Infantry Division which consisted of mere remnants was fighting 
its way back to Lyuban and the 129th Infantry Division was falling 
back behind the Plyusha River southeast of Albinsk. These two 
divisions had escaped encirclement. The 102nd Infantry Division 
was still fighting on the Ptich River. 
Behind the encircled Bobruisk forces a new defensive line 
was established. Gruppe Lindig contained the 390th Field Training 
Division and the 12th Panzer Division which was unloading at 
Marina Gorka.235 Therefore, on a 140 km front between the German 
4th and 2nd Armies only a 20 km frontage astride the Minsk road 
was defended with four security battalions, ad hoc units reinforced 
by assault guns and one-third of the 12th Panzer Division.236 
Lt. General Hoffmeister of the XXXXI Panzer Corps planned the 
breakout from Bobruisk for the night of June 28-29, 1944. During 
the day more than 10,000 soldiers in Bobruisk fought off Soviet 
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attempts to break into the city.237 Major General Hamann, 
Commandant of Bobruisk conducted an all-around defense of 
Bobruisk. There were gun emplacements in buildings, barricades in 
the streets, and tanks dug into the ground on street corners, and 
the city entrances were heavily mined. The German Command 
pulled back troops to the city center and concentrated large forces 
of Infantry, artillery and tanks in the northern and northwestern 
districts for a breakout attempt during the night. The German 
breakout would attempt to force the road in a breakout to the 
northwest in the general direction of Osipovichi. 
JUNE 29, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The 3rd Panzer Army consisted of the 212th Infantry 
Division, the remnants of Corps Detachment D, and the 252nd 
Infantry Division.238 Field Marshal Model asked Colonel General 
Reinhardt what forces he would need to maintain a continuous 
front to Army Group North. Reinhardt responded that the front 
could be maintained if Kampfgruppe von Saucken could help cover 
the southern flank. 
In the south half of a Soviet battalion had crossed over the 
Berezina River in the morning fog. Two companies of Soviet 
infantry had already occupied the village of Brod west of the 
Berezina and 14 km south of the Lepel-Begoml road. The German 
engineers began destroying all the bridges over the Berezina River. 
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The 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters moved to Borsuki in the 
morning. The 212th Infantry Division was pulled back to the Biber 
line with contact to the IX Corps through Zerkowischtsche (see 
Figure 112). The IX Corps reported at 1100 hrs that Soviet armor 
was now in front of Gorodez and in front of the 212th Infantry 
Division and on both sides of the Plina road going north. On the 
Lepel-Kalnik road densely packed Soviet motorized formations 
were breaking through at Ssloboda to the north (see Figure 112). 
Luftwaffe air strikes were requested against Soviet armor and 
motorized columns on these roads: Karbany-Gorodez, Uschatschi-
Bogdanowo, and Uschatschi-Posselok. The Soviets at Brod were 
reported building a bridge at noon (see Figure 112). Northeast of 
Kublitschi on the left flank of the IX Corps the Soviets achieved 
two breakthroughs (see Figure 112). During the late afternoon the. 
212th Infantry Division was withdrawn behind the Berezina line. 
Finally, a general withdrawal was ordered by the end of the day to 
the following defense line: west bank of the Ponja River from south 
of Dokszyce to the line of lakes north of Plissa Lake.239 
4th Army 
Field Marshal Busch informed the 4th Army at 1930 hrs on 
June 28th that the Korpsgruppe von Saucken consisting of the 5th 
Panzer Division, Kampfgruppe Gottberg, Gruppe Altrock and other 
attached units were now under 4th Army command.240 The mission 
of Korpsgruppe von Saucken was to secure the deep north flank of 
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the 4th Army so that it would be possible for the 4th Army to fight 
its way back behind the Berezina River. 
General von Tippelskirch flew with his Storch aircraft in the 
morning to meet General von Saucken. On his return trip he flew 
out further to the east to get a picture of the situation east of the 
Berezina River. His plane was almost shot down near Wydriza (35 
km southeast of Borisov) by ground fire.241 The Storch aircraft 
received several hits. 
The Soviets had already crossed the Berezina River to the 
north in the area of Ziembin.242 The Army Group also reported 50 
Soviet T-34 tanks on road at Bobr moving southwest. The 4th Army 
issued again the order to speed up the withdrawal and get behind 
the Berezina River. However, the bulk of the 4th Army with the XII 
Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps, VI Corps, and XXVll Corps was not 
expected to be able to reach the Berezina River earlier than June 
30, 1944 because of the slow progress in the fighting withdrawal 
from the Drut River line (see Figure 113).243 The 4th Army like the 
9th Army previously was threatened with being cutoff east of the 
Berezina River by the parallel advance of Soviet units (see Figure 
113). 
The Berezina River bridge at Beresino was to become a 
strategic position of decisive importance in the retreat of the 4th 
Army. It was now a high priority target for the Soviet Air Force. 
During the morning the bridge received a direct bomb hit which 
destroyed 10 meters of the bridge.244 The Army Engineer 
Commander reported at 1030 hrs that the bridge could be repaired 
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by 1700 hrs. Then the bridge received another direct hit at 1215 
hrs which severely damaged 15 meters of the bridge. Nevertheless, 
German engineer troops worked rapidly under continuous air attack 
and reopened the bride to traffic at 1500 hrs.245 A ferry operation 
was also started. The congested roads leading to Beresino were 
under constant Soviet air attack.246 
VI Army Corps. The corps requested fighter cover for the 
Belynitschi-Beresino road because of the heavy losses suffered due 
to Soviet air attacks. 
XXVll Army Corps. There had been no radio contact with this 
corps since noon on June 28, 1944.247 The 4th Army sent the corps 
radio messages briefing them on the bridges over the Berezina 
River at 0040 hrs on June 30th. Radio contact was restored when 
the corps confirmed the message at 0315 hrs. The bridge at 
Tschernjawka was reported blocked by the Soviets.248 The bridge 
at Beresino and the footbridge at Shukowez were reported open. 
XXXIX Panzer Corps. The corps reported that the withdrawal 
from the Drut River line was continuing and it would cross the 
Berezina River on both sides of Beresino and at Shukowez. The 
corps requested fighter cover for the Belynitschi-Beresino road. 
The corps reported at 1100 hrs that Traffic on the Belynitschi-
Beresino road had come to a complete stop since 0700 hrs.249 A 
Storch aircraft was requested to determine the cause of the 
traffic obstruction so measures could be taken to restore the flow 
of traffic. The corps advised the 4th Army that the fastest way to 
expedite the withdrawal would involve the loss of vehicles. 
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Therefore, the corps in order to avoid such loss proposed all 
vehicles east of Beresino be driven off both sides of the road into 
the woods. The end of the column would then be able to get 
underway. A bridgehead east of Beresino could be established so 
that the vehicles could be parked within this bridgehead until they 
could be moved to the west side of the Berezina once the bridge at 
Beresino was operational.250 
Meanwhile, the 4th Army obtained further reports about an 
immediate threat to the Berezina River crossing at Beresino. The 
XXXIX Panzer Corps was informed at 1310 hrs that a Soviet force of 
unknown strength with artillery had been identified in the area 15 
km southeast of Beresino (see Figure 113). 
The Soviet forces pursued the retreating front from the east 
closely. The 110th Infantry Division reported at 1535 hrs an 
attack by 40 tanks and infantry at Lichinitschi (south of Krugloje). 
The corps reported a Soviet breakthrough with armor and flak 
artillery northwest of Betynitschi. The German divisions were now 
locked into a race with the Soviets for the Berezina River. 
XII Army Corps. The corps reported that the 18th Panzer 
Grenadier Division would not cross the Drut River until 1000 hrs. 
Lt. Colonel Reden reported at 0400 hrs that Soviet armor had not 
yet entered Brodez, but Soviet combat reconnaissance had reached 
the Berezina River at Jakschizy.251 Elements of the 9th Army were 
in this area. The dispersed 134th Infantry Division and the 707th 
Infantry Division were here. The 707th Infantry Division was 
ordered to the bridgehead at Brodez where bridge construction was 
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in progress and two small ferries were in operation. The most 
western units of the XI I Corps were ordered to proceed to the 
Berezina River sector south of Beresino where the 4th Army was 
threatened on its southern flank. . 
The XII Corps reported that the 18th Panzer Grenadier 
Division had been delayed as of 0849 hrs and would not be across 
the Drut River before noon. The 57th Infantry Division was 
withdrawing from Ussakino (6 km west of the rail line) and the 
267th Infantry Division was at Dulebo. Further east heavy traffic 
congestion was reported. The 31st Infantry Division was moving 
along two routes. The smaller part of the division was on the 
southern road at Kurpanje (8 km southeast of Pogost). The larger 
part of the division was on the northern road at Matschesk (12 km 
southeast of Pogost). 4th Army Headquarters ordered the 31st 
Infantry Division at 1500 hrs to destroy the Soviet force that was 
advancing against the main highway from the Wjas-Kutin-
Klubtscha road. 
The XI I Corps received a radio message at 1730 hrs declaring 
that Goroditsche (20 km south of Beresino) was occupied by Soviet 
forces.252 The 4th Army ordered the XII Corps at 1930 hrs to 
employ the 31st Infantry Division to protect the Beresino-
Belynitschi road from the south once it reached the Berezina 
River.253 The 31st Infantry Division was also ordered to send a 
regiment immediately through Beresino to Tscherwen. The 18th 
Panzer Grenadier Division was also ordered to send its armored 
reconnaissance vehicles immediately to the west edge of the 
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Beresino. The situation at Beresino was growing more tense. The 
707th Infantry Division reported Soviet armor followed by trucks 
loaded with infantry on the east bank of the Berezina River at 
Sseliba advancing north. The small brigehead at Brodez was still 
holding. It was only defended by rear service troops, an artillery 
battalion, and two anti-tank guns (Pak). It would attempt to hold 
the town but reinforcement with infantry and antitank guns (Pak) 
were urgently needed. One engineer battalion alone held both sides 
of Perewos. 
The intensification of the crisis facing the 4th Army was 
evident by the end of June 29th. The Soviets had pursued the 4th 
Army closely during its withdrawal from the Drut River line. The 
Soviets had reached the Berezina River at Tschernjawka during the 
evening.254 Soviet armor was advancing from the south toward 
Beresino (see Figure 113). The XII Corps had been ordered to 
expedite their withdrawal, but the corps was delayed because the 
crucial bridge at Beresino had been made impassable for several 
hours. The corps was trapped on the Belynitschi-Beresino road and 
consequently suffered from continuous Soviet air attacks against 
this main road for hours.255 Lt. General Schuenemann, Commander 
of the 337th Infantry Division was killed during one of the Soviet 
air attacks on the Belynitschi-Beresino road.256 This was the third 
general killed within 24 hrs in the 4th Army.257 
Korpsgruppe von Saucken in the north was suppossed to hold 
the Soviets back north of the Minsk-Smolensk highway to facilitate 
the withdrawal of the 4th Army. However, the Soviets broke 
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through Korpsgruppe von Saucken with strong motorized and armor 
units along both sides of the highway to the Berezina River.2sa The 
bridgehead Borisov was held and the Soviets crossing the river 
northwest of Borisov were Repulsed at Studenka and Zembin by the 
5th Panzer Division.259 
9th Army 
The plan for the breakout from Bobruisk was laid out by the 
XXXXI Panzer Corp's orders which contained the following 
provision_s: 
1 . The breakout was to be to the left of the road and 
directly west of the Berezina River in a general 
northern direction with the armored group of the 20th 
Panzer Division in front. 
2. The remaining divisions would follow behind the 
right wing of the 20th Panzer Division. 
3. The breakout would begin on June 28th at 2300 hrs. 
Rear Guards were to hold their secure positions until 
0200 hrs on June 29th. 
4. Tracked vehicles, Volkswagen and riding horses were 
to be brought along but other vehicles and horses were 
to be destroyed. 
5. The wounded would remain in Bobruisk under medical 
care. The 383rd Infantry Division and troops of 
"Fortress Bobruisk" were to gather the wounded and 
,7 
------i 
bring them to the citadel in Bobruisk to place them 
under medical care.2so 
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The first breakout attempt from Bobruisk was executed at 
0130 hrs.261 The Germans concentrated artillery and mortar fire 
on the breakout sector to the northwest of Bobruisk. Officers 
formed skirmish lines followed by soldiers. The attack failed 
leaving 1000 Germans dead on the battlefield.262 The attack was 
resumed at 0200 hrs and despite murderous fire from Soviet 
artillery and machine guns German troops broke through to the road 
toward Osipovichi.263 Meanwhile, the Soviets crossed the Berezina 
River and broke into Bobruisk at 0400 hrs and the remaining 
German garrison was liquidated by 1000 hrs leaving the Red Army 
in possession of Bobruisk.264 
The 20th Panzer Division's Panzer Grenadiers succeeded in 
breaking through the Soviet lines during the night. The armored 
group of the division followed up this attack in a breakout in the 
region of Nasarowka against weak Soviet resistance to the north 
(see Figure 114). During the evening hours the 20th Panzer 
Division Kampfgruppe encountered strong Soviet resistance in a 
line between Luki and Schatkowo to the west. The Soviets were 
reinforcing the bridge at Schatkowo. German columns were fired 
upon by heavy weapons from the Schatkowo bridge area. This 
ceased with the German capture of Luki and Schatkowo (see Figure 
114). The Germans proceeded to secure their right flank by 
shooting up the Schatkowo bridge with an 88 mm Flak gun 
rendering It unusab~. 
356 
Meanwhile, the 383rd Infantry Division was assigned the 
difficult task of fighting rearguard actions to cover the Bobruisk 
breakout.265 These rearguards were reported still resisting the 
pursuing Soviets in the northern outskirts of the city at 1300 
hrs.266 These rearguards were mostly overtaken by pursuing Soviet 
forces. The rearguards would often have to fight off attacks from 
all directions. Flexible use of assault guns were required to fight 
off Soviet armor. Lieutenant Behr of the 383rd Infantry Division 
coined the alert warning "panzer nach vorn" (tanks to the front) or 
"panzer nach hinten" (tanks to the rear) to move the assault guns to 
the point of crisis.267 
Major General Haman, Commandant of Bobruisk and Lt. General 
Hoffmeister, Commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps had 
successfully broken out of Bobruisk during the night, but were 
later captured during the retreat to the west.268 Nevertheless, a 
large German force broke out the encirclement at Bobruisk. German 
aerial reconnaissance reported around 1200 hrs that the front of a 
large German column was approximately 1 O km northwest of the 
city. Between this location and Ossipowitschi a Soviet formation 
was reported moving to the northeast which could possibly cut off 
the German breakout. The 9th Army requested that all the 
resources of the German 6th Air Force be employed to assist this 
breakout.269 According to aerial reconnaissance weak armored 
spearheads of the XXXXI Panzer Corps and XXXV Army Corps had 
reached the region east of Ossipowitschi by 1700 hrs. The German 
column was lead by six tanks and ten vehicles with the infantry 
marching in the rear which stretched back to Bobruisk.270 There 
were also other German forces noted by aerial reconnaissance 
which were recognized 10-15 km north of Bobruisk on the east 
bank of the Berezina River. 
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A new defensive front further to the west was being 
assembled with the Lindig force which contained the 390th Field 
Training Division and the 12th Panzer Division. The new front 
consisted of the Marina Gorka Bridgehead extending to Talka and 
Lapitschi which sealed off the Bobruisk-Minsk road.271 
JUNE 30, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The threat to the south flank of the 3rd Panzer Army emerged 
with the repeated Soviet attempts to cross the Berezina river. A 
Soviet thrust into the rear at Katnik increased the threat to the 
army. The 212th Infantry Division was withdrawn to the 
southwest first behind the Berezina river and later behind the 
Ponja river. 
During the night Soviet forces pushed through the right flank 
of the 212th Infantry Division northeast of Begoml and crossed the 
Berezina river occupying Babzy further to the west.272 The 
security forces in Kalnik were withdrawn to the northwest to 
protect the Ponja river crossing at Juchnowka. 3rd Panzer Army 
sent Army Group Center a report about strong Soviet columns 
concentrated on the east bank of the Berezina river at Brod and 
Begoml. Air strikes by the Luftwaffe were requested. 
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Field Marshal Model wanted to block the Lepel-Dokszyce road 
and also the rail line from Glebokie to the west. Therefore, 3rd 
Panzer Army was given command of the 391 st Security Division. 
The division commander, General von Monteton had his command 
post in Glebokie.273 The Soviets were viewed as moving in two 
directions. The northern group was moving in the direction Dvina-
Duenaburg and was already west of Polozk on the Dvina river. The 
southern group with the 1st Tank Corps was viewed as thrusting 
south in the direction of Minsk possibly taking Molodetschno. 
Meanwhile, in the center the Soviet 43rd Army would attack along 
both sides of Glebokie. 
Colonel General Reinhardt advised the Chief of Staff at Army 
Group Center that the main danger to the 3rd Panzer Army was in 
the south where the Soviets were crossing the Berezina river at 
Brod outflanking the Panzer Army.274 The crossing site at Kalnik 
was lost and in order to avoid the 212th Infantry Division from 
being cut off it became necessary to withdraw the division behind 
the Ponja river. Reinhardt made it clear with the weak forces at 
his disposal that they must be deployed behind a river or in a 
prepared position in order to hold a sector. 
The 212th Infantry Division smashed a Soviet attack in 
battalion strength east of Beresino by concentrated fire. During 
the evening several Soviet attacks on both sides of the Beresino 
river crossing in battalion strength were repulsed. Finally, the 
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212th Infantry Division received the order to withdraw from the 
Berezina position at 1730 hrs and begin the defense of the Ponja 
river sector. However, the Soviets had already crossed the Ponja 
river on the southern wing of the Panzer Army. Dokszyce was also 
abandoned in the withdrawal (see Figure 112).275 
IX Army Corps. Chief of Staff of the IX Corps reported the 
withdrawal to the Gorilla line and withdrawal of the left wing of 
the 212th Infantry Division to Tscherniza. Colonel General 
Reinhardt informed General Wuthmannn at 1830 hrs that the 
Soviets had occupied Dzissna and had formed a bridgehead 
southwest of Dzissna. The IX Corps was ordered to begin its 
withdrawal movement to the line east of Krolewszczyzna-
Holubicze-Plissa Lake. The Corps was to focus its effort on 
protecting the rail junction at Glebokie. Army Group North was 
given the task to restore the connection to the 3rd Panzer Army at 
Glebokie. General Wuthmann informed Colonel General Reinhardt 
that he could only defend Glebokie from the northeast but not from 
the north. Reinhardt replied that he did not think the Soviets could 
get through the swamp, but assault guns would be held in reserve if 
necessary. 
4th Army 
VI Army Corps. The VI Corps was placed under the unified 
command of Lt. General Vincenz Mueller. All troops south of 
Tschernjawka would belong to Gruppe General Mueller. The VI 
Corps Headquarters crossed over the Berezina at Shukowez on a 
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temporary bridge. By 1200 hrs the first elements of the VI Corps 
had crossed over the river. 
XXVll Army Corps. It was reported at 1800 hrs that the 
spearhead of the Corps was west of Krugloje. There was no radio 
contact with the Corps.276 Gruppe General Mueller which was 
forming rear guard defenses 30 km east of the Berezina river 
finally reported that the XXVll Corps was now west of Krugloje 
(see Figure 115). 
XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Army Corps. The 4th Army 
reported to the XXXIX Panzer Corps at 0315 hrs that the road to 
Beresino was under enemy fire.277 However, the bridge was still in 
German hands, intact and operational. General Tippelskirch 
transferred his command post from Shornowka to Ssmilowitschi at 
0400.278 However, Tippelskirch remained in Beresino to meet with 
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller, Commander of the XII Corps. 
Tippelskirch had appointed Mueller commander of all troops in the 
VI Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps, and the XII Corps for the purpose of 
expediting the withdrawal over the Berezina river.279 The XXVll 
Corps was the only Corps excluded from his command. Tippelskirch 
in reference to the withdrawal movement advised Mueller to 
expedite the entire withdrawal movement by disposing of all 
superfluous material and regardless of heavy vehicles open the 
Belynitschi-Beresino road.280 Tippelskirch issued the following 
order: 
The sharp reduction in fighting strengths and the need 
to fight two separate battles within 4th Army's area 
make it essential to combine all troops engaged south 
of Tschernjawka, including the VI Army Corps 
Headquarters into a single group. 
These troops will therefore be formed into Gruppe 
General Mueller under the command of General Vincenz 
Mueller. This order takes effect forthwith. 
General Mueller is to see to it that the elements of the 
XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters freed by this 
reorganization are extricated by the fastest possible 
means and transferred via Minsk to the Korps Gruppe 
von Saucken.281 
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The rapid movement of the 31st Infantry Division over the 
Beresino Bridge was ordered. The 12th Grenadier Regiment was 
already near the bridge. The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that the 
110th Infantry Division was falling back under strong Soviet 
pressure and wanted to know which bridge across the Berezina 
river was available for the division's withdrawal. Currently, 
General Mueller notified the XXXIX Panzer Corps that as of 1130 hrs 
traffic over the bridges was not possible.282 In the XII Corps area, 
the 18th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 267th Infantry Division 
movement proceeded as planned. The XII Corps had no report from 
the 57th Infantry Division, but it was noted to have had especially 
difficult obstacles to overcome in the withdrawal. The XII Corps 
line secured by rear guards was now the line Ussakino-lgliza-
Korythiza-south of Pyschatschje (see Figure 115). The XII Corps 
was approximately 30 km from from the Berezina river at 2100 
hrs. (see Figure 115).283 There were 50 to 60 Soviet tanks 
reported to have passed through Uchwala advancing to the west. 
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The situation on the Beresino bridge was growing more tense 
by the hour. The Soviets south of the bridge were laying down 
harassing fire along the bridge and road. The Soviet Air Force 
conducted continuous, rolling air attacks since 1630 hrs. General 
Mueller ordered extensive destruction of baggage trains and 
vehicles to clear the road to Beresino.284 There was a shortage of 
fuel and food among the retreating troops. The situation west and 
north of Beresino was growing more precarious (see Figure 115). 
The 286th Security Division reported that Soviet infantry at 
Poplawy (9 km southwest of Beresino) had crossed the large road 
to the north. The bridge at Tschernjawka was burnt and two Soviet 
tanks which had crossed the bridge were destroyed.285 The Soviets 
had crossed the Berezina river in several places north of 
Nowosselki. The town of Beresino had been under heavy air attack 
since 1700, but the bridge was still passable.286 General 
Oschmann, Commander of the 286th Security Division was lightly 
wounded during the air attacks. The road to Tscherwen at 1855 hrs 
was again cleared of Soviet forces and opened so the traffic was 
able to move. 
Field Marshal Model's new order for the main mission of the 
4th Army was received at 2200 hrs: 
4th Army's main task remains to get its divisions back 
behind the Berezina river in as battleworthy a condition 
as possible while the reinforcement of the echelons on 
both flanks continues. Contact with 9th Army's eastern 
flank through Tscherwen is to be established and 
maintained. The protection of the flanks on the north 
wing is required and the prevention of the outflanking 
of Borissow in the north. The defense line is to be 
pulled back to the road behind the the Berezina river on 
both sides of Borissow. This would free the 5th Panzer 
Division in case of an emergency to be employed west 
of the Berezi na river to the northwest. There is no 
available garrison for Borissow. Borissow is to be 
incorporated into the forming of a defensive front as a 
strongpoint (see Figure 116).287 
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Field Marshal Model made it clear that he would not be bound 
to hold Hitler's designated fortresses when he chose not to 
garrison "Fortress Borissow.288 
The situation reported by the 4th Army at 0250 hrs on July 1, 
1944 stated that most of Gruppe General Mueller (XII Corps, 
remainder of VI Corps, and XXXIX Panzer Corps) was still retreating 
toward the Berezina river (see Figure 115).289 The threat to the 
Beresino bridge had intensified. The bridge was now under 
observer directed artillery fire. There was an approximately 60 
km long column of horse-drawn wagons and motorized vehicles two 
and three abreast on the Belynitschi-Beresino road moving west 
slowly because of heavy traffic congestion.290 
The Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Dethleffsen 
summarized the plight of the 4th Army: 
Lack of information on the flanking armies' situation 
makes it impossible for the 4th Army to judge whether 
there is a risk of the enemy developing a third 
encircling ring with pincers meeting about in the region 
Minsk. The large gap on 3rd Panzer Army's right leads 
one to suppose that there is no way of stopping an 
advance on Minsk by strong enemy forces, especially 
from the north. The extraordinary degree of enemy air 
superiority, German troops fighting in the east had not 
imagined until now, lead to especially high losses on 
our side; combined with his numerical superiority in 
tanks and the constant threat to our formations flanks 
and rear which resulted in the dismemberment of a 
unified front to neighboring armies has resulted not 
only in a considerable deterioration of combat worth 
but also a sharp decline in morale. Our losses of 
weapons are extraordinarily high. The difficult terrain 
east of the Berezina river through which our formations 
must traverse as they fight their way back has given 
rise to irreplaceably high losses of vehicles and 
precious material. Losses among commanders are 
terrible. XXXIX Panzer Corps has lost three commanding 
generals within 24 hours. Only a few formations are 
still firmly under their commanders' control. 
We can only reckon with significant elements of 4th 
Army bei11g available to be employed in the development 
of a new defensive front if they are spared the burden 
of being bottled up again in the area of Minsk.291 
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The end of June 30, 1944 marked the 8th day of the Soviet 
offensive and sealed the fate of the 4th Army divisions when the 
Soviets obtained observer directed artillery fire on the Beresino 
bridge.292 The Beresino-Tscherwen road had also been cut again by 
Soviet forces. Meanwhile, German forces in their vehicles waited 
in long columns to cross the Berezina river while the Soviet Air 
Force conducted continuous attacks against the masses of vehicles 
in the 4th Army pocket (see Figure 115). The rear guards of Gruppe 
General Mueller were still 30 km east of the Berezina river while 
Soviet motorized and armor formations were outrunning the 
Germans to the west (see Figure 115). The Soviets were 
approaching from the south on a broad front along the Beresino-
Tscherwen road.293 There were still no available forces on the 
Beresino-Tscherwen-Minsk road. The weakened regiments from the 
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31st and 12th Infantry Divisions were speedily brought up so they 
could be used to hold this road. The Soviets had already crossed 
the Berezina river southeast and north of Borissow (see Figure 
115). They were advancing by swinging wide of Borissow to the 
west with strong armored formations (see Figure 115).294 These 
Soviet forces presumably reached an area 20 km north of Minsk 
(see Figure 115). The German forces in the 4th Army by contrast 
were forced to destroy the infrastructure of their Army with the 
destruction of military material and vehicles east of the Berezina 
river. 
Gruppe von Saucken 
General von Tippelskirch had flown out to brief General von 
Saucken personally during the morning. Tippelskirch had moved his 
headquarters to Ssmilowitschi and arrived at 1100 hrs to receive a 
report that the Soviets had reached the beginning of the Berezina 
river and were moving in columns on the Lepel-Biehomla road and 
on the track Ssklez-Postreshze-Brod. Gruppe von Saucken received 
a reinforced reconnaissance detachment with artillery to 
reconnoiter the west bank of the Berezina river to the north and 
determine Soviet strength in the area of Biehomla. This unit was 
assigned to block any southwestern movement by the Soviets. 
There was a report at 1000 hrs of 5 Soviet tanks north of Rudnja 
(18 km west of Borissow) moving south.295 This spearhead was to 
be repulsed by 10 tanks and a rifle company from the 5th Panzer 
Division. East of Kamien Soviet armor had penetrated Ziembin and 
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a bridgehead was being built north and east of the town. A strong 
Soviet armor attack occurred 7 km southeast of Ziembin and the 
armor broke through. Borissow was now under attack by more than 
50 tanks from the north, east and southeast (see Figure 115).296 
The Soviets started building bridges at Nowosselki and at Mal. 
Ucholody which permitted them to secure the west bank of the 
Berezina river.297 During the evening the Soviets broke through the 
German Bridgehead at Borissow east of the highway bridge (see 
Figure 116).298 Another Soviet breakthrough to the north at 
Studenka was sealed off. A Soviet detachment from the Brod area 
with 5 tanks and artillery appeared at Pleszczenice (60 km 
northwest of Borissow) and was destroyed. 
The 4th Army was now faced with encirclement from the 
north and south (see Figure 115). Furthermore, it had to execute a 
crossing of the Berezina river without adequate crossing points 
and under continuous air attack while resisting the pressure of 
encirclement. The entry made in the war diary for June 30, 1944 
described the situation of the 4th Army as almost hopeless.299 
9th Army 
The Soviets were reported advancing beyond "Fortress 
Sslusk" (see Figure 117) to the north. The 9th Army had prepared 
strong positions south of Usda. The front southeast of Marina 
Gorka was holding. Army Group Center ordered the 9th Army to use 
the 12th Panzer Division to block the Soviet advance southeast of 
Minsk. Furthermore, the 9th Army was placed in command of 
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"Fortress Minsk" and was given the assignment to "increase the 
defensive readiness of "Fortress Minsk" with all possible means" at 
00.00 hrs, June 30, 1944 (see Figure 118).300 
Meanwhile, the 9th Army was struggling to withdraw the 
remnants of XXXXI Panzer Corps and the XXXV Army Corps from the 
Bobruisk pocket (see Figure 119). The 20th Panzer Division's 
armored advance group ran into strong Soviet resistance at 
Tschutschja and threw the Soviets back. The woods north of 
Tschutschja were then cleared of Soviets. The German spearhead 
then encountered renewed Soviet resistance at Oktjabr which was 
smashed with the capture of the glass factory.301 The Germans 
captured various Soviet heavy weapons. Lt. General von Kessel, 
Commander of the 20th Panzer Division deployed a captured Joseph 
Stalin tank (see Figure 99) at the end of the German column to 
secure the rear. The removal of the threat to the right flank 
facilitated the mass of retreating German columns to advance 
north between Shatkowo and Ssytschkowo (see Figure 114). The 
Soviets were next encountered at the road junction northeast of 
Ssytschkowo attacking the flank of the German column from the 
north and west. The various Kampfgruppen assembled along the 
bank road which ran parallel to the Berezina river and fought off 
various weak Soviet attacks while retreating north (see Figure 
114). This column reached the area of Werbki in the afternoon. 
Lt. General Hoffmeister reorganized the units from various 
divisions for a further retreat. The 20th Panzer Division remained 
the most powerful unit possessing several tanks, 12 half-tracks 
368 
and a self-propelled howitzer.302 The 383rd Infantry Division 
conducting the rearguard action could not always block all the 
Soviet attacking units and individual Soviet tanks sometimes broke 
through and would attempt to shoot up the German columns. But 
once the German columns crossed the bridge at Werbki this problem 
was prevented by the deployment of 88 mm Flak guns which 
secured the bridge from attack by Soviet armor.303 The Germans 
after concentrating their forces captured Ssloboda, the rail bridge 
north of Oktjabr and the Sswisslotsch crossing north of Ssloboda. 
However, Sswisslotsch remained under Soviet control and Soviet 
reinforcements were pouring into the town. 
The most foreward elements of the XXXXI Panzer Corps and 
the XXXV Army Corps reached the Sswisslotsch estuary as the 12th 
Panzer Division was advancing toward the Sswisslotsch sector to 
make contact with 9th Army elements retreating from Bobruisk. 
The Hoffmeister force reported the following status during the 
morning: "Bridge at Sswissiotsch in our hands. Short of rations, 
fuel and ammunition. Where do we go from here?"304 The 12th 
Panzer Division replied: "Make for Pogoreloje."305 The Hoffmeister 
group reported at 1355 hrs: 
Having to fight hard to break through again today. 
Sswisslotsch bridge in our hands, Berezina bridge in 
enemy hands. Short of ammunition, medical supplies 
and rations.306 
The Hoffmeister force reported later in the afternoon having 
captured all three bridges around Sswisslotsch: the Sswisslotsch 
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river bridge west of the town; the road bridge over the Berezina 
river into the town; and the railway bridge over the Berezina river 
to the south.307 Unfortunately, the Bobruisk survivors could not 
hold onto the bridges and they were lost again.308 
Meanwhile, the 12th Panzer Division continued its attack at 
Lapichi and threw the Soviets back across the Sswisslotsch river. 
The 9th Army Commander, General of Armor von Vormann ordered 
the Lindig force (see Figure 119) at 1510 hrs to launch a relieving 
attack with the 12th Panzer Division from Pogoreloje toward 
Sswisslotsch before first light.309 The fate of approximately 
30,000 men depended on the attack of the 12th Panzer Division 
toward Sswisslotsch. 31 o 
The Bobruisk survivors regrouped and the ordnance officer of 
the 36th Infantry Division reconnoitered a route for the breakout of 
the motorized vehicles. The motorized column would begin moving 
with the onset of darkness to the west and then turn north to the 
bridge at Lipen. The objective was to reach Pogoreloje where the 
advance units of the 12th Panzer Division were located.311 This 
column commenced its western movement at 1800 hrs after 
receiving supplies from the air. Meanwhile, the 383rd Infantry 
Division secured the town of Tschutschja against a Soviet armor 
attack at 1930 hrs and later in the evening the Sswisslotsch-
Berezina triangle against mounting Soviet pressure. The attempt 
to secure the right flank by the demolition of the Berezina river 
bridge north of Oktjabr failed. 
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During the evening of June 30th the bridge at Lipen was 
occupied by the Kampfgruppe Colonel von Lilienhoff. This 
Kampfgruppe stormed the bridge using a captured T-34 tank (see 
Figure 120) and successfully broke through.312 This bridge would 
later on July 1st provide a crossing for Lt. General von Kessel's 
Kampfgruppe to reach the 12th Panzer Division. 
General Hoffmeister sent part of the armored group of the 
20th Panzer Division in the southwest direction toward 
Brizalowitschi to secure the left flank and then turn north to reach 
Lipen-Malinowka. The flank security was necessary due to a 
reported Soviet column moving from Ossipowitschi in the direction 
of Sswissiotsch. The armored group as expected met the Soviets 
at Brizalowitschi and the 59th Panzer Grenadier Regiment launched 
an energetic attack which repulsed the Soviets. However, most of 
the half-tracks were lost because of Soviet tank fire. It was 
during the night that the half-track containing Generals 
Hoffmeister, Engel and Conrady was lost and the generals were 
reported missing.313 It was later discovered that all three 
generals had been taken prisoner by the Soviets.314 
Field Marshal Model in discussion with OKH outlined his 
reinforcement needs. The 4th Panzer Division and 28th Jaeger 
Division were to assemble in the Baranovichi-Ssluzk area. The 1st 
Hungarian Cavalry Division from the 2nd Army was also to 
reinforce Baranovichi. The 170th and 132nd Infantry Divisions 
were to reinforce the Minsk area. The 170th Infantry Division was 
to be committed at Molodeczno. The 7th Panzer Division was to be 
371 
employed at Baranovichi or Molodeczno depending on the situation. 
Minsk was not be held as a "Fortress." Therefore, Army Group 
Center was anticipating at least five new divisions to build a new 
defensive line on the Baranovichi-Dzerhinsk-Molodeczno axis. 
These five divisions were: 4th Panzer Division, 7th Panzer 
Division, 28th Jaeger Division, 132nd Infantry Division, and 170th 
Infantry Division.315 
JULY 1, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The main danger to the 3rd Panzer Army remained the hole 
between it and the 16th Army of Army Group North.316 The 
probable Soviet advance in the direction of Duenaburg would 
require them to take the area around Glebokie. This would result in 
the severing of the 3rd Panzer Army's lifeline since south of the 
road and rail line Glebokie-Postawy and west of it lay partisan 
infested terrain containing well lead partisan units totaling at 
least 12,000 men (see Figure 121).317 Nevertheless, the forces to 
close the hole between the 16th Army and 3rd Panzer Army were 
not available. The 3rd Panzer Army was also threatened in the 
south by Soviet forces that were moving through the ever enlarging 
hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army in the south 
(9ee Figure 122).318 This hole in the south like the hole in the 
north could only be closed by the deployment of new forces. 
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During the afternoon Soviet forces in battalion strength 
moved from the northeast out of the swamp and emerged at 
Torgany in the rear of the 2121h Infantry Division. This 
development caused the division to issue the order for withdrawal 
at 1600 hrs. The division had already been weakened by reinforcing 
the area of Glebokie. Glebokie remained the key position on the 
entire front. The 212th Infantry Division dispatched the Grenadier 
Regiment 423 and a battery of assault guns from Assault Gun 
Battalion 232 toward Glebokie. 
The IX Corps reported that Soviet reconnaissance forces were 
at Werecieje. Colonel Praefke, Chief of Staff of the IX Corps 
advised Major General Heidkaempfer that the Soviets were trying 
to outflank the corps on the left flank. Heidkaempfer advised the 
IX Corps that they must hold their present position so the 
withdrawal of the 212th Infantry Division could be executed along 
both of the single roads leading from Glebokie to the west (see 
Figure 121 ).319 The only other retreat route was through partisan 
infested terrain southwest of Glebokie, but this route would only 
be used in an extreme emergency. The Grenadier Regiment 423 was 
to deploy north of Glebokie with the assault guns. The commander 
of the assault gun battery reported, however, at 1600 hrs that the 
Soviets had reached the wooded terrain south of Miereckie. The 
Soviets from this location had begun to fire their artillery on 
Glebokie. 
General Wuthmann requested to withdraw the IX Corps under 
cover of darkness, but Colonel General Reinhardt instead demanded 
a counterattack tomorrow toward the north with all available 
forces concentrated for the attack. The release of the following 
reserves for the attack was granted: Engineer Battalion 62, 
Grenadier Regiment 423, and assault guns. 
373 
The 252nd Infantry Division after it pushed back the Soviets 
advancing on Glebokie was to be pulled back to the area of the west 
edge of Plissa Lake to Ginki. The 252nd Infantry Division and Corps 
Detachment D had lost contact with each other because the Soviets 
managed to occupy the woods between the two divisions. 
The IX Corps Command Post was now located at Gut 
Konstantinowo, 12 km southwest of Glebokie (see Figure 121).320 
The Soviets were clearly interested in seizing Glebokie since this 
would serve as the key road and rail junction for further operations 
against Duenaburg. It was clear that the next Soviet operations 
would be to take Glebokie thereby severing the road and rail 
lifeline to the 3rd Panzer Army. Consequently, the 212th Infantry 
Division received the order at 2100 hrs to withdraw and defend the 
position between Serwetsch (west of Parafjanowo )-north of 
Dokszyce-west edge of the swamp terrain northeast of Dokszyce. 
The 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters was transferred during the 
course of the day to Postawy (see Figure 121 ).321 
4th Army 
The 4th Army Headquarters in Ssmilowitschi had received 
few reports during the night. The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that 
the Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was located on both 
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sides of the main highway behind the Klewa river (see Figure 122). 
The 110th Infantry Division was still the furthest division to the 
east (see Figure 122).322 A Soviet attempt at encirclement was 
prevented by the destruction of the Mosha Bridges. The corps 
wanted-to build a bridgehead east of the Berezina river with the 
110th Infantry Division in the line Shurowka-Dmitrowitschi-
Oreschkowitschi. The 110th Infantry Division was directed to head 
for Shukowez. 
General von Tippelskirch flew to Beresino in the early 
morning. He discovered that Gruppe Floerke was withdrawing from 
their position at Tschernjawka. Tippelskirch viewed this action as 
premature. He wrote down an order to Lt. General Floerke 
personally: 
The decision now to withdraw to the south is 
intolerable given the scope of the total situation of the 
army. You are to turn around immediately and attack 
the enemy moving through Murowo. A withdrawal is 
only permitted under heavy enemy pressure and is only 
allowed up to the Usha which must be held and 
connection with the VI Army Corps at Shukowez 
established ... It is critical therefore that this order is 
strictly carried out. 323 
Minsk was now threatened by Soviet mobile forces. The 
170th Infantry Division was enroute by train to Minsk but its 
.arrival was not anticipated before July 2nd at 0600 hrs. Between 
Minsk and Molodeczno the 221 st Security Division was deployed to 
secure the rail line. The Commandant of "Fortress Minsk," General 
Sperling had only 900 men from alarm units and stragglers that had 
been picked up.324 Soviet attacks were anticipated to be coming 
soon. 
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Gruppe von Saucken whose main task remained the securing 
of the the Borissow-Minsk road also prevented Soviet traffic from 
crossing the road to the south and penetrating the region north of 
Lohojsk (see Figure 122). In Beresino from 0400-0430 hrs the 
sound of combat could be heard from the direction of Pogost. In 
Brodez (15 km south of Beresino) a Soviet division was assembling 
to cross the Berezina river.325 The Soviets had already advanced to 
Negonitschi west of the Berezina river around midnight with an 
entire division. 
Kampfgruppe General Mueller had several objectives to 
accomplish today. It had to destroy the weak Soviet forces that 
were east of the Berezina river blocking the German retreat and 
then immediately cross over the river and shore up the south flank 
of the Berezina river.326 
The 4th Army presented Army Group Center at 1000 hrs with 
a summary of its situation. The 267th Infantry Division and 18th 
Panzer Grenadier had smashed the pursuing Soviet forces in the 
area south of lgliza. Northwest of Brodez the Soviets had crossed 
the Berezina river in division strength and were advancing to the 
north. The Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle," and the 
110th Infantry Division were west of the Klewa river on both sides 
of the Minsk-Smolensk highway. Tschernjawka was taken by the 
Soviets.327 Kampfgruppe vc;m Saucken after a hard battle lost 
Borissow (see figure 123).328 The forward line of the Kampfgruppe 
currently runs from 6 km southwest of Gliwin to Rudnja on the 
Ussjasha river (30 km northeast of Minsk) (see Figure 123). 
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The XXXIX Panzer Corps reported that the Soviets with strong 
forces and armor had pierced the position of the Panzer Grenadier 
Division "Feldherrnhalle" north of the Minsk-Smolensk highway at 
Kotytniza and was pressing the attack further in the direction of 
Galez. Soviet armor was also reported to have broken through the 
line of the "Feldherrnhalle" at Kukarewo. The Soviets had also 
reached the Berezina river northeast and west of Shurowka. 329 
The XII Army Corps requested an air attack from the IV 
Flieger Division against the Soviets east of Korytniza and to the 
south on the road. The XII Corps reported at 1108 hrs its 
intentions to build a bridgehead at Beresino to bring across units 
to the west bank of the Berezina river and hold open the crossing to 
the west. Fighter cover was necessary the entire day. The 
destruction of Soviet forces at Selischtsche was not possible due 
to the shortage of forces. But here and on both sides of Shornowka 
German countermeasures were underway. 
The XII Army Corps reported at 1300 hrs that the 267th 
Infantry Division and 18th Panzer Grenadier Division were now in 
the line Dulebo-Matschesk-Babinka and had received orders to 
retreat to the Klewa river. Dulebo was under heavy attack. The 
Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" was now in the line 
Babinka-Sababiny-Galez. The 57th Infantry Division was advancing 
out of the area west of Golynka, the 110th Infantry Division was 
engaged in the withdrawal to the bridgehead Shukowet. The 31st 
Infantry Division has reached the Klewa river. The Soviet 
concentration at Sselischtsche (5 km north of Beresino) was 
reported on the Berezina river. 330 
377 
Kampfgruppe Mueller was presently in danger east and west 
of the Berezina river. Soviet armor with infantry was reported at 
1115 hrs to have pushed through Tscherwen to the north and cut 
both sides of the Minsk-Smolensk highway thereby cutting off the 
route of retreat and supply for the 4th Army (see Figures 122 & 
123).331 The 286th Security Division and the XII Army Corps were 
ordered to immediately send combat effective units with anti-tank 
(Pak) guns to clear out the Soviet forces severing the 4th Army's 
lifeline to the west.332 4th Army reported at 1355 hrs to Army 
Group Center that ground supply was no longer possible, and that 
air supply of food, fuel and ammunition was necessary for the units 
at Beresino and all units east of Tscherwen.333 
The 110th Infantry Division was ordered at 1505 hrs to 
immediately march through Mikulitschi on Tscherwen. However, 
the 110th Infantry Division reported that the situation on the west 
bank of the Berezina river and on both sides of the Shukowez bridge 
could only be controlled by bringing up new forces from the west 
since the XII Corps had no further available forces. 
The next few hours brought more adverse reports. 
Kampfgruppe Koenig reported at 1120 hrs that Soviet forces of 
unknown strength had blocked the road at Now. Marjanowka and 
Kampfgruppe Koenig was incapable of freeing the road. 
Kampfgruppe Floerke reported at 1715 hrs that the Soviets had 
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taken Nowosselki. The 110th Infantry Division reported that 
contact was made in Schepelewitschi with the 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Division which was now 50 km from Beresino. The 
Soviets which had broken through the Panzer Grenadier Division 
"Feldherrnhalle" on the Minsk-Smolensk highway were at 1700 hrs 
1 km from Pogost. 334 
The 4th Army sent a summary of the situation to Army Group 
Center and OKH at 1815 hrs stating: 
The enemy through the advance of strong forces west of 
the Berezina river from the south and through the 
extension of his breakthrough position on the Berezina 
at Tschernjawka has encircled the XII Army Corps and 
the XXXIX Panzer Corps. Consequently, the failure to 
respond with air supply en masse for these corps and 
the XXVll Army Corps will result in the breakout of 
units which will cease to be combat effective. The 
advancing enemy armor forces from the northeast on 
Molodeczno precluded the rail transport of approaching 
reinforcements for Minsk. The Army at the moment 
only has freedom of action for the 5th Panzer Division 
and its mission to secure the unloading of approaching 
reinforcements in the region of Molodeczno and from 
there to restore contact with the 9th Army in the 
direction of Stolpce. The enemy advance on Minsk will 
be delayed as long as possible. A General Staff Officer 
from the Army Group with full command authority is 
requested for Minsk early on July 2nd.335 
The 4th Army transferred their Command Post to the 
encampment at Melitta on the highway 6 km east of Minsk. 336 
Kampfgruppe von Saucken reported that the Soviets were 
advancing on a broad front on both sides Kamien (12 km northwest 
of Ziembin) against the line Kozyry-Chotajewicze. The Soviets 
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advancing through Pleschtschenije to the southwest made it 
necessary for a rapid concentration of forces in the Kaina sector 
northwest of Lohojsk. General von Saucken ordered the withdrawal 
of the front to the highway sector on both sides of Smolewitschi 
which would shorten the front. 
The 286th Security Division was ordered to send a 
Kampfgruppe to the area east of T scherwen to combat the Soviet 
units that had broken through in this area. Lt. General Mueller had 
restored communications with Lt. General Graf von Oriola who was 
presently the commander of VI Army Corps and Lt. General Floerke 
of the 14th Infantry Division.337 He requested that sufficient 
forces with anti-tank weapons be transferred toward Tscherwen 
(see Figure 123). Soviets were attacking Poplawy at 1800 hrs. A 
Soviet force of 200 men was reported to have crossed the Berezina 
river at Sharnowka. 
The 4th Army issued the last report of July 1 , 1944 stating: 
Fighting heroically on all sides in places against a 
closely pursuing enemy with superior forces, the army's 
last divisions are trying to fight their way back to the 
Berezina river despite shortages of ammunition, rations 
and fuel. 338 
The 57th Infantry Division was attacking in the area west of 
Golnyka. The 267th Infantry Division, 18th Panzer Grenadier 
Division, and Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle" earlier 
were fighting between Dulebo and Galez. Presently, these divisions 
were trying to fight their way back to the bridgehead south of the 
Minsk-Smolensk highway between Beresino and Pogost.339 The 
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Soviets were reported to have broken through the German lines 
north of Pogost. In the rear of the 4th Army, the Soviets had 
crossed the river at Guta (6 km southwest of Beresino) and had 
reached the road at Sslobodka and Tscherwen west of the river.340 
Further north the Soviets had taken Nowosselki and crossed the 
Berezina river in numerous places. The 110th Infantry Division had 
reached Shukowez on the Berezina river, but had completely 
exhausted its rations.341 The Kampfgruppe von Saucken was 
engaged in heavy battles west of Borissow against superior Soviet 
forces. There was also no communication with the XXVI I Army 
Corps.342 
General von Tippelskirch sensing the desperation of the 4th 
Army felt that he should fly personally to the cut off corps because 
as Commander of the 4th Army he belonged with his troops.343 
However, Colonel Dethleffsen, Chief of Staff of Army Group Center 
argued that this was not the time "to make a gesture" but to build a 
new front from the rear.344 Tippelskirch in the end agreed with 
Colonel Dethleffsen. 
The 4th Army situation was desperate. The 4th Army 
reported that the XII Army Corps, XXXIX Panzer Corps and the XXVll 
Army Corps were encircled (see Figure 122).345 On the right flank 
the Soviets had occupied the only road that the 4th Army could use 
as a route of retreat. The Soviets were also occupying a wide front 
east of Tscherwen. On the left flank the Soviets had reached the 
Berezina river at Shornowka and Shukowez. The Soviets had also 
crossed the river between Tschernjawka and Borissow. Borissow 
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was captured by the Soviets. Kampfgruppe von Saucken was locked 
in battle west of Borissow and Soviet armored forces were 
approaching Molodeczno (see Figure 122). The mass of the 4th 
Army still remained east of the Berezina river. Kampfgruppe 
Mueller was being thrown back into a bridgehead east of the 
Berezina river and the XXVll Army Corps still remained 50 km to 
the northeast of the river. Lt. General Mueller reported at 1900 hrs 
Soviet breakthroughs with armor at Dulebo and on the highway 
toward Pogost. The Berezina bridgehead had been contracted to a 
depth of 6-1 O km as a result of ammunition shortages for artillery 
and heavy weapons.346 Elements of the 31st Infantry Division, 
267th Infantry Division and 286th Security Division were 
transferred to the west bank of the Berezina river to prevent the 
Soviets from bypassing them and reaching their rear area. Lt. 
General Mueller requested continuous fighter cover and Luftwaffe 
air strikes for July 2nd against the Soviets on the highway 
northeast of Pogost. The failure of the air supply effort in 
providing sufficient quantity of supplies meant that the breakout 
of the corps would result in the loss of combat effective units. 347 
The 4th Army reported the following order of battle during 
the evening of July 1, 1944: 
Kampfgruppe Mueller: 
XII Army Corps with elements of 31st Infantry Division; 
remnants of Panzer Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle," 
12th Infantry Division, 337th Infantry Division; 
Commandant of Beresino Garrison; 286th Security 
Division; and the XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters. 
Kampfgruppe von Saucken: 
5th Panzer Division; Headquarters of von Gottberg 
force; and Kampfgruppe Floerke (remnants of 14th 
Infantry Division). 
XXVll Army Corps: 
110th Infantry Division 
Kampfgruppe Koenig: 
remnants of Grenadier Regiment 12 (31st Infantry 
Division); remnants of Grenadier Regiment 27 (12th 




Lt. General von Kessel crossed the rail line Ossipowitschi-
Brizalowitschi-Ssloboda early in the morning. His group reached 
the wooded swamp terrain southeast of Lipen. The Bobruisk troops 
had marched through the night of June 30-July 1st around 
Sswisslotsch to the southeast of Lipen with the 20th Panzer 
Division leading the way.349 The 20th Panzer Division located the 
bridge over the Sswisslotsch river at Lipen which was unoccupied 
by Soviet troops permitting the Germans to cross over the river 
and proceed in the direction of Malinowka-Pogoreloje.350 Lt. 
General van Kessel and the commander of Grenadier Regiment 59 
along with the remaining staff were leading the column with a 
half-track in front and a captured Joseph Stalin tank bringing up 
the rear. The column at 0700 hrs heard the noise of armored 
vehicles approaching from the direction of Malinowka-Pogoreloje. 
The 12th Panzer Division launched its attack to rescue the 
survivors of Bobruisk in the early morning hours. Captain 
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Blancbois, Commander of the 1st battalion, Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment 25 of the 12th Panzer Division reinforced with armor 
launched his attack at 021 O hrs through Pogoreloje towards the 
town of Sswisslotsch.351 The Hoffmeister group reported at 0500 
hrs that it held a 3 km front south of the Sswisslotsch river and 
that the the town of Sswisslotsch was still occupied by Soviet 
troops. German tanks of the 12th Panzer Division penetrated as far 
as Prudichi (2 km northwest of Sswisslotsch) at 0840 hrs.352 The 
Panzer Grenadier battalion during the afternoon had penetrated to 
within a few kilometers of the Bobruisk force. Captain Blancbois 
and his Panzer Grenadier battalion mounted in half-tracks fought 
elements of 4 Soviet rifle divisions before making first contact 
with the Bobruisk troops in the early afternoon at Malinowka.353 
This undertaking had assisted the breakout of thousands of 9th 
Army troops. Later, on July 3, 1944, the 9th Army reported that a 
total of 25,000 men from Bobruisk had successfully escaped Soviet 
encirclement. 354 
JULY 2, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The 3rd Panzer Army had become increasingly detached from 
the rest of Army Group Center. Its front was further north closer 
to Army Group North while a huge hole in the entire front existed in 
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the south (see Figure 124). The 3rd Panzer Army concentrated its 
forces around Glebokie while the Soviets attacked its flanks.355 
The Soviets using armor had forced their way into Holubicize in the 
Corps Detachment D sector. The 212th Infantry Division defended 
the line Parafjanowo-north of Dokszyce-Krolewszczyzna. An 
attack in regimental strength on both sides of Dokszyce was 
smashed. Colonel General Reinhardt advised the commander of the 
212th Infantry Division at 1035 hrs that the Soviet tank supported 
attacks would have to be repulsed without further use of assault 
guns since it was the desire of the IX Corps to have all the assault 
guns sent to Glebokie. General Senzfuss was of the opinion that 
the Soviets would not succeed in cutting off the 212th Infantry 
Division. The division still had security troops available for 
reserves. 
The IX Corps reported at 1050 hrs that Soviet reconnaissance 
forces had been observed at Laskie (10 km northeast of 
Woropajewo). The Corps dispatched 2112 flak batteries, 1 assault 
gun battery and one battalion of infantry loaded in trucks from the 
102nd Regiment of the 252nd Infantry Division. The Soviet 
presence in the area of Laskie represented a serious threat of a 
wide outflanking movement from the north which threatened the 
new withdrawal route. Colonel General Reinhardt continued to 
stress to General Wuthmann of IX Corps the importance of holding 
Glebokie so that the 212th Infantry Division would have a clear 
retreat route (see Figure 125). Colonel Schmid reported at 1330 
hrs that the village of Osinogrodek was already occupied by the 
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Soviets and along the road to the west several burned out vehicles 
were observed as a result of the surprise attack of the Soviet 44th 
Motorized Rifle Brigade against Postawy (see Figure 125). The 
situation had become critical in the south and the north as the 
front was bent back around Glebokie in a wide arc (see Figure 125). 
The 212th Infantry Division was placed under command of the IX 
Corps.356 The division was to withdraw to the north and then turn 
west. The 212th Infantry Division was to occupy the line Servecz 
lake-northwest of Krolewsczyzna-Zabinka. The IX Corps was to 
maintain contact with the left wing of the 212th Infantry Division 
holding the line Zabinka-north of Bursy lake at Romanoczuki. This 
line was to be held and only a withdrawal to the line of lakes north 
of Glebokie was permitted under severe Soviet pressure. 
During the afternoon the Soviets broke into Korolewoon on 
the right wing of Corps Detachment D with infantry and armor. The 
Soviets continued to press their attack and took Podhaje. The 
order was issued to withdraw at 1650 hrs to the 212th Infantry 
Division and the IX Corps to withdraw in the general line Servecz 
lake-west bank of lake west of Lastowiec-Pistrowskije lake. 
Colonel General Reinhardt spoke to General Wuthmann, Commander 
of IX Corps around 2000 hrs and reported that the 252nd Infantry 
Division had reached the line on the Pietrowskije lake. The corps 
was given the mission to hold the position Ssewecz lake-Glebokie 
and to place its reserves on the supply road. Colonel General 
Reinhardt now viewed the threat from the south as far greater then 
the north. The Soviets had turned toward Duenaburg in the north. 
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The 212th Infantry Division reported at 2015 hrs that the 
withdrawal road at Soroki was blocked by the Soviets. Three 
assault guns were sent to Soroki to assist the withdrawal of the 
division. The new IX Corps Command Post was located at Ozuny. 
Colonel General Zeitzler spoke with the Chief of Staff of the 
16th Army of Army Group North shortly after 2300 hrs. The 16th 
Army was given the order to hold Polozk as a "Fortress" (Fester 
Platz).357 This assignment made a continuous front connecting the 
16th Army to the 3rd Panzer Army no longer possible.358 
Therefore, the 3rd Panzer Army was faced with a completely open 
north flank. Colonel General Zeitzler also informed Lt. General 
Krebs, Chief of Staff Army Group Center around Midnight that the 
Soviets were on the highway and rail line north of Dunilowicze 
based on POW interrogation and were preparing to take Postawy. 
4th Army 
Lt. General Mueller requested at 0255 hrs air resupply for the 
110th Infantry Division on the east bank of the Berezina river 
opposite Shukowez. Unfortunately, Shukowez had been occupied by 
the Soviets earlier. This meant that the destruction of the 110th 
Infantry Division was fairly certain. 
During the night the 4th Army Headquarters at Melitta (east 
of Minsk) was informed by Army Group Center that forces were 
being channeled to Molodeczno because of the, threat of 
encirclement from the north. The 170th Infantry Division arriving 
as reinforcement was ordered to Molodeczno instead of Minsk. The 
387 
Assault Gun Battalion 1337 was also unloaded at Molodeczno. 
Army Group Center ordered Lt. General Lend le of the 221 st Security 
Division to take command of all arriving elements of the 170th 
Infantry Division pending the arrival of the commanding officers 
for this division. The 170th Infantry Divisional elements, Assault 
Gun Battalion 1337 and Police Regiment 2 were formed into 
Kampfgruppe Lendle to block the area of Radoskowicze and to hold 
open the area of Molodeczno. 
However, General von Tippelskirch was not comfortable with 
an unknown general defending his northern flank. Therefore, he 
ordered Lt. General Metz, a battle proven commander to assume 
command of the arriving elements of the 170th Infantry Division 
and the 221st Security Division Headquarters. Metz was ordered to 
form Kampfgruppe Metz with all available troops in the area.359 
Metz was also given the mission to block the rail line and road to 
Wilna, and prevent the Soviet motorized troops from advancing to 
the west by the line Lepel-Borissow. 
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller during the late evening of July 1, 
1944 had transferred his command post over the Berezina river to 
an area 6 km southwest of Beresino and north of the highway.360 
Lt. General Mueller placed the Commander of the 110th Infantry 
Division in charge of crossing all divisions over the bridge at 
Shukowez. 
Lt. General Krebs and General von Tippelskirch conferred at 
0915 hrs. Tippelskirch expressed the concern that 
countermeasures must be taken since the Soviets had almost 
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reached the Wilna area. Kampfgruppe von Saucken could not remain 
west of Borissow when the Soviets had advanced through Wilejka 
to Smorgonie (see Figure 124). Lt. General Krebs agreed with 
Tippelskirch. Therefore, General Tippelskirch based upon this 
understanding ordered Kampfgruppe von Saucken which consisted of 
the 5th Panzer Division, Heavy Tank Battalion 505 and a multiple 
rocket launcher battalion to disengage from the current action and 
advance through Radoszkowice to reach the battle around 
Molodeczno. The Kampfgruppe was ordered to hold open the 
swampy terrain section of Molodeczno to permit the unloading of 
reserves from the west and maintain a base to receive the 
encircled elements of the 4th Army (see Figure 124 ). 
Kampfgruppen von Gottberg, Mueller, Floerke and the Heavy 
Tank Battalion 501 were to prevent the Soviet advance and capture 
of Minsk.361 They were also to maintain the connection to the 
encircled units. Kampfgruppe Floerke was to hold the area around 
Tscherwen as long as possible because only here did a possibility 
exist to restore a connection to the encircled formations.362 Lt. 
General Floerke reported Soviet offensive preparations and 
requested a Stuka attack on Ostrowy. 
The 4th Army Headquarters during the late afternoon 
established a new command post at Zaslaw (20 km northwest of 
Minsk).363 A series of reports were received from Lt. General 
Floerke at 2105 hrs. Floerke had radioed earlier at 1130 hrs that 
overwhelming Soviet forces had broken through at Lyssaja Gora and 
his Kampfgruppe had been forced to occupy a new defensive line 
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along the Gat river. The German line was reported at 1850 hrs to 
run through Kukolewka-Tschernogradje. Then at 1955 hrs Floerke 
radioed that Soviet armor had broken through the center of the 
position on the road and had turned the flank of the position. The 
Kampfgruppe proposed to establish a new line at Sadoroshje (on the 
highway)-Jagodka. The bridge at Ssmilowitschi had been destroyed 
by aerial bombs and high explosives. The 4th Army ordered Lt. 
General Floerke to reinforce the units escaping from the 
encirclement at Ssmilowitschi and prepare to smash the expected 
Soviet attack. These units at Ssmilowitschi were to be supplied 
and then immediately evacuated to the west. 
General Metz arrived at Molodeczno at 0530 hrs and placed 
the following units under his command: 170th Infantry Division, 
Kampfgruppen of the 14th and 299th Infantry Divisions, Police 
Battalion 31, and the 221 st Security Division Headquarters with 
attached units. Soviet armor emerged in Krasne only 16 km 
southeast of Molodeczno. Together the Kampfgruppe 299th Infantry 
Division and German Tiger tanks pushed the Soviets back. General 
Metz reported that Wilejka was under weak tank and artillery fire 
since noon. Metz reported his defensive line north of Molodeczno. 
A defense screen was being rapidly organized at Smorgonie by 
Army Group Center. The 5th Panzer Division assembled in the area 
of Ossoschizkij-Gorodok and freed the rail line to Molodeczno at 
Krasne (see Figure 124). 
In the south Kampfgruppe Floerke was pressed back which 
decreased the prospects for the encircled corps. Ssmilowitschi 
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was picked by the 4th Army as the supply center for fuel, food and 
ammunition for the encircled corps: XII Army Corps, XXXIX Panzer 
Corps and XXVll Army Corps.364 However, the 4th Army reported at 
1940 hrs that ground supply could no longer be guaranteed at 
Ssmilowitschi and air supply was urgently requested. 
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller reported that since early 
morning a battle continues at Pogost. Soviet crossing attempts 
north of the Beresino bridgehead had been smashed, the holding of 
the bridgehead till evening appeared questionable. The Soviets 
were halted at the Berezina river on both sides of Beresino by the 
4th Army (see Figure 126). But the increased Soviet pressure and 
the outflanking movement in the south made it necessary for the 
corps and the 110th Infantry Division to withdraw in the direction 
of Smolewitschi (36 km northeast of Minsk) on the following day. 
Lt. General Mueller reported at 1845 hrs that his divisions had 
crossed the Berezina river except for the rear guards.365 Mueller 
stated that the divisions had "complete confidence" and the "will to 
breakthrough" in taking the direction toward Smolewicze. 366 
The 4th Army reported at 2140 hrs that Minsk was threatened 
from the northeast by Soviet armor (see Figure 126).367 
Kampfgruppe Mueller was informed that it must withdraw through 
Ssmilowitschi where resupply was planned and then proceed past 
Minsk to the south then west. The XII Army Corps radioed that it 
was moving in the direction of Minsk with "complete confidence" 
and the "will to breakthrough" but help was needed through air 
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supply.368 The 4th Army's supply problems were enormous. More 
than 20,000 men were starving.369 General von Tippelskirch 
sent the following message to Kampfgruppe General Mueller: 
The progress of the corps is followed with a fervent 
heart. We are doing everything to help that we can with 
our limited forces.370 
General von Tippelskirch had made a decision for the building 
of a new front with the withdrawal of the reinforced 5th Panzer 
Division to the area of Molodeczno (see Figure 124). Kampfgruppe 
von Saucken remained in the area west of Borissow (see Figure 
124). And the remaining German soldiers could not effectively 
prevent the Soviet armored formations from advancing which had 
already reached Wilejka and Stolpce. The withdrawal of the 5th 
Panzer Division, however, opened up the area west of Borissow 
which lead to the compression of the encircling ring around the 
encircled corps (see Figure 126).371 Kampfgruppe von Gottberg 
continued to hold its position on both sides of the rail line in the 
region of Smolewitschi. General von Tippelskirch prevailed upon 
both General von Gottberg and Floerke personally to hold their 
positions east of Ssmilowitschi and Minsk. Kampfgruppe Floerke 
especially was needed to hold its position while there was a 
chance to save elements of the encircled corps. But during the 
course of the day Kampfgruppe Floerke was pushed back from the 
area west of Tscherwen to Ssmilowitschi.372 
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9th Army 
During the early morning hours of July 2, 1944 Stolpce was 
still under German control. The 9th Army Headquarters crossed the 
Njeman and deployed in the town of Mir.373 The Soviets were 
moving rapidly and Soviet armor arrived in front of Stolpce and 
began firing into the city. The Soviets took the city during the 
morning and blocked the Njemen bridges that were needed by 
Kampfgruppe Lindig which was still in the area southwest of 
Marina Gorka. The 12th Panzer Division received the order to 
attack the Soviets in Stolpce and throw them back across the 
Njemen river (see Figure 124).374 The main supply line to Minsk 
ran through Stolpce which was now cut. The 12th Panzer Division 
disengaged from the line Talka-Ugolez and Kampfgruppe Lindig to 
attack Stolpce (see Figure 124). 
The 9th Army reported that as of July 2nd 15,000 men from 
Bobruisk had successfully broken through to German lines with the 
help of Kampfgruppe Lindig and the 12th Panzer Division.375 
Meanwhile, the Soviets had appeared southeast of Stolpce and to 
the northwest of Stolpce lay the partisan infested Naliboki woods 
and swamp area that no longer had intact bridges over the Njemen 
river. The advance of the Soviets on Molodeczno from the northeast 
signaled the beginning of the expected encirclement of Minsk (see 
Figure 126). The Minsk encirclement had approximately a 60 km 
circumference.376 The 9th Army Headquarters was forced to move 
by Soviet pressure from Mir to Nowamysz near Baranowicze.377 
The Soviets advanced from Stolpce to the west and captured Mir 
with armor and infantry. 
JULY 3, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
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The Soviets during the night had achieved deep breakthroughs 
southeast and east of Glebokie with strong armor and infantry 
forces (see Figure 125). The 212th Infantry Division was forced to 
withdraw to a new position west of Glebokie (see Figure 125). 
This withdrawal was covered by the heroic actions of weak rear 
guard troops. The withdrawal was conducted as plannned. 3rd 
Panzer Army continued to withdraw to the west to avoid 
envelopment. 
During the night the Soviets had achieved deep breakthroughs 
on both inner flanks of Corps Detachment D and the 252nd Infantry 
Division (see Figure 125). The IX Corps gave its divisions the order 
at 0530 hrs to fight their way back to a line west of Glebokie: 
Sserwetsch lake-Olchowiki-Gut Konstantynowo-Mosarz. 378 
Contact with the 212th Infantry Division had been lost during the 
night. The commander of Grenadier Regiment 423 in Dunilowicze 
reported that the Soviets had broken through west of Glebokie 
using 2 assault guns and by concentrating its regiments. Grenadier 
Regiment 423 before the Soviet attack had 400 men and at 1000 
hrs only 100 men remained.379 The four battalions of the 212th 
Infantry Division were personally lead from the front during the 
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withdrawal by the division commander and the operations officer. 
The divisional artillery was withdrawn behind a protective screen 
of infantry. 
The IX Corps reported that the Soviets had been deflected 
from the southern road by the 252nd Infantry Division. The main 
Soviet pressure was not in front of Glebokie but from the north. 
Nevertheless, Colonel Schmied at Zuberki had established an 
assault gun barrier and prevented a Soviet thrust onto the main 
road. The intention of the IX Corps was to transfer the 212th 
Infantry Division to the southern sector and the 252nd Infantry 
Division to the northern sector of a new defensive line. Corps 
Detachment D was to disengage and be transferred by motorized 
column to the lake sector of Postawy. The IX Corps Headquarters 
remained at Oschany (see Figure 125). 
Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs, Chief 
of Staff of Army Group Center at 1300 hrs that his troops had lost 
much of their combat effectiveness. They were fighting their way 
back to the Dunilowicze line (see Figure 125). A defense of 
Postawy could not be guaranteed. The right and left flanks of the 
Panzer Army were just hanging in the air completely open (see 
Figure 126).380 An immediate reconnaissance was requested 
especially between both Army Group Center and Army Group North 
to ascertain the furthest advance of the Soviets. Reinhardt further 
explained that if the Soviets broke through the Postawy position 
the Panzer Army would not be able to do anything because of the 
lack of combat troops (see Figure 125).381 
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The rear guards of the IX Corps consisted of blocking 
positions on the southern road at Laskie and on the northern road at 
Zuberki. Both blocking positions were occupied by Infantry and 
assault guns. The Zuberki position repulsed a company strength 
attack supported by armor at 1330 hrs. The IX Corps had been in 
continuous battle since June 22, 1944 and the troops were 
exhausted and many were fighting rear guard actions and retreating 
in their bare feet.382 The withdrawal to the Holbie sector with the 
bridgehead Dunilowicze had not been completed by the evening. The 
Soviets managed to occupy the area on both sides of Postawy. 
During the evening aerial reconnaissance reported a Soviet armored 
thrust by 18 tanks from the northeast toward Postawy. The 252nd 
Infantry Division had its armor protective screen organized on the 
north edge of the town. The entire IX Corps later in the evening 
was ordered to withdraw further to the west and occupy the First 
World War positions west of Postawy on both sides of the town 
(see Figure 127).383 The right wing of the corps was to rest on the 
northern tip of the Narocz lake and the left wing on the Kamja bend 
at Vileitos. 
Soviet attacks supported by armor and tactical aircraft 
against Glebokie failed. The 16th Army reported that it would 
restore contact with the 3rd Panzer Army through Duenaburg. Two 
divisions were freed by a withdrawal of the I Army Corps and were 
to assemble southeast of Duenaburg. 
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4th Army 
On the morning of July 3, 1944, the 4th Army Headquarters in 
Zaslaw (northwest of Minsk) received two messages from 
Kampfgruppe Mueller. Kampfgruppe Mueller had retaken the 
Beresino bridgehead and then abandoned it. Lt. General Mueller had 
transferred his command post to Gaidukowo (24 km northwest of 
Beresino).384 Kampfgruppe Floerke reported at 0130 hrs that 
strong Soviet pressure made it necessary at dawn to withdraw to 
Ssmilowitschi. Lt. General Floerke reported at 0440 hrs that the 
traffic through Ssmilowitschi had diminished. The troops had held 
the bridgehead throughout the night in costly battles. The 4th 
Army informed Lt. General Floerke at 07 45 hrs that Kampfgruppe 
Floerke would have to hold on as long as possible to make contact 
with the XII Army Corps which was approaching from the region of 
Gaidukowo. Kampfgruppe Mueller was informed by radio at 0815 
hrs that the situation at Minsk was unclear and the strongpoint 
Ssmilowitschi and Kampfgruppe Floerke were endangered. 
Therefore, a rapid juncture with Kampfgruppe Floerke was 
necessary. Kampfgruppe Floerke reported at 0750 hrs that the road 
junction north of Ssmilowitschi was occupied and Soviet columns 
were moving north. 
The Soviet 2nd Guards Tank Corps broke into Minsk from the 
east on July 3, 1944 and forward elements of the 11th Guards and 
31st Armies had reached the city (see Figures 128 & 129).385 The 
1st Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front arrived on the 
southeast outskirts of Minsk 4 hours after the 3rd Belorussian 
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Front forces which completed the encirclement of the German 4th 
Army.386 The 4th Army received an urgent report around 1000 hrs 
that the Soviets had entered Minsk. 387 The 4th Army reported to 
Army Group Center at 1055 hrs that Kampfgruppe Floerke had been 
pushed back to Ssmilowitschi and the connection to the XII Army 
Corps was in progress (see Figure 129). Minsk was cleared of 
German troops by units of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts by the 
end of the day.388 Minsk had been lost and individual Soviet tanks 
were already between Minsk and Zaslaw (see Figure 128). The 5th 
Guards Tank Army passed around Minsk from the north and broke 
out into the area northwest of Minsk and cutoff the German retreat 
toward Molodeczno (see Figure 128).389 The 5th Panzer Division 
and 170th Infantry Division had the mission to hold open the 
bottleneck Molodeczno east of Radoszkowice and to block the 
crossings at Usza and Wilja up to Smorgonie (see Figure 128).390 
Lt. General Metz clarified the situation on the north flank in 
his 0700 hrs report. Elements of the 170th Infantry Division and 
221 st Security Division were deployed from Krasne to Smorgonie. 
The reserves consisted of 2/3 of the 5th Panzer Division 
assembled in the area Krasne-Molodeczno. German rail traffic 
from the west could now only run as far as Smorgonie. A German 
pilot reported Soviet bridge construction over the Wilja river 4 km 
north of Smorgonie. The 4th Army requested air strikes on the 
bridge and reconnaissance northeast of Smorgonie. This request 
was was sent to Army Group Center and simultaneously to OKH and 
the 6th Luftflotte. 
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The 4th Army Headquarters was transferred from Zaslaw to 
Molodeczno during the afternoon. The 4th Army Headquarters 
received reports in Molodeczno concerning Minsk. Minsk was lost 
to the Soviets around 1000 hrs and Soviet armor was reported on 
the road half way between Grodek-Ostroszycki-Radoszkowice and 
Kosakowa as well as on the road Minsk-Zaslaw and Minsk-
Rakuw.391 Kampfgruppe von Saucken was attacking Soviet armor at 
Kosakowa when it received an order from General Tippelskirch to 
defend the land bridge from Molodeczno in the line north of 
Radoszkowice to Smorgonie. It was also to hold this area open for 
the retreating corps against the pursuing Soviets from the 
southeast. The 4th Army informed Kampfgruppe Mueller and 
Kampfgruppe Floerke at 1710 hrs that Minsk was occupied by the 
Soviets and the best breakout route was through Stolpce where two 
Panzer divisions were being sent.392 Kampfgruppe Gottberg was 
ordered at 1715 hrs to prevent a Soviet advance from Minsk to the 
land bridge on both sides of Wolozyn with all available means (see 
Figure 128). 
Kampfgruppe Gottberg with the fall of Minsk became 
fragmented. Field Marshal Model issued new orders for the 5th 
Panzer Division to attack toward Grodek-Ostroszycki. 
General von Tippelskirch constructed a new front using the 
60 km wide roadless swamp terrain of the Puszca Nalibocka woods 
(see Figure 129). North of the Nalibocka woods the defense was 
delegated to the VI Army Corps. On the left of the Nalibocka woods 
the XXXIX Panzer Corps was assigned this sector to defend. The 
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corps defense assignment extended from the land bridge of Wolozyn 
to the line northeast of the swampy terrain and south of Wolozyn 
to the Berezina river. 
A conference among 4th Army Commanders occurred during 
the morning of July 3, 1944. General Voelckers, Lt. General 
Vincenz Mueller, Lt. General Traut, Lt. General Ochsner, Lt. General 
Drescher, Maj. General Schuermann, Maj. General Klammt and Lt. 
General Trowitz were all present.393 Lt. General von Kurowski was 
not present. General Voelckers who showed signs of exhaustion 
took charge of the conference. The purpose of the conference was 
to determine the direction of the breakout from the 
encirclement.394 The atmosphere of the conference was definitely 
optimistic. The notion of surrender or capitulation was never 
expressed or indicated.395 Lt. General Mueller complained about the 
excessive use of nonessential vehicles by the Panzer Grenadier 
Division "Feldherrnhalle." The division still had too many cars on 
the road which clogged the road and consumed gasoline that was 
needed for the assault guns. However, the main source of irritation 
expressed concerned the non-arrival of supplies and poor 
communications with 4th Army Headquarters.396 The breakout was 
to be conducted in two corps groups with the XXVll Corps leading 
the movement west.397 The individual breakout of divisions was 
not discussed at this conference. 
General Voelckers at the conclusion of the conference 
ordered the retreat to the west to begin on the evening of July 3, 
1944. The order of battle for the breakout was organized as 
follows: 
1. 57th Infantry Division and weak elements of the 
78th Sturm Division were to advance through 
Samostotschje to Rudnja on the right. 
2. The 31st Infantry Division was to advance to 
Tscherwonnaja Sslobadka in the center. 
3. The 78th Sturm Division was to advance to 
Beresowka on the left. 
4. The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division was in the 
rear to first secure both sides of Ossowyj Bor as a 
rearguard then it could follow the other divisions.398 
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The XXVll Army Corps received one 800 liter fuel drop by air to 
support the breakout. 399 This fuel was used mostly for the 
command and radio vehicles of the corps staff. However, the 78th 
Sturm Division also received 200 liters of this fuel. 
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller reported to the 4th Army at 1435 
hrs that the troops of the encircled divisions had lost their combat 
effectiveness: 
The route to Ssmilowitschi was blocked by the enemy 
in strength. Individual groups of tanks are approaching 
from the north. The route conditions are difficult. 
Despite stringent measures heavy congestion occurs 
and as a result signs of disaffection among the vast 
numbers of stragglers are evident. There existed no 
more possibilities to concentrate combat troops and 
artillery with sufficient ammunition rapidly enough for 
a planned attack because of movement problems. 
Therefore, I have decided and ordered the breakout of 
the threatened encirclement with as many men of sound 
morale as possible with basic weapons heading south of 
Minsk to the west.400 
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Field Marshal Model issued the following orders for further 
operation of the 4th Army: 
1 . The area of Dukora must be held by conducting a 
sufficient anti-tank defense to make possible a rallying 
point for the elements of the 4th Army still east of 
Minsk. The enemy following up in this direction is to be 
shaken off, and his actions against Minsk from the north 
suppressed, by a thrust of an armored group from the 
5th Panzer Division from the area of Radoszkowice onto 
Grodek-Ostroszycki. The elements east of Minsk are to 
be directed westwards through Stolpce or Wolozya 
depending on the situation. 
2. The area of Wolozyn-Molodeczno-Smorgonie was 
to be kept open. The enemy crossing the Wilja river 
north of Smorgonie is to be attacked and thrown back 
over the river. The neck of land between Smorgonie and 
the marshes south of Lake Narosz is to be blocked.401 
Soviet movement during the evening determined the 
possibility for construction of a new front and the fate of the 
encircled corps. According to recent reports an entire Soviet Tank 
Army was breaking through past Minsk to the south through 
Dsershinsk-Rubeshewitsche. Another report issued by Lt. General 
Lendle of the 221 st Security Division at 1415 hrs based on German 
aerial reconnaissance reported 3 Soviet columns lead by armor 
advancing side by side on Minsk while German columns were only a 
few kilometers west of Minsk.402 The XII Army Corps had 
successfully fought its way through in 3 Kampfgruppen to the west 
in the area north of Tscherwen.403 Kampfgruppe Floerke was 
thrown out of Ssmilowitschi.404 There were no reports from the 
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110th Infantry Division and the XXVll Army Corps. The defense of 
Minsk had collapsed during the morning.405 The Soviets by noon 
were west of Minsk and probing Zaslaw. Strong Soviet armored 
forces were attacking further west of Grodek-Ostroszycki and 
locked into combat at Kosakowa with Kampfgruppe of the 5th 
Panzer Division where continuous and heavy armored battles 
developed. Soviet reconnaissance forces northwest of Smorgonie 
had succeeded in crossing the Wilja river. 
Lt. General Vincenz Mueller no longer believed a general 
breakout was possible under the circumstances. He had elected to 
gather what battle hardened troops of sound morale he had left and 
taking only infantry weapons launch a breakout. This marked an 
end to any effective combat operations of the old 4th Army. The 
encircled forces consisted of the remnants of 1 O divisions of the 
old 4th Army, 4 divisions of the VI Army Corps, and the Panzer 
Grenadier Division "Feldherrnhalle. "406 Therefore, a total of 15 
divisions ceased to exist as combat effective units.407 
The Luftwaffe had failed to provide the necessary air support 
for the ground troops in their attempts to breakout to the rear. It 
also could not provide air cover for the rear areas to protect rail 
transport. The German soldier was repeatedly called upon to 
provide his own air defense. Previously, the Luftwaffe High 
Command openly stated that the enemy controlled the air by day 
and night. German air defense doctrine called for the employment 
of all weapons including machine guns and rifles against low flying 
air attacks. Their advice to the German Soldier about seeking 
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cover during an air attack did not mean sticking their "head in the 
sand," but "lying on their back, raising their rifle and shooting."408 
Army Group Center also found it necessary to issue an order on July 
3, 1944 to all military personnel traveling on trains. When the 
train under air attack halted all military personnel were to 
disembark and engage the Soviet aircraft with rifles and machine 
guns.409 
9th Army 
The 12th Panzer Division had been pulled out of the front at 
Marina Gorka during the night and was enroute toward Stolpce. The 
4th Panzer Division had commenced its attack from Nieswiez and 
made good progress. Horodziej was taken during the advance. The 
attack of the 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions to retake Stolpce had 
not yet succeeded. The 4th Panzer Division was stalled northeast 
of Horodziej by severe Soviet resistance. The 12th Panzer Division 
lacking reports from Stolpce dispatched a Storch aircraft to 
assess the situation and it was shot down over the city. 
The Bobruisk troops which had escaped earlier had been 
moved by train to the west, but many that had escaped later were 
now marching on foot in stocking feet because their feet were too 
sore to wear boots. The lucky ones were riding in vehicles of the 
12th Panzer Division and supply vehicles. 
Major General von Kessel of the 20th Panzer Division 
concentrated the mass of motorized and horse-drawn vehicles into 
one group with the purpose of finding another crossing over the 
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Njemen since the Soviets had occupied Stolpce.410 The 
Kampfgruppe of the 20th Panzer Division thrust to the northwest 
through partisan positions in the Nalibotski forest as far as 
Jeremicze where the Kampfgruppe began the construction of a 
bridge over the Njemen river. The 9th Army had dispatched an 
assault gun reinforced Kampfgruppe of the 28th Jaeger Division and 
a bridging column to this location. This bridge was completed by 
1800 hrs on July 3rd. 
The battle of Stolpce had taken an unfavorable turn. The 12th 
Panzer Division reached the area northeast of Stolpce, but a 
breakthrough appeared hopeless.411 The spearhead of the 4th 
Panzer Division had failed to make any further headway by evening. 
The Soviets were laying down artillery fire on the rail station 
Horodziej where the 4th Panzer Division was being relieved by the . 
28th Jaeger Division which was forced to unload on the open 
tracks. 
The 9th Army during the morning was renamed "Gruppe von 
Vormann" and placed under the command of 2nd Army.412 The 9th 
Army was to retain the designation "Gruppe von Vormann" until 
July 10th when the 9th Army Headquarters became fully functional 
again.413 "Gruppe von Vormann" consisted of the following units: 
12th Panzer Division 
28th Jaeger Division 
Gruppe Harteneck: 
4th Panzer Division 
4th Cavalry Brigade 
1st Hungarian Cavalry Division 
"Fortress Baranowicze" 
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and all arriving formations in this area.414 
The 9th Army reported at 1330 hrs the recovery of 
approximately 25,000 soldiers of various units from Bobruisk. 415 
JULY 4, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
A link up by 3rd Panzer Army with the 16th Army was going 
to be attempted through Koziany with the 215th Infantry Division 
from the 16th Army and Grenadier Regiment 435 and 
Sturmgeschuetz Brigade 393 of the 3rd Panzer Army. Meanwhile, 
Kampfgruppe 3rd Panzer Army was ordered to block the neck of 
land between Narocz lake and Dzisna, and along both sides of 
Postawy (see Figure 127). 
The withdrawal movement by the 212th and 252nd Infantry 
Divisions into the old First World War positions (line of lakes 
directly west of Postawy) went according to plan (see Figure 127). 
Corps Detachment D was partly transported by truck to the 
southern sector of its new position north of the Miadziol lakes. 
The 212th Infantry Division's rear guards had to fall back to the 
forward outposts of Miadziolka. Aerial Reconnaissance revealed 
that Soviet columns were advancing out of the region of 
Parafjanow through partisan territory to the west on the right 
flank of the Panzer Army (see Figure 127).416 The spearhead had 
reached the region directly east of Konstantynowo. Ground 
observation reported at 1700 hrs that individual tanks were 
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probing out of the area of Kobylnik to the north. The Soviets with 
the mass of their motorized vehicles had crossed the of land north 
of the Narocz lakes. The 3rd Panzer Army responded by dispatching 
a strengthened Kampfgrupppe with infantry units, 
Sturmgeschuetzen (assault guns), and Nashoernern (tank 
destroyers) under the command of Major Hoppe of the Heavy Panzer 
Jaeger Battalion 519 (see Figure 127).417 Major Hoppe was 
assigned to beat back this renewed threat of envelopment and if 
possible occupy the line of lakes between Narocz and Miadziol. 
The necessity of stripping reserves to strengthen the right 
flank of the Panzer Army weakened the center sector where there 
were no further available reserves. The linking up with the 16th 
Army north of Koziany was no longer possible due to a shortage of 
forces (see Figure 127).418 
Lt. General Krebs informed 3rd Panzer Army at 1530 hrs that 
it was to take over the command of Wilna.419 Contact with the 
Commandant of "Fortress Wilna" would shortly be arranged. Lt. 
General Krebs informed the Panzer Army that there was a prospect 
that the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions would arrive to assist this 
front. Wilna was supposed to be reinforced. The supply of the 
Panzer Army would be based on the rail line Wilna-Kauen. Maj. 
General Heidkaempfer requested at 1700 hrs that Lt. General Krebs 
arrange for the destruction of the Wilna river bridge at Michaliski 
by a low level air attack. Engineer Battalion 505 received the 
demolition assignment to destroy the stream crossings west and 
north of the northern tip of Swir lake. The IX Corps was no longer 
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exposed to great danger on the southern flank because of the 
deployment of the 197th Infantry Division by truck. Major Hoppe's 
Kampfgruppe was supposed to launch a flank attack but the 
infantry to support and protect the Kampfgruppe's armor had not 
arrived from Corps Detachment D. The infantry riding in panje 
wagons would have to increase their pace in order to keep up and 
protect the armor. 
The IX Corps rear guards were ordered to remain in the 
stream sector east of Postawy till 0200 hrs. Soviet armor 
northeast of Postawy had not yet reappeared. The battalion 
strength of the 212th Infantry Division averaged only about 150 
men who needed food and sleep.420 The left wing of the IX Corps 
was located in Kurti (6 km northwest of Postawy) but because of a 
lack of troops contact could not be reestablished to the 16th Army 
through Koziany (see Figure 127).421 Maj. General Heidkaempfer 
knew that everything must be done to concentrate artillery against 
the eastern front of the corps so that the probable Soviet attack on 
Postawy on July 5th could be met with concentrated artillery fire. 
The IX Army Corps Command Post was now located at Jankiszki (5 
km southeast of Aduliskis) (see Figure 127). 
The 3rd Panzer Army defense at the end of the day was based 
upon the First World War position between the north edge of the 
Miadziol lake and the Hoduschki woods. Corps Detachment D was 
ordered to attack the following day and occupy the neck of land 
between Narocz lake and Miadziol lake. 
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4th Army 
The XXVll Army Corps which had been out of contact since 
June 30th had fought their way back and Joined Kampfgruppe 
Mueller in the area of Ssmilowitschi.422 Generals Mueller and 
Voelkers reported at 0700 hrs their decision to breakout that 
evening in the direction south of Minsk proposed by General von 
Tippelskirch.423 Army Group Center at 1530 hrs ordered 
Kampfgruppe 4th Army to block the neck of land between the 
Nalibocka woods and the swamp terrain south of the Narosch lakes 
in the line forward of Wiszniew-Smorgonie and to delay the 
Soviets forward of this line as long as possible. Meanwhile, 
Soviets advancing from Minsk to the west took Rakow defended by 
weak security forces. 
Field Marshal Model did not address the encircled divisions 
personally this day because he was involved in the conduct of 
offensive operations. The Soviets on a wide front had already 
crossed the road to Smorgonie at Molodeczno and west of the city. 
General von Saucken was forced to withdraw the Kampfgruppe 5th 
Panzer Division from Grodek and used it to clear the Molodeczno-
Smorgonie road (see Figure 130). In the VI Corps sector the 
Soviets forced their way into Molodeczno and Gmurgainys. Battles 
were still raging in these areas. Soviet forces advancing along the 
rail line from the northeast also took Lebicdziew. Aerial 
reconnaissance reported massive Soviet forces moving on the roads 
Bobruisk-Minsk and Mogilew-Beresino-Ssmilowitschi. 
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The 4th Army reported during the evening that since June 26, 
1944 the Soviets had deployed the following units against the 4th 
Army: 41 rifle divisions, 4 tank corps, 1 mechanized corps, 1 
cavalry corps, 1 tank brigade and a large number of independent 
army units.424 The 4th Army reported that at least 1000 Soviet 
tanks had been deployed against it and 473 had been destroyed.425 
The 4th Army breakout was not successful. The 78th Sturm 
Division, 25th Panzer Grenadier Division and 31st Infantry Division 
were halted in their advance to the west.426 The 25th Panzer 
Grenadier Division's spearhead lead by 3 assault guns was blocked 
by Soviet heavy· weapons from any further advance 3 km west of 
Belaja-Lusha. 427 The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division had saved 32 
assault guns and 20 self-propelled guns from being abandoned due 
to lack of fuel, but these guns had mostly exhausted their 
ammunition and there was no further available fuel. The division 
had received no regular supply of fuel, ammunition and food since 
the Soviet offensive began on June 22, 1944.428 The only supply of 
ammunition left was for rifles along with some handgrenades. 
The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division launched another attack 
consisting of only infantry leaving their vehicles behind on the 
road. The attack was launched through the wooded area to the right 
of the road by Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119 under the 
command of Major Koller. Motorized Grenadier Regiment 35 under 
the command of Colonel von Bergen was to exploit the breakthrough 
of the 3rd Battalion of Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119. Lt. 
Colonel Luick, Commander of Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119 
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remained behind with the remaining units and combat vehicles. The 
attack failed, however, and the Soviet defense line could not be 
cleared by a joint effort from the west and east. Meanwhile, 
Soviet attacks were repelled despite a shortage of ammunition. 
Soldiers that had no more ammunition would have to crouch in fox 
holes until the Soviets were within hand-to-hand combat range 
whereupon the troops would jump out of their holes using empty 
weapons in hand-to-hand combat to repulse the Soviets.429 Soviet 
attacks were repulsed but the Soviets continued uninterrupted fire 
into the compressed cauldron with all available weapons which 
caused the Germans high casualties. The Command Post of the 25th 
Panzer Grenadier Division was at Belja Lusha and the XXVll Army 
Corps Command Post was at Basseka. 
2nd Army 
Gruppe General von Vormann. On the right wing of Gruppe Lt. 
General Harteneck the Soviets were advancing from the southeast 
directly south of the rail line west of Siniawka. On the left wing 
of Gruppe Harteneck the Soviets encircled Nieswicz and took Kleck 
from the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division. The 4th Panzer Division 
was assembling around the town of Snow. The 4th Panzer Division 
received the mission to attack to the south to prevent a Soviet 
breakthrough at "Fortress Baranowicze" (see Figures 130 & 131 ).430 
The 12th Panzer Division was fighting its way back to the west and 
had abandoned its attack toward Stolpce. The 28th Jaeger Division 
and Kampfgruppe Lt. General von Kessel were to establish a 
security line on the Usza sector facing northeast. The Soviets 
were reported to have already occupied Turzec in this sector. 
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Army Group Center in sorting out the available divisions of 
the 9th Army decided that the following divisions were still 
operational: 35th, 102nd, 129th, and 292nd Infantry Divisions.431 
The remaining 9th Army divisions could not be used as divisions.432 
The 20th Panzer Division was to be restored and all available 
elements made combat ready. 
JULY 5, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The Soviets attacked the south wing of the IX Army Corps 
during the night and broke into the German positions at Laposie and 
Mikitki. The Soviets also took Juodaciai. There was already a hole 
in the direction of Wilna which kept growing larger with the gap 
between the 3rd Panzer Army and the 4th Army (see Figure 130). 
There was still no contact with Army Group North yet.433 
Reconnaissance reported that Tverecius (18 km north of Aduliskis) 
was occupied by the Soviets. The Soviets attacked the eastern 
front of the Panzer Army from the right wing to the hills at 
Postawy with heavy casualties (see Figures 130 & 132). 
Maj. General Heidkaempfer advised Army Group Center that 
the position in the southern sector could not be held any longer. A 
withdrawal to the Aduliskis line (see Figures 130 & 132) during 
the night was proposed. The Chief of General Staff informed 
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Colonel General Reinhardt that both sides of Postawy could no 
longer be held and the right wing was already southeast of 
Svencionys (see Figure 132). A withdrawal was ordered for that 
night. The new Panzer Army Command Post was to be established 
in Sirvintos.434 
"Fortress Wilna" was to be placed under the command of the 
3rd Panzer Army during the discussion at 1500 hrs between Col. 
General Reinhardt, Field Marshal Model, and General von 
Tippelskirch at the Wilna airport.435 However, the formal 
subordination of the city would occur later. The discussion was 
shifted at 1630 hrs to the subject of Wilna's defense with the 
Commandant of "Fortress Wlna," Major General Poel.436 "Fortress 
Wilna was merely a notion without combat troops. The strength of 
the garrison consisted of 1 battalion from the 170th Infantry 
Division, 3 companies of stragglers with engineer platoons, 4 Flak 
batteries, and 1 military police company.437 "Fortress Wilna" was 
officially placed under command of Col. General Reinhardt of the 
3rd Panzer Army at 2000 hrs.438 Hitler wanted Wilna held and the 
following reinforcements were to be sent to Wilna: 
2 Valkyrie Regiments (1068, 1069), 
Hitler's "Escort Battalion" (Battalion von Werthern), 
761 st Brigade (partially motorized), 
Anti-tank Battalions (PAK) (1059, 1060), 
1 combat battalion 1041 for the 252nd Infantry 
Division.439 
The arrival of these reinforcements was expected by July 6th in 
the afternoon. 
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The 225th Infantry Division was requested for Podbrodcie. 
However, the 225th Infantry Division had just begun assembling in 
the area of Dukstas-Turmont for an attack to restore the front 
between Army Group North and 3rd Panzer Army.440 No other 
divisions were available from Army Group North. The 225th 
Infantry Division would be available at the earliest by July 10th 
after unloading from rail transport. The first transport will roll 
through Duenaburg on July 7th. 
Major General Heidkaempfer oriented the Commandant of 
"Fortress Wilna" at 2100 hrs about the enemy situation. Soviets 
had been observed advancing toward Wilna from the direction of 
Aschmena (see Figure 130). Soviets were also reported at 2030 
hrs to have broken through at Lentupis moving further to the west 
(see Figure 132). Aerial reconnaissance identified groups of Soviet 
armor and a Soviet motorized group moving west toward Podbrocie. 
Contact between Army Group North and 3rd Panzer Army still had 
not been restored during the day.441 
4th Army 
Both the XI I Army Corps and the XXVI I Army Corps were 
moving west (see Figure 130). The XII Corps was located in the 
woods south of Pekalin at the road intersection (4 km south of 
Pekalin). Both corps after heavy battles had lost most of their 
supplies and artillery. The corps were going to advance south of 
Minsk on the line Dsershinsk-Zaslaw and then turn northwest in the 
direction of Wolozyn-Dubina.442 A supply drop was requested that 
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night at Bridgehead Wolma where 8 fires in a square would provide 
recognition for the air drop. 
A message from the XXVll Corps at 1420 hrs stated: 
All attempts to force a way out with our last resources 
have failed. The Corps is on the defensive.443 
General von Tippelskirch replied by radio at 2300 hrs to the 
XXVll Army Corps: 
With deep emotion and shattered by the feeling that we 
can do nothing to help, your old true Comrade-in-Arms 
salutes the Army. General von Tippelskirch.444 
The XXXIX Panzer Corps was now 40 km southeast of Minsk 
(see Figure 130). 
The Soviets broke through the VI Army Corps in the evening 
with 15 tanks and became entangled with Kampfgruppe Lt. General 
von Bergen at Wolozyn (see Figure 130). These Soviet tanks were
repulsed after 6 were knocked out (see Figure 130). Nevertheless, 
Grodek and Wolozyn were lost on the new 4th Army front by the end 
of the day. Field Marshal Model ordered the 4th Army to assemble 
for defense of the neck of land between the Naliboki woods and the 
swamp terrain east of Smorgonie.445 The PanzerKorps von Saucken 
(XXXIX Panzer Corps Headquarters, 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions) 
were to attack northwest of Smorgonie to the north to repulse the 
Soviets which had crossed over the Wilja river and were advancing 
on Wilna (see Figure 130).446 The connection with the south wing 
of the 3rd Panzer Army was to be restored. However, The 170th 
Infantry Division under Kampfgruppe von Saucken was thrown out 
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of Molodeczno and Smorgonie (see Figure 130). The new defensive 
line was located on the edge of the hills on both sides of Markowo. 
Elements of the 221 st Security Division west of Smorgonie 
repulsed a Soviet armored thrust (see Figure 130). 
A conference of the surrounded 4th Army Generals was held 
at 1630 hrs and attended by General Voelckers, Traut, Trowitz, 
Klammt and Schuermann.447 Generals Drescher and Ochsner were 
not present. General Voelckers stated that all breakout attempts 
had failed for days. It was finally time to take a defensive 
posture. Maj. General Schuermann inquired what purpose this 
measure would serve. He asked, "Will the Corps be broken out from 
outside the encirclement by German forces?" General Voelckers 
responded: "There were no available forces. The objective was 
defense against Russian pressure for 2-4 days followed by 
surrender of the entire Corps. "448 Maj. General Schuermann 
requested permission for his division with empty weapons to 
breakout. General Voelckers refused his request. General 
Voelckers stated: 
The Russians have advanced further than 100 km to the 
west, you will enter new encirclements again and 
again, and in my opinion will fail to return to the 
homeland. When we surrender ourselves, the chance 
exists, that at least the men may save their lives. 
Besides think of your wounded. In an orderly surrender 
to the Russians the chance exists that they will be 
provided for.449 
Finally, General Voelckers departed from the conference and 
Maj. General Schuermann conferred with the remaining Division 
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Commanders. He stated: "Can no commander make the best of 
things. "450 Lt. General Trowitz who had previously underwent 
encirclement at Tscherkassy and Maj. General Klammt agreed 
immediately with the view of Maj. General Schuermann. Lt. General 
Traut, however, continued to vacillate between the breakout and 
surrender. Later, Lt. General Traut decided in favor of the 
breakout.451 
The final conference of the surrounded 4th Army Generals 
assembled under the direction of General Voelckers at 1900 hrs.452 
There were only 4 generals at this meeting. General Voelckers 
informed them that Lt. General Drescher, Commander of the 267th 
Infantry Division had just reported Russian breakthroughs on the 
eastern front of the Corps in two places. General Voelckers now 
granted his permission to all the generals to breakout.453 The 4 
Division Commanders agreed that each general would breakout on 
his own front separately. 
The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division's sector during the day 
had not changed. The Soviets continued to attack from the west to 
the east. The Soviets were repulsed in hand-to-hand combat and 
the last handgrenades had been used.454 There was now a shortage 
of rifle ammunition with no more than 10-15 rounds per rifle. The 
situation was becoming critical. The 25th Panzer Grenadier 
Division now had 600 wounded receiving no medical care. It was 
similar for the other divisions, the 57th Infantry Division had 1000 
wounded, the 260th Infantry Divisions had 800-1000 wounded.455 
Medical supplies were no longer available. Maj. General 
Schuermann ordered a reconnaissance of the Soviet lines to 
determine the position for the breakout. 
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Maj. General Schuermann issued the order to breakout to his 
commanders at 2000 hrs. He divided the division into 3 attack 
groups: 
1 . Colonel von Bergen with Grenadier Regiment 35 on 
the right. 
2. Maj. General Schuermann in the center with the 
artillery section of the Panzer Jaeger Battalion, the 
engineer battalion and elements of Grenadier Regiment 
119. 
3. Lt. Colonel Luik with Grenadier Regiment 119 on 
the left. 456 
The three groups were to be in position at Welikij-Less at midnight 
for the attack. 
The wounded were entrusted to the care of a doctor, who was 
left in possession of a letter with an appeal to the military honor 
of the Russian commander. The artillery was destroyed once the 
ammunition had been exhausted. 
The objective of the attack was to reach Koidenowo 
(southeast of Minsk) which was also known as Dserhinsk. Maj. 
General Schuermann proceeded to the assembly point at 2200 hrs. 
The assault of the 25th Panzer Grenadier Division took place at 
midnight with shouts of "Hurra" and empty weapons.457 The 
breakout succeeded but many wounded were left behind in the dark 
during the assault. 
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The other two main groups were under the command of Lt. 
General Traut southeast of Volma and Lt. General Mueller east of 
Volma.458 Both of these groups attempted to breakout to the west, 
southwest and south toward the area of Baranovichi (see Figure 
130). The Soviet 53rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front and the 
50th and 49th Armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued to 
surround and compress the pocket containing the German 4th 
Army.459 
2nd Army 
Kampfgruppe Lt. General Richert (part of the LV Army Corps) 
had reached the west bank of the Sslutsch coming from the area 
Ssosnkowitsche. The 292nd Infantry Division was advancing along 
the rail line Luniniec-Baranowicze to restore contact to the 
southern wing of Kampfgruppe Lt. General Harteneck (see Figure 
133).460 
Kampfqruppe General von Vormann. The Soviets broke through 
the north wing of the 4th Cavalry Brigade with 10 tanks and 6 were 
knocked out (see Figure 133). The 4th Panzer Division attacking 
from Snow to the southwest liquidated this breakthrough (see 
Figure 133).461 Soviet forces on the north wing of Kampfgruppe 
von Vormann had crossed over to the west bank of the Usza river. 
Aerial reconnaissance confirmed the presence of numerous tanks. 
The 28th Jaeger Division gained only limited ground against these 
Soviet units (see Figure 133). The 12th Panzer Division which had 
made contact and linked up with numerous straggler units crossed 
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the Niemen river at Jeremicze (see Figure 133). Kampfgruppe von 
Vormann was able to repulse Soviet breakthroughs toward 
Baranowicze (see Figure 130).462 The construction of a new 
defensive front behind the present front had begun. The rebuilding 
and reorganizing of smashed divisions was also in progress. 
The Soviet plan of attack by using a multiple axis advance 
starting with 6 major points of concentration combined with 
objectives in depth had achieved an outstanding success. Soviet 
offensive operations from June 22nd to July 5th had virtually 
liberated most of White Russia (see Figure 134 ). 
JULY 6, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The Chief of the General Staff ordered the Commandant of 
"Fortress Wilna" to blow all the bridges from Niemenczyn to the 
edge of the city.463 The bridges around the city still being used 
were to be manned by security forces. General Poel reported that 
all bridges that lead from Wilna to the east had been destroyed 
three days ago. 
The 212th Infantry Division rearguards were closely engaged 
by the Soviets. Elements of the division were engaged on the east 
edge of the woods 3 km east of Lentupis. The security troops under 
Soviet pressure withdrew from Lentupis (see Figure 135). The 
Soviets attacked the IX Corps in the morning in the rear of its right 
wing and Kampfgruppe Corps Detachment D from the south. (see 
Figure 136). The Soviets advancing from the area of Tverecius 
attempted to outflank the north flank of 3rd Panzer Army by 
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thrusts from the east and north. The Soviet forces advancing in the 
south encountered only extremely weak German resistance. The 
Soviets in the north were moving along the road from in the 
northeast in the direction of Svencionys (see Figure 135). The IX 
Corps was assigned the general task of providing the "defense for 
Duenaburg." Meanwhile, a 155 km hole remained between the 3rd 
Panzer Army in the south and the 4th Army in the north (see Figure 
136).464 
The gaping hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th Army 
created major problems for the defense of Wilna (see Figure 136). 
Lt. General Krebs advised Colonel General Reinhardt that one 
Valkyrie Regiment would be in Wilna today and tomorrow another 
regiment and the Fuehrer Begleit Battalion would be in Wilna. 
Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs that 3rd 
Panzer Army could only fulfill one mission, either the northern 
operation with the 252nd Infantry Division or the defense of 
Wilna.465 Reinhardt stated: 
The notion of fortresses is pure nonsense. There are no 
forces and also no suitable headquarters available for 
the defense. When the Soviet main effort is on Wilna, 
the 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters perceives that 
establishing contact with Army Group North had greater 
importance since the Army can at least go on 
controlling such troops as it still possesses. 466 
Lt. General Krebs informed the 3rd Panzer Army at 1040 hrs 
of Field Marshal Model's decision. The main effort of the 3rd 
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Panzer Army was to be centered on Wilna.467 Panzer Platoon 21 
had already arrived and was to move up in the direction of 
Podbrodcie. Elements of the 170th Infantry Division had arrived in 
Wilna and were to make contact with the IX Corps to the north. 
Army Group Center reported at 1045 hrs that the following 
units were en route to Wilna: Infantry Battalion 1041 in Lublin, 
Valkyrie Regiment 1067 in area of Bialystok, Valkyrie Regiment 
1068, Valkyrie Regiment 1069, Infantry Brigade 761 from Kauen, 
and Fuehrer Begleit Battalion von Werthern which would depart 
Arys on July 6, 1944.468 
The 225th Infantry Division would be transported by rail and 
employed on the south wing of the Panzer Army to close the hole 
between the 4th Army and 3rd Panzer Army.469 
Soviet forces in the wooded terrain northwest of Lentupis 
advanced further to the north to the region of Paginiai (see Figure 
135). Soviet attacks east and northeast of Aduliskis suffered 
heavy casualties, but forced the north wing of the Panzer Army 
during the morning to be pulled back in the line Aduliskis-
Melagenai (see Figure 135). 
Colonel General Reinhardt visited the command post of 
"Fortress Wilna" during the afternoon and discovered that there had 
been no further reinforcement of the garrison. Reconnaissance 
reported at 1230 hrs that 8 Soviet tanks and accompanying 
infantry had apparently crossed the Wilja river before the 
demolition of the bridge at Mikalischki. The inner defenses of 
Wilna was organized into a series of defense positions and a main 
422 
battle line that was weakly occupied on the northern arc and more 
strongly occupied on the eastern arc. Road obstacles were 
prepared, however, there were no mines. Railroad engineers had 
prepared demolition charges at the entrances to the city. The air 
defense was reinforced by ten 88 mm cannons. These guns would 
be complemented by four full strength batteries of 88 mm guns and 
a Flak Kampftruppe during the night of July 7th. These 88 mm guns 
could be used as potent anti-tank guns as well as air defense guns. 
Col. General Reinhardt stressed the importance of protecting the 
most important bridges to the Flak Commander. Panzer platoon 21 
was sent to reinforce the security line east of the city. The supply 
situation in the city had improved with rations for 30,000 men for 
21 days stockpiled.470 Two more infantry battalions had arrived by 
the end of the day in Wilna. One battalion was deployed on the 
northern sector and two battalions were kept in reserve. 
Soviet pressure against the eastern front of the IX Army 
Corps increased. However, two Soviet battalions were annihilated 
in Lentupis. The motorized Army Engineer Battalion 505 with the 
support of assault guns was given credit for the success of the 
counterattack which retook the town. The Commanding General of 
the IX Corps reported the especially dangerous situation at 
Lentupis at 1930 hrs to Col. General Reinhardt. Corps Detachment 
D was withdrawing on the rail line northeast of Lentupis (see 
Figure 135). The IX Corps was going to hold the elevated terrain 8 
km southeast of Svencionys as long as possible (see Figure 135). 
The 391 st Security Division had practically disintegrated.471 The 
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IX Corps reported that it disengaged from the Soviets and the right 
wing of the Corps was on Soros lake in the line Perszukszta-both 
sides of Svencionys-line of lakes northeast of Svencionys-and the 
lake at Koncerzina (see Figure 135). This line was to be held as 
long as possible to allow the 225th Infantry Division to unload its 
advance elements on July 7th (see Figure 135). 
The arrival of the 6th Panzer Division had been anticipated so 
some of the bridges over the Wilja river had not been blown up 
earlier and this represented a dangerous situation since the 6th 
Panzer Division would not arrive till July 10th at which time the 
bridges would h·ave to all be blown up.472 Meanwhile, the first 
trains loaded with reinforcements for Wilna arrived at 1800 hrs 
with elements of Infantry Brigade 761, Panzer Grenadier Brigade 
von Werthern, and Valkyrie Regiments 1068 and 1069. 
4th Army 
There were no reports from the XI I and XXVI I Army Corps 
today.473 The Soviets advanced southwest from Molodeczno and 
reached the wooded terrain northwest of Wiszne. The elevated 
terrain around the city was held. Elements of the 7th Panzer 
Division were employed to hold the line here, and also attack to the 
north to cut off the Soviet units which had broken through the 
defense line. The 5th Panzer Division was successful in closing 
the hole south of Smurgainys by attacking east from Krewe to the 
north. Soviet attacks through Ziuprenai and deep into the flanks 
forced the withdrawal of the line 11 km southeast of Krewe 9 km 
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northeast of Krewe-Aschmena. Soviet forces outflanking the 4th 
Army advanced into the hole between the 3rd Panzer Army and 4th 
Army (see Figure 136). Soviet motorized forces moved through 
Smurgainys and Mykoloskis against Wilna (see Figure 136).474 
The 25th Panzer Grenadier Division during its successful 
breakthrough ran into a hail of Soviet fire from artillery, tanks, 
anti-tank guns and mortars. Maj. General Schuermann's 
Kampfgruppe burst through the Soviet lines, but out of the original 
1000 men only 100 survived.475 Colonel von Bergen, Commander of 
Motorized Grenadier Regiment 35 was killed in the breakout and Lt. 
Colonel Luick, Commander of Motorized Grenadier Regiment 119 
was severely wounded and most probably taken prisoner.476 The 
remnants of the division were broken down into small groups of 
30-50 men. Maj. General Schuermann's Kampfgruppe crossed the 
rail line Bobruisk-Minsk with 80-90 men moving south, but after 
three futile attempts no breakout was achieved.477 Maj. General 
Schuermann decided to swing back around Minsk to the north and 
then turned west and broke through with his dwindling detachment 
north of Molodeczno and south of Wilna past Mereczsanka.478 A 
difficult crossing of the Njemen river was achieved after a sharp 
fight with Soviet troops for the control of a pontoon bridge.479 
Finally, Maj. General Schuermann and his Kampfgruppe of 35 men 
reached German lines on August 17, 1944 southeast of Sudauen. 480 
Lt. General Traut's group tried to breakthrough to Dzerzhinsk, 
but was destroyed by the Soviet 49th Army of the Soviet 2nd 
Belorussian Front.481 Between Minsk and Baranowitschi the 
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majority of the 78th Sturm Division under the command of Lt. 
General Traut had assembled in a village which had become 
surrounded by Soviet infantry on all sides. The Soviet infantry 
launched a sudden attack from all sides with shouts of "Hurra" and 
stormed the village killing the wounded and taking Lt General Traut 
and the remaining soldiers prisoner.482 Lt. General Traut raised his 
hands and surrendered according to one survivor.483 
Lt. General Muellers Kampfgruppe broke through to the Ptich 
river south of Minsk and attempted to seize the airfield at Ozertso 
12 km southwest of Minsk but failed. 
The Soviets had taken extensive measures to prevent the 
infiltration of German troops to the rear and at the same time 
began exploiting the newly occupied areas for military manpower. 
Maj. General Schuermann was the only German General of the 4th 
Army to survive and escape Soviet captivity. He delineated the 
Soviet measures he encountered in his retreat to German lines as 
follows: 
1. Russian hunting detachments in strengths of 3-15 
men strongly armed with machine guns and machine 
pistols scoured the terrain. 
2. Partisans were deployed as militia in the villages 
to prevent the population from helping the Germans by 
strict surveillance. 
3. Conscription detachments covered the land. The 
men between 17 and 45 years of age were mobilized for 
military service. The horses and grain were seized. 
4. Slow moving aircraft scoured the area and the 
located Germans were reported by radio to hunting 
detachments or combat aircraft. 
5. Construction of blockade lines were organized.484 
2nd Army 
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Kampfgruppe von Vormann. The Soviets broke through on the 
right wing of the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division on both sides of 
the road to Brest-Litovsk and achieved deep breakthroughs on both 
sides of Lachewicze against the 4th Cavalry Brigade. The attack of 
the 28th Jaeger Division and 12th Panzer Division in an attempt to 
cut off the Soviets west of the Usza sector failed. Kampfgruppe 
von Vormann was withdrawn to the Myszanka sector (south of 
Baranowicze) - east edge of Baranowicze - Cyryn Korelicze (see 
Figure 136). 485 Elements of the 12th Panzer Division thrust into 
the rear of the advancing Soviets from the north. 
JULY?, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The Wilna city defenses were attacked by two battalions of 
National Polish patrisans during the early morning hours which 
were repulsed (see Figure 137). The bridge at Niemenczyn was 
blown up during the night by German troops. Air force reports 
observed strong Soviet reconnaissance forces moving toward Wilna 
which were engaged by the Luftwaffe and 8 Soviet tanks were 
destroyed (see Figure 137). Maj. General Heidkaempfer, Chief of 
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Staff 3rd Panzer Army informed Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff 
Army Group Center of the situation. The 225th Infantry Divison had 
not arrived from Army Group North. Lt. General Krebs assured 
Heidkaempfer that a parachute regiment would be flown into Wilna 
on July 8th.486 Therefore, the airport was not to be destroyed prior 
to their arrival. Maj. General Heidkaempfer requested air 
reconnaissance between Wilna and the right wing of the IX Corps to 
ascertain the position of Soviet forces west of Narocz lake (see 
Figure 137). The first train carrying Panzer Brigade von Werthern 
arrived in Kauen at 1215 hrs. These elements were directed to 
advance through Wilkomir to Sirvintos. 
The withdrawal of the IX Corps was executed according to 
plan but was pursued by the Soviets on a broad front (see Figure 
138). The Soviet main effort was focused on both the main roads 
leading to Svencionys and on the left flank of the 252nd Infantry 
Division (see Figure 138). The wooded terrain southeast of 
Svencionys was penetrated by 600 Soviet infantry and several 
tanks while German troops were still engaged north of this position 
(see Figure 138). The Soviets continued their advance to the west 
along both sides of the main road east of Kukiskiai. Maj. General 
Heidkaempfer reported to Lt. General Krebs that Soviet forces were 
advancing on the left wing of the IX Corps toward lgnalina and they 
were encountering no German resistance (see Figure 138).487 
Therefore, the left wing of the IX Corps was open again (see Figure 
138). The Soviets were also advancing southwest of the right wing 
of the IX Corps toward Podbrodzcie. 
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Colonel General Reinhardt informed Lt. General Krebs that the 
Soviet 3rd Mechanized Corps with 4 brigades was prepared to 
attack Wilna. Col. General Reinhardt considered pulling back the 
defense line to the west bank of the Wilja-Neris because the 
terrain in this area offered better possibilities of defense since 
there was a shortage of forces and supplies for the defense of 
"Fortress Wilna." Lt. General Krebs response to this proposal was 
that the mission of Kampfgruppe 3rd Panzer Army remained 
twofold: 
1 . The containing of the Soviet advance as long as 
possible.· 
2. The holding of "Fortress Wilna" for the 
approaching German forces.488 
The 225th Infantry Division was to be employed to cover the 
lakes on the right flank of the 16th Army. In case the Soviets 
occupied the rail line at lgnalina then the 225th Infantry Division 
would be employed to clear the Soviets from the rail line (see 
Figure 138). The Fuehrer Begleit Battalion was to be used north of 
Wilna in an eastward direction. Currently, the battalion was 
unloading in Kauen. Lt. General Krebs assured General Poel that the 
parachute regiment would arrive today in Wilna. Maj. General 
Heidkaempfer stressed the decisive importance of Army Group 
North blocking the area between the Dringa Lake and Dysna lake. 
The Soviets during the early afternoon pushed the German 
forces back west of lgnalina and cut the crucial rail line Wilna-
Duenaburg (see Figure 138).489 Paluse was lost at 1500 hrs from 
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an attack from the southeast (see Figure 138). The Commandant of 
Wilna was notified at 1230 hrs that the parachute regiment would 
land at the airport and it was then to be deployed to the north. 
Meanwhile, Grenadier Brigade 761 arrived in Wilna without its 
equipment. The airport at Wilna was to be kept open for the arrival 
of the parachute regiment and then was to be blown up no later then 
1600 hrs.490 The forces arriving in Wilna were concentrated into 
one unit. The Parachute Regiment 16 and the 1st Parachute 
Engineer Battalion of Parachute Regiment 21, Grenadier Brigade 
761 and Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern were combined and 
placed under the command of Lt. General Bergen of the 390th Field 
Training Division. 
Lt. General Krebs notified Maj. General Heidkaempfer that 
Hitler had issued a "Fuehrer Befehl: "Fortress Wilna" was to be held 
under all circumstances. The fortress must allow itself to be 
encircled if necessary."491 Major General Heidkaempfer responded 
to Lt. General Krebs that "the situation at Wilna was developing 
exactly like Vitebsk. "492 Krebs responded that he did not believe 
this was the case because "the Panzer Army was 300 km closer to 
German military bases and Wilna was facing only 3 mechanized 
Brigades not rifle corps and tank corps. "493 
The IX Corps in its fighting withdrawal was pursued on a wide 
front southwest, east and northeast of Svencionys (see Figure 138). 
The Soviets in the south had reached the rail line at Podbrodszie. 
Lt. General Krebs informed the Panzer Army just before 
midnight that General Stahel was appointed the new Commandant of 
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"Fortress Wilna."494 Major General Heidkaempfer reported that the 
Soviets were already on the west bank of the Wilja river and had 
blocked the arterial road to Wilkomir with anti-tank gun fire.495 
Major von Werthern, Commander of the Fuehrer Begleit Battalion 
could no longer get out of Wilna except through Kauen to reach the 
Panzer Army Headquarters. The Soviets had pushed their way to 
within 200 meters of Wilna's eastern defense line (see Figure 139). 
The anticipated parachute regiment had not arrived except for the 
regimental staff and two companies. The Soviet crossing of the 
Wilja river was certainly possible because the police battalion 
from Police Regiment 16 had failed to secure the area. Anti-tank 
guns, Flak Kampftruppen and two Latvian police companies were 
withdrawn from the German bridgehead at Nowa Wilejka (see Figure 
139). It was hoped with these forces the Soviets could be delayed 
until the last train arrived in Wilna. Soviet armor now appeared 
before the entire front. General Poel believed that Soviet armor 
had bypassed the airport and therefore it was still safe for Junker 
52 aircraft to land with troops.496 Maj. General Heidkaempfer 
requested to be informed immediately when the landing of Junker 
52 transport aircraft was no longer possible due to Soviet 
operations.497 Meanwhile, Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern 
was still coming out of Wilkomir. The Panzer Army had requested 
to employ Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern on the west bank 
of the Wilja river, but Hitler insisted that the brigade be placed 
into "Fortress Wilna. "498 
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The IX Corps would have to withdraw again to avoid being 
outflanked. The Soviets occupied lgnalina and had crossed the rail 
line at Podbroczie heading west. The new resistance line was: 
Orinos Lake - length of Zeimena river and the Zeimena lake chain to 
the chain of lakes west of lgnalina. Contact with the arriving 
225th Infantry Division was to be established. 
4th Army 
There was no radio contact from the surrounded Divisions of 
the 4th Army.499 The last contact had been the messages received 
on July 5, 1944. General von Tippelskirch sent one last message to 
the XII Army Corps: 
Everlasting thanks for your courage and heroism. May it 
bear fruit despite a11.soo 
Meanwhile; Soviet aircraft dropped propaganda leaflets on the 
surrounded troops which stated: 
LAST WARNING 
German soldiers surrender, further resistance is 
senseless. Army Group Center has been completely 
destroyed, your comrades have deserted you ... Lay down 
your weapons and come out of the woods in lines with 
white flags.soi 
The eastern front of the new 4th Army had been penetrated 
northeast of Krewe and pushed back to a line 10 km west of Krewe 
(see Figure 137). The north wing of the army was forced back 
through Aschema by strong Soviet reconnaissance forces. The 4th 
Army was in the process of withdrawing to a new line Surwiliszki-
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Medinikaj. Field Marshal Model assigned the 4th Army the task of 
delaying the Soviets advancing toward Wilna along the rail line 
Molodeczno-Wilna by attacking with mobile forces the southern 
flank of the Soviets (see Figure 137).502 
Kampfgruppe Weidling holding the line with weak police 
forces east of Lida was pushed back to the west by Superior Soviet 
cavalry and armor forces (see Figure 137). This made it possible 
for the Soviets to breakout of the Naliboki woods. Soviet armor 
was moving along the Molodeczno-Lida rail line and had reached the 
region northeast of Lipniczki (see Figure 137). Kampfgruppe 
Weidling was subsequently placed under the command of the 4th 
Army at 2300 hrs. 
2nd Army 
The Soviet breakthrough attempt on the southern wing of 
Kampfgruppe von Vormann resulted in a deep penetration on the 1st 
Hungarian Cavalry Division's sector (see Figure 137). However, the 
Soviet attacks southeast of Baranowicze and on the north wing of 
the Kampfgruppe were mostly beaten back (see Figure 137). The 
encirclement of "Fortress Baranowicze" was prevented (see Figure 
137) ,503 
433 
JULY 8, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The Soviets closed the ring around "Fortress Wilna" which 
was defended by 8 battalions (see Figure 140).504 The 5th Guards 
Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps had broken through 
to the city fortifications and breached them and encircled Wilna 
from the north and south in cooperation with the Soviet 5th Army 
(see Figure 140).505 General Stahel reported to the Command Post 
of the 3rd Panzer Army for a briefing as the new Commandant of 
"Fortress Wilna." The road between Wilkomir and Wilna had been 
disrupted by the Soviets so General Stahel flew by Storch aircraft 
into Wilna (see Figure 140). The Panzer Grenadier Brigade von 
Werthern coming from Kauen reached the Army Command Post 
which had taken shelter in a rail station as a result of an air 
attack. Major General Heidkaempfer informed Lt. General Krebs of 
the situation at Wilna and wanted to know what forces would be 
used on the front when Wilna was encircled.506 Lt. General Krebs 
stated that the 131 st Infantry Division and other units would soon 
be arriving. The IX Corps was to be strengthened on the southern 
wing while the northern wing was left to Army Group North to 
reinforce. The 225th Infantry Division would soon be arriving on 
·the southern front of the IX Corps. 
The Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern was requested to 
be employed up to 20 km northwest of Wilna in order to free the 
west bank of the Wilja river to the north. The Brigade was, 
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however, to be based in Wilna. The 131 st Infantry Division coming 
from Grodno was to be employed upon arrival to free the area south 
of Wilna. The 5th Panzer Division was in the area 30 km southeast 
of Wilna to cover the city from the south. 
Soviet armor was reported entering Nowosiolki southeast of 
Wilna. Soviet armor was also reported blocking the main road 
Wilna-Wilkomir by tank fire (see Figure 140).507 A report by an 
officer was received at 1200 hrs that the Soviets were on the road 
to Sirvintos southeast of Mejszagola (see Figure 140). This 
prompted the transfer of the 3rd Panzer Army Command Post to 
Wilkomir.5os Later in the afternoon the Command Post moved to 
Gut Leonpol (4 km southwest of Wilkomir).509 Meanwhile, numerous 
attacks supported by armor were repulsed on the southern and 
eastern front of Wilna (see Figure 140). A heavy engagement for 
both sides of a railroad tunnel southwest of Wilna occurred. Soviet 
reconnaissance thrust through Mejszagola to the northwest pushing 
back weak German forces 7 km northwest of Mejszagola. The 
Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern coming out of Wilkomir 
received the order to establish a bridgehead on the south bank of 
the stream northwest of Mejszagola (see Figure 140). 
The Soviets pursued the withdrawal movement of the 212th 
and 252nd Infantry Divisions of the IX Corps to the Zeimena sector 
slowly (see Figure 141). The 391st Security Division established a 
defensive line on the right flank of the Corps. The pressure on both 
sides of Svencioneliai mounted and Maj. General Heidkaempfer 
requested Luftwaffe support (see Figure 141 ). The Soviet 43rd 
Army was responsible for the operations against the IX Corps. 
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The arrival of the Soviet 39th Army on the front before Wilna 
was confirmed so that another 6 divisions and two tank brigades 
would shortly enter the battle. The Commandant of Wilna sent two 
messages during the evening: 
Heavy combat in the evening, further terrain loss, 
northwest bank abandoned. Panic. The situation of the 
troops for tomorrow is very grave. Thrust from 
Ludwino from the east and heavy battles on the west 
wing and strong Soviet forces had been detected at 
Nowosiolko. A total of 18 tanks had been knocked 
out.510 
The second radio message followed: 
Condition of the troops is so serious that disintegration 
by midday tomorrow is probable. Ammunition shortage. 
If remnants are to be rescued, a breakout in the 
direction of the west must be authorized at 0200 
hrs.511 
4th Army 
Kampfgruppe General Weidling pulled its right wing back to 
NowoGrodek and Usielub (see Figure 142). Soviet attacks forced a 
further withdrawal to the west to Molczadz and the Nieman river. 
Strong Soviet cavalry forces breached the thin German security line 
and Soviet armor entered Lida (see Figure 142).512 The rail line to 
Wilna north of the city had been crossed by Soviet forces moving 
west (see Figure 142). 
436 
Kampfgruppe Mueller during the night of July 8, 1944 
attempted to breakout across the Ptich river in the region of 
Samokhvalovichi. The Soviet 121 st Rifle Corps of the 50th Army 
defeated Kampfgruppe Mueller decisively.513 Lt. General Mueller 
surrendered and made the following statement during interrogation 
by the Soviets: 
Our position had become intolerable. We found 
ourselves isolated. We had born enormous losses. 
Thousands of soldiers had been wounded. They were 
left without attention of any kind, since there was no 
possibility of helping them. Everyone was starving.514 
Lt. General Mueller accepted the Soviet terms of surrender 
and on July 8, 1944 issued the following order: 
To the soldiers of the 4th Army located east of the 
Ptich River! 
After a week of heavy fighting and marches our position 
has become hopeless ... Our fighting ability has fallen to 
the minimum, and there is no hope of supplies. The 
Russians, according to information from the High 
Command, are at the city of Baranovic hi. The last 
paths ... have been cut off to us. There is no hope of 
breaking out of here with our forces and equipment. our 
formations are scattered in disorder. A Colossal 
number of wounded have been abandoned without any 
aid. Having been given further information about the 
terms of capitulation proposed by the Soviet command 
group, Gen. Mueller gave the order to "cease fighting 
immediately. "515 




Kampfgruppe von Vormann. The main battle line was broken 
in several places by Soviet attacks. The Soviet 28th and 65th 
Armies reinforced their attack on Baranowicze with the 4th Guards 
Cavalry Corps and the 9th Tank Corps from the north. The 4th 
Guards Rifle Corps and the 1st Guards Tank Corps were employed in 
the south against Baranowicze. This added reinforcement allowed 
the Soviets to take Baranowicze (see Figure 142). The attack on 
both sides of Baranowicze from the north and south broke through 
permitting the city to be taken by a frontal assault in the early 
hours of July 8, 1944 (see Figure 142).516 The Soviets breached the 
front of the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division and reached the rail 
station Lesna and the road to Slonim northwest of the rail station. 
The Soviets occupied Nowa Mysz west of Baranowicze (see Figure 
142). The 28th Jaeger Division northwest of Baranowicze resisting 
the Soviet attack suffered the loss of 1 infantry and 1 artillery 
battalion which were cutoff from the rest of the division.511 The 
Soviets reached Dworzec and crossed the Molczadz river to the 
west. The 12th Panzer Division was withdrawing from the area 
southwest of Nowogrodek and advancing from the northwest on 
Dworzec. 
438 
July 9, 1944 
3rd Panzer Army 
The 3rd Panzer Army informed Army Group Center that the 
only way to stabilize the 3rd Panzer Army front was to expedite 
the closing of the hole between 3rd Panzer Army and the 16th 
Army.51s The Panzer Army required more than the 225th Infantry 
Division to close the hole north of Wilna. One infantry Division and 
one Panzer division were needed in addition to close the gap.519 
The Commandant of Wilna had proposed to breakout, but 
Hitler's orders to hold Wilna under all circumstances was received 
at 0230 hrs.520 Everything was being done in the way of attacks to 
relieve Wilna. Maj. General Heidkaempfer noted that Wilna was in 
danger of encirclement from the northwest and the southwest (see 
Figure 142). An attack by the Fuehrer Escort Battalion was not 
possible since it was already under attack. An attack toward Wilna 
would only be possible by units arriving from the west. 
Colonel General Reinhardt spoke to Field Marshal Model 
concerning the Fuehrer's decision. Reinhardt stressed, "that it was 
insanity to give troops the order to hold when they can not hold at 
all. "521 Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff of Army Group Center 
called Col. General Reinhardt after Reinhardt's conversation with 
Field Marshal Model and explained the Fuehrer's decision to him. 
The order to hold Wilna had been transmitted at 0200 hrs by Army 
Group Center directly to General Stahel in Wilna. The Luftwaffe 
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received the mission to support the battle at Wilna. Col. General 
Reinhardt responded: 
that the decision to hold the fortress would create a 
new hole which the army could not plug because the 
army has no more forces. It is too bad for the troops in 
Wilna. The command of the Army is placed in question 
through this order.522 
Army Group Center awaited a new decision of the Fuehrer 
which was expected during the afternoon. Col. General Reinhardt 
noted that this appeared "too late" for the case of Wilna.523 The 
Soviets during the night forced the garrison of Wilna back to the 
general line of the south edge of the rail station to directly east of 
the eastern entrance - cathedral square - south bank of the Wilja 
river. The main battle line in the western sector northwest of the 
rail station remained under German control (see Figure 143). 
Meanwhile, Panzer Grenadier Brigade von Werthern had since 
0545 hrs been attacking Mejszagola (see Figure 143). Soviet 
resistance was broken and reconnaissance was dispatched from 
Mejszagola to the south and east (see figure 143). 
Kampfgruppe T olsdorf reported at 0940 hrs that the Soviets 
had reached the western exit of Wilna and further strong elements 
were in Ludwinowo and east of it (see Figure 143). Lt. Colonel 
Tolsdorf reported that he could not attack because there were no 
available heavy weapons and artillery. Therefore, the following 
order was issued: 
The Kampfgruppe will take the defensive and defend the 
presently held Waka sector between Landwarow-Gorale 
to the junction with the Wilja river. Reconnaissance is 
to be conducted to the southeast up to the bend in the 
river. All arriving elements are upon arrival to be 
placed under the command of Lt. Colonel Tolsdorf. All 
bridges are to be blown up as possible so long as 
explosives are available.524 
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The Soviets during the course of the day closed the ring 
tighter around "Fortress Wilna." (see Figure 143). The German 
attack from the west toward Wilna failed due to the shortage of 
anti-tank weapons.525 Strong Soviet forces advanced south of 
Wilna to the west and reached the stream sector of Landwarow and 
occupied Gorale and the rail line to the southeast (see Figure 143). 
Maj. General Heidkaempfer reported that aerial reconnaissance had 
observed a Soviet column on the road from Wilna to the southwest 
containing 28 trucks, 2 tanks and a recon car. 
The Soviets attacked "Fortress Wilna" during the evening from 
the southeast and east with infantry and armor. The Soviets 
succeeded in breaking through several German positions and 
infiltrated the inner city (see Figure 143).526 Violent battles 
continued throughout the city leaving it in flames in several places 
as a direct result of artillery fire. 12 Soviet tanks had been 
destroyed. Air supply of Wilna was in operation, but General Stahel 
notified 3rd Panzer Army Headquarters at 2000 hrs that a spotlight 
could not be used to identify the place for the supply drops at night 
since the city was burning. Soviet fighter aircraft covered the 
entire battle area and the Soviet Flak defense southeast of the city 
was active. The Soviets had managed to settle into many parts of 
the city and interfere with German movement by 2320 hrs.527 
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German Flak Battalion 296 had proven successful in knocking out 
Soviet tanks during the fighting which had proved decisive for the 
entire garrison of the fortress.528 Three Soviet tanks entered the 
rail strongpoint of Stare Troki west of Wilna. The Soviets 
northwest of Wilna had reached the north bank of the Wilja river in 
the woods 4 km northeast of Nykonty. 
The relief effort for Wilna was being assembled in Kauen 
north of the rail line and elements of the 6th Panzer Division 
including a panther tank battalion had arrived by evening.529 The 
69th and 93th Infantry Divisions along with a parachute battalion 
would be assembled at Kauen shortly. This attack group forming in 
the area Kauen-Jonawa-Wilkomir was assigned the task of 
restoring contact with "Fortress Wilna" and the south wing of the 
IX Army Corps. The mobile forces of the group would be employed 
to delay the advance of the Soviets in the area around and north of 
Wilna. 
IX Army Corps. The commanding general of IX Corps informed 
Col. General Reinhardt that the troops holding the line on the 
outermost left flank had experienced a rupture of their front. The 
Soviets were advancing on Sela and were already further west and 
south of Tauragnai lake. Col. General Reinhardt gave the IX Corps 
Commander freedom to withdraw to the line Orinos lake-Lakajai 
lake-east of Labanoras-to the eastern tip of Alsetos lake. The IX 
Corps was to maintain contact with the 391 st Security Division on 
its right and on the left contact with Taurignai lake. Soviet 
spearheads were reported at 1030 hrs on the highway before Utena. 
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Army Group North was sending assault guns to clear the 
Duenaburg-Utena road. Soviet pressure on the German defense of 
the rail line on both sides of Svencioneliai increased (see Figure 
141 ). The 225th Infantry Division was now in action and the 
Soviets had been forced out of Garniai to Juknenai. The division 
was clearing the road to the southeast and in the direction of 
Utena. Army Group North reported that the 225th Infantry Division 
had retaken Tauragnai during the evening. However, a hole between 
the left wing of the 252nd Infantry Division 7 km southwest of 
Tauragnai and Tauragnai lake remained open. Colonel Praefke, Chief 
of Staff of IX Corps informed Lt. General Krebs, Chief of Staff Army 
Group Center that the attack to the east from the north bank of 
Tauragnai lake by the attack group of the II Army Corps of Army 
Group North would widen the gap between the 16th Army and 
elements of the 3rd Panzer Army since the Soviets were advancing 
west on the south side of Taupagnai. Combat engagements near 
Utena were occurring. The 225th Infantry Division was fighting 
northeast of Utena. Army Group North continued to be assigned the 
task of making contact with the 3rd Panzer Army's north wing.sJo 
This contact was to be made at a small lake near lndibakiai. 
4th Army 
Kampfgruppe Weidling on the right wing of the 4th Army was 
withdrawn to a new position southwest and west of Lida. The 4th 
Army front by the evening ran from south of Jasiunai 8 km east of 
Salcininkavi to Devyanishkes with a mobile defense north and east 
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of Voronovo. Key divisions of the 4th Army had been greatly 
reduced in strength by continuous action. The following divisional 
strengths of anti-tank guns and tanks were reported for July 9, 
1944: 
5th Panzer Division: 6 Panzerkampfwagen IV 
12 Panzerkampfwagen V 
Panthers 6 towed heavy anti-tank 
guns 
6 self-propelled anti-tank guns 
7th Panzer Division: 26 Panzerkampfwagen IV 
6 Sturmgeschuetz (assault guns) 
20 heavy anti-tank guns 
13 heavy (88 mm) anti-tank guns 
170th Infantry Division: 6 towed heavy anti-tank guns 
The 170th Infantry Division was no longer capable of 
defensive operation.531 The 50th Infantry Division with 6 
battalions had taken over the southern defensive sector of the 4th 
Army. The 4th Army had lost by July 10, 1944 130,000 out of an 
original strength of 165,000 men which meant that 78% of the old 
4th Army had been lost.532 
The remnants of the old 4th Army had been routed and only 
small isolated groups of desperate German soldiers attempting to 
reach German lines in the west remained and of these troops only 
80 officers and 838 soldiers returned to German lines.533 The 
Commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front assigned the 49th Army to 
liquidate the remnants of the encircled German forces. The 38th 
Rifle Corps was given the specific task to comb the terrain east of 
the Ptich river to mop up the isolated small pockets of German 
troops. 
The tragic fate of the German 4th Army was marked by a 
short message from the Fuehrer which was transmitted to the 
armies of Army Group Center by Field Marshal Model: 
The Fuehrer in conference with me today expressed his 
satisfaction with the conduct of the troops of the Army 
Group which have been involved in the heavy battles of 
the last few days. Reinforcements will be arriving. 




Kampfgruppe von Vormann. The troops were exhausted from 
the previous day's engagements and could not hold the defensive 
line east of Slonim any longer (see Figure 144). They were 
withdrawn under constant Soviet pressure to the west bank of the 
Szczara. The 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions withdrawal progressed 
as planned (see Figure 144). The 28th Jaeger Division was locked 
in heavy combat with the Soviets northeast of Slonim (see Figure 
144). Elements of the 4th Panzer Division attacked from Slonim to 
the northeast to provide some relief.535 The Soviets with weak 
forces had already forced a crossing over the Szczara 15 km north 
of Slonim (see Figure 144). German local reserves were rushed to 
counter this penetration. 
